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The case for cross-border merger control and the need for a supranational merger control system 
has been debated upon and several scholars have written extensively on the subject. What is 
immediately evident from literature is that it is not easy to regulate such mergers because of the 
challenges encountered. The challenges are pronounced in developing and emerging economies 
(DEEs) as arguably they have less experience in the enforcement of merger laws and lack 
adequate resources for such an exercise. Other challenges identified from publicly available 
information are the lack of extra territorial application of national competition laws to conduct 
taking place outside their borders, limited skills and expertise and poor cooperation and 
coordination arrangements among the jurisdictions involved. Further cross-border merger 
regulation presents challenges to merging parties too due to their exposure to different national 
competition laws. 
 
The dissertation focuses on whether supra-national competition authorities address the 
challenges of cross-border merger regulation in DEEs. However, there are a number of supra-
national competition authorities established by DEEs that generalising the study would be an 
unrealistic and impractical task to undertake. In view of this, the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA) was selected as a sample because it is the regional economic 
community that has recently established a fully operational supra-national competition authority 
to regulate inter alia, cross border mergers. Further, all COMESA Member States are DEEs 
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Operational Definitions on Terms 
1. Abuse of Dominance: Conduct by dominant firm(s) to the commercial detriment of 
competitors and/or consumers. 
2. Anti-competitive Practices: Conduct by undertakings which prevent, restrict or distort 
competition.    
3. Cartel: Group of firms operating in the same or related markets which eliminate 
competition among themselves to the detriment of consumers.  
4. BRICS: BRICS is an acronym of a group of fast emerging economies namely Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa. 
5. Community Dimension: Competition effects on two or more Member States in the 
European Union 
6. Competition: Process of rivalry among firms to win consumers’ patronage.  
7. Competition Law: A law that promotes or seeks to maintain competition by regulating 
anti-competitive conduct. 
8. Domestication: Process of transforming international legal instruments into municipal 
legal instruments. 
9. Economies of Scale: Stage in the development of a firm when its unit cost of production 
falls with increasing output. 
10. Extra Territorial Jurisdiction: legal ability of a government or government agency to 
exercise authority beyond its borders. 
11. Foreign Direct Investment: Investment made by foreign firms in a domestic economy 
of another country. 
12. Local Nexus: Likelihood of conduct affecting competition in the reviewing jurisdiction 
13. Market: Products that are substitutable and traded in space where conditions of 
competition are sufficiently homogenous.  
14. Market Power: Ability of a firm(s) to prevent effective competition by engaging in anti-
competitive conduct without regard to the reaction of competitors and consumers. 
15. Merger: Acquisition of direct or indirect control by one or more undertakings over the 
whole or part of the business of one or more other undertakings. 
16. Multi National Corporation: Corporations with a global dimension. 
17. Person: For purposes of this dissertation, person means a natural or legal person. 
18. Regional Dimension: Competition effects on two or more COMESA Member States 
19. Regressive Tax: A tax imposed in such a manner that the tax rate decreases as the 
amount subject to taxation increases.  
ix 
20. Supra National Competition Authority: Competition authorities that regulate
competition conduct affecting more than one country
21. Undertaking: Includes any person, public or private, involved in the production of, or
trade in, goods, or the provision of services.
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1.0   Introduction 
 
1. There has been an evident increase in the number of cross-border mergers in the past 
decades and research reveals that the regulation of these mergers presents challenges.1 
Globalisation and the consequent emergence of Multi-national Corporations (MNCs)2 
is largely responsible for the proliferation of cross-border mergers and the subsequent 
challenges of regulating them. Globalisation and the associated expansion of markets 
has generated an increase in international mergers as firms seek to strengthen their 
positions for a strategic advantage.3 The widening of markets has also increased the 
potential for the effects of transnational mergers to extend beyond the physical 
location of the firms involved thereby arousing the interests of multiple regulators.4  
 
2. As a world-wide phenomenon, the globalisation has generated markets that know no 
national boundaries, giving rise to a wide variety of cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions. Such cross-border transactions increase the competitive pressure on 
companies and the pressure on domestic competition regimes requiring them to deal 
with the threat to competitiveness of national markets that cannot be ignored. The 
increasing impact of globalisation on business activity has paralleled the spread of 
 
1 This view is supported by a number of authorities. See for example A Paper by Ivana Rakic, “Cross-border 
Mergers and Competition Law; An Overview of Comparative Practice”, under “Settings,” 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325106294_CROSS-
BORDER_MERGERS_AND_COMPETITION_LAW_AN_OVERVIEW_OF_COMPARATIVE_PRACTICE 
(accessed on 12 October 2018)  See also the European Central Bank Paper by Nicolas Coeurdacier, Roberto A. 
De Santis and Antonin Aviat, “Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions; Financial and Institutional Forces”, 
under “Settings,” 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1018.pdf?3d8589d6ef40959b47328b2f7cae4dcc (accessed on 
11 October 2018). Further see the Organisation for Economic and Development Round Table Policy 
Roundtables of 2011 on Cross-Border Merger Control, “Challenges for Developing and Emerging Economies”, 
under “Settings,” http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/mergers/50114086.pdf (accessed on 11 October 2018). 
See also Daiva Burksaitiene, “Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions: An Analysis of Activity”. A Paper 
Presented at the 6th International Scientific Conference, 13-14 May 2010, Vilnius, Lithuania, under “Settings”, 
http://dspace.vgtu.lt/bitstream/1/557/1/030-037_Burksaitiene.pdf (accessed on 22 October, 2019).  
2 These are companies with operations in several countries. MNCs’ conduct occasioned in one country may not 
be anti-competitive but the effects of such conduct may be anti-competitive in another part of the world. 
3 Julie Clarke, The International Regulation of Transnational Mergers: Dissertation submitted in Total 





competition law regimes; so, most countries in which multinational companies do 
business have competition law and a competition authority.5 
 
3. Before delving into the focus of the dissertation, it is important to contextualise the 
meaning of globalisation. There is no single accepted definition of globalisation. It 
may mean different things to different people and usually its definition depends on the 
discipline and subject of discussion. Therefore, as observed by Stephen Davies and 
Bruce Lyons, it is described as an elusive and contested concept.6 However, it is 
important to adopt definitions from some authorities for purposes of this dissertation. 
The beginning authority is the Financial Times which defines globalisation as “a 
process by which national and regional economies, societies and cultures have 
become integrated through the global network of trade, communication, immigration 
and transportation”.7 As a result of this integration and global networks, markets have 
transcended national boundaries. Consistent with the foregoing, globalisation has also 
been defined as “the expansion of markets beyond purely national boundaries”.8  
 
4. Julie Clarke has observed that “this process of expansion, facilitated by the growing 
reduction of public trading barriers has important implications for competition policy. 
Mergers are now more likely to have economic and social consequences that extend 
beyond national borders. This has implications not only for the way in which 
individual mergers should be assessed, but also for national merger policy. The 
globalisation of markets should therefore be an important consideration in 
determining an appropriate policy framework for transnational merger review”.9  
 
5. Lastly, for purposes of this dissertation, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe has defined globalisation “as the ever closer economic integration of all the 
countries of the world resulting from liberalisation and consequent increase in both 
volume and the variety of international trade in goods and services, the falling cost of 
 
5 Supra-note 3  
6 See Stephen Davies and Bruce Lyons, “Mergers and Merger Remedies in the EU; Assessing the Consequences 
for Competition” (2007) and William Blumenthal, “Reconciling the Debate over Merger Remedies; A 
Discussant’s Proposed Decision Rule”, (2001) 69 George Washington Law Review 978. 
7 http://lexicon.ft.com/term?term=globalisation (accessed on 10 June 2018) 
8 Hans Lofgren and Prakash Sarangi: Introduction; Dynamics and Dilemmas of Globalisation in Hans Lofgren 
and Prakash Sarangi (eds), The Politics and Culture of Globalisation: India and Australia (2009).  




transport, the growing intensity of the international penetration of capital, the 
immense growth in the global labour force, and the accelerated worldwide diffusion 
of technology, particularly communications”.10 What is evident in all the definitions 
above is that markets have expanded beyond national boundaries as a result of 
globalisation. Consequently, new tools of regulating markets have to be adopted as 
geographically constrained tools appear to have become obsolete. 
 
6. International trade is one evident consequence of globalisation. As international trade 
has increased, the number of competition law enforcement activities related to cross-
border mergers and cartels has risen substantially (up by about 250%–466% since the 
1990s).11 This trend has been catalysed by global value chains (GVCs).  
 
7. GVCs are closely related to the concept of globalisation. As observed by some 
scholars, they are a function of a multiplicity of producers located in several 
jurisdictions providing components for and/or assemble and manufacture end-use 
products. GVCs have developed rapidly since the 1990s, largely as a result of reduced 
transportation and communication costs and increasing mobility and concentration of 
financial resources that makes it easier and more efficient to shift production across 
borders. GVCs offer potential benefits to both producers and consumers. However, 
not all is flowery about GVCs. They carry a potential for harm that is often beyond 
the reach of current legal remedies.12 They can also shield producers who artificially 
raise prices from legal responsibility. It has been observed that producers anywhere in 
a GVC can reduce competition and raise prices for all subsequent purchasers. Such 
conduct may have effects in many jurisdictions. Moreover, the harmful effects from 
the conduct are likely to be found outside the jurisdiction in which they are located. 
Consequently, where producers can be confident that they are shielded from 
competition law enforcement, they are more likely to engage in such conduct.13 
 
 
10 https://www.coe.int/en/web/compass/globalisation (accessed on 12 October 2018) 
11 John Davies, Sean F. Ennis and Antonio Capobianco, “Implications of Globalisation for Competition Policy: 
The Need for International Cooperation in Merger and Cartel Enforcement”, under “Settings,” 
http://e15initiative.org/publications/implications-of-globalisation-for-competition-policy-the-need-for-
international-cooperation-in-merger-and-cartel-enforcement/ (accessed on 26 June 2018). 
12 David J. Gerber, “Competition Law and Global Supply Chains”, June 2016. under “Settings,” 





8. GVCs harm represents a transnational problem, but little has been done on the 
transnational level to respond to the harms. As a result, the tools available for dealing 
with them remain primarily national. However, national legal tools remain either 
limited in scope or applied in ways that render them largely ineffective.14 In view of 
the foregoing, it appears that national competition authorities (NCAs) cannot cope 
with these developments as they are unable to effectively address anti-competitive 
effects emanating therefrom. Several reasons account for this among them the lack of 
extra-territorial reach of national competition laws, the difficulties in obtaining 
evidence abroad and the admissibility of such evidence in national courts, present 
troubling challenges for the regulation of cross-border mergers. 
 
9. The application of a State’s anti-trust laws15 to conduct occasioned outside that State 
raises key issues, inter alia,16 
 
a) it must be determined whether the law of a particular country (or subdivision 
thereof) extends to conduct taking place outside its borders. 
 
b) it must be confirmed whether any domestic court or tribunal has jurisdiction to 
hear the matter. 
 
c) if the law does have extra-territorial reach and a domestic court or tribunal has 
jurisdiction to hear the case, practical problems of enforcement will arise, 
both with respect to obtaining of evidence and the implementation of any 
penalties. 
 
10. To address anti-competitive mergers that have cross-border effects, countries engage 
in a number of mechanisms inter alia memoranda of understanding, comity and 
enshrining provisions in their laws allowing for extra-territorial reach17. However, 
 
14 Supra-note 12 
15 The terms Anti-trust laws and competition laws have been used synonymously in this dissertation. 
16 Calvin S. Goldman, Q.C. and J.D. Bodrug, Competition Law of Canada”, Volume 2, Juris Publication, 2005, 
p. 13. 
17 For example, Article 4 of the Ethiopian Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Proclamation provides 
that it has jurisdiction on all conduct regardless of where they are consummated as long as they have effect in 




these mechanisms appear not to be effective as mostly they depend on the cooperation 
of one jurisdiction to implement the laws of another or assist in the investigation of an 
undertaking that has violated the laws of another country.18 The different rules of 
admissible evidence in the national courts may compound this problem. The view that 
such mechanisms depend on the will of countries involved to cooperate was implicitly 
recognised in 1895 when the US. Supreme Court remarked as follows in the Hilton v. 
Guyot case: 
 
“Comity”, in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on 
the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is 
the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, 
executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to 
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or 
of other persons who are under the protection of its laws”.19 
 
11. Indisputably, the US Supreme Court in the above case was not blind to the fact that a 
country can elect to ignore ‘comity’ without significant legal consequences because it 
is simply recognition and not absolute legal responsibility, albeit a serious matter in 
international intercourse. The foregoing is supported by the views of Bruno Zanettin 
when he explicated that “the use of positive comity is discretionary and left to the 
goodwill of anti-trust authorities”.20  
 
12. A cursory review of cross-border merger regulation shows that it is not only national 
competition authorities that face challenges. Firms engaged in cross-border mergers 
also face various challenges due to their exposure to more than one national 
competition law. Some of the challenges include the need to comply with different 
information requests in different jurisdictions, multiple filing fees, inconsistent 
 
Act of Zambia has similar language. However, this extra-territorial reach may be ineffective if it is not 
recognized by other countries where the law is desired to be applied. 
18 This is not to say such mechanisms do not always work. As stated in the text, they depend on the levels of 
cooperation between countries and the officials involved. Cooperation worked well between South Africa and 
Zambia in the case of excessive pricing in Zambia involving Chemical and Engineering (CES) Limited in 2006. 
This information was sourced by the author from the Competition and Consumer Protection of Zambia on 25 
August 2015. 
19 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895) 
20 Bruno Zanetti, Cooperation between Anti-trust Agencies at the International Level: Hart Publishing. Oxford 




decisions, insufficient nexus, different trigger events and different review periods 
among others. Multi-jurisdictional review of cross-border mergers therefore, arguably 
raise the cost of implementing mergers. Further, these costs may have an impact on 
consumers as companies engaged in mergers may simply pass the cost through higher 
prices of their goods and services. There is also arguably, a likelihood of 
procrastinating the merger specific benefits.   
 
13. Consequently, the case for supra-national merger control systems has gained 
prominence. Supra-national competition authorities are created pursuant to a Treaty or 
Trade Agreements in an economic grouping of countries. For example, the European 
Union (the EU), developed a system of competition laws in the 1957 Treaty of Rome 
to address cross-border competition cases.21  
 
14. DEEs have also adopted similar systems in an attempt to effectively handle cross-
border competition matters. Some of the objectives of establishing supra-national 
competition authorities are to strengthen the case for regional integration and to 
address the challenges posed by the regulation of cross-border competition cases, 
among them mergers. The organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) has observed that over the past decades, numerous countries have embarked 
on a path to regional integration, as it is widely recognised to bring several benefits, 
including the enhancement and acceleration of economic growth.22 The OECD has 
further observed that since regional integration is often combined with trade and 
investment liberalisation, competition law and policy becomes crucial, as benefits of 
trade and investment liberalisation should not be compromised by cross-border anti-
competitive practices and be appropriated by private undertakings by means of their 
unlawful conduct.23 
 
15. With the foregoing perspective in mind, while there has been a lot of research 
conducted on the operations of the EC (which regulates competition in developed 
 
21 Most countries in the European Union are Developed Countries 
22 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development; “Regional Competition Agreements: Benefits and 
Challenges”, 12 November, 2018. under “Settings,” https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/us-
submissions-oecd-2010-present-other-international-competition-





countries)24 regarding the solutions it provides in regulating cross-border mergers, 
little research has been conducted on whether supra-national competition authorities 
in DEEs addresses challenges of cross-border merger regulation. This is especially 
true for COMESA, the regional economic community (REC) that recently established 
a fully functioning supra-national competition authority at the time of writing this 
dissertation. Dabbah Maher has also observed that DEEs face enormous challenges 
when seeking to establish merger control regimes and effective competition law 
regimes more generally.25 During the past decade in particular, an abundance of 
academic literature, studies and reports by various international organisations have 
emerged in which challenges were identified and discussed at length in relation to 
establishing effective competition law regimes in DEEs. This notwithstanding, there 
has been insufficient attention given to the challenges in the area of cross-border 
merger control and how to resolve them. 
 
16. The research explored on this issue and determined whether supra-national 
competition authorities in DEEs are a solution to such challenges, with a specific 
focus on COMESA. Some challenges have been outlined in the preceding paragraphs. 
However, these issues have been explored in greater detail in Chapters ten, eleven and 
twelve of this dissertation. 
 
17. The problem addressed by the research as elaborated above may therefore be 
summarised as follows: 
 
a) National Competition Authorities encounter challenges when regulating 
Cross-border mergers. 
 
24 The EC has been specifically mentioned here because to the greater understanding of the author it was the 
only (apart from the COMESA Competition Commission) other fully functioning supra-national competition 
authority with a mandate on cross-border mergers at the time of writing this dissertation and for purposes of 
comparison with COMESA, it regulates competition in developed markets. The Eurasian Economic 
Commission is also a supra-national institution that regulates competition affecting more than two Member 
States but has no mandate on mergers. The United States of America Federal Trade Commission and the 
Department of Justice though based on the principal of being apex competition authorities to those in the States, 
they may not exactly be compared or equated to the EC because the States in the United States of America are 
not complete sovereign nations as is the case in the European Union. 
25 See Dabbah Maher, “Competition Law and Policy in Developing Countries: A critical assessment of the 





b) Undertakings involved in cross-border mergers also encounter competition 
regulatory challenges 
c) There are several challenges among them the lack of extra-territorial 
application of national competition laws and the exposure of firms engaged in 
cross-border mergers to more than one national competition law. 
d) The challenges are more pronounced in DEEs due to lack of resources, 
inadequate legal framework, and insufficient experience in enforcing merger 
laws among other things. 
e) To address these challenges, countries engage in a number of mechanisms like 
cooperation, comity and enshrining provisions in their laws providing for 
extra-territorial reach. 
f) Mechanisms in e) above do not however appear effective as they depend on 
the goodwill of one country to implement the laws of another country. 
g) The solution appears to lie in the creation of supra-national competition 
authorities 
h) The creation of supra-national competition authorities is especially feasible in 
RECs where countries are bound by Treaties, Trade Agreements and other 
common values and goals. 
i) In developed countries the EU has established the EC to address identified 
challenges and much research has been conducted on the solutions it offers in 
addressing these challenges. 
j) DEEs have also established supra-national competition authorities. However, 
not much research has been conducted on the solutions such supra-national 
competition authorities in DEEs provide in addressing challenges of cross-
border merger regulation. 
k) The research explored this inquiry and determined whether supra-national 
competition authorities in DEEs are a solution to addressing the identified 
challenges. 
l) COMESA was selected for this purpose because it is the REC that has recently 
established a fully functional supra-national competition authority among 






18. In addressing this wide inquiry, the following issues will, inter alia, be considered: 
the nature of cross-border mergers; the merger laws of COMESA Member States; the 
approaches to merger regulation in COMESA; rethinking the current cooperation 
paradigm in cross-border merger regulation; the extra-territorial application of merger 
laws in the COMESA Member States; the creation of a supra-national competition 
authority; and whether the supra-national competition authority is a panacea to the 
challenges of cross-border merger regulation; and questions of primacy between 
domestic law and regional law.26 
 
1.1 The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
 
19. It is necessary as background to the problem to be investigated, that the nature of 
COMESA be outlined. COMESA is a REC composed of 21 Member States namely; 
Republic of Burundi, Union of Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of 
Djibouti, Arab Republic of Egypt, State of Eritrea, Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia, Federal Republic of Somalia, Republic of Kenya, Libya, Republic of 
Madagascar, Republic of Malawi, Republic of Mauritius, Republic of Rwanda, 
Republic of Seychelles, Republic of Sudan, Kingdom of Swaziland,27 Republic of 
Tunisia, Republic of Uganda, Republic of Zambia and Republic of Zimbabwe.28  
 
20. COMESA is created under the Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (the Treaty). The main objective of the Treaty is market 
integration i.e. where the markets of all the Member States would culminate in one. 
This view is derived from the wording in the preamble of the Treaty which inter alia, 
provides that:  
 
“….. Resolved to strengthen and achieve convergence of their economies 
through the attainment of full market integration”. 
 
 
26 In this dissertation, the terms domestic, municipal, local and national law mean the same. 
27 It should be noted that the Kingdom of Swaziland is now called Eswatini. The Treaty should be amended at 
some point to reflect this change. 
28 The Federal Republic of Somalia and the Republic of Tunisia acceded to the Treaty on 19 July 2018. See the 
Final Communique of the Twentieth Summit of the Authority of Heads of State and Government. Tunisia 




21. To achieve this objective, there is need to implement certain measures inter alia, the 
elimination or significant reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers resulting in free 
movement of labour, goods and services across borders.29 Further, to ensure that firms 
operating in the Common Market do not erect barriers to trade through anti-
competitive conduct30, the Treaty has under Article 55 provides for matters of 
competition. It was realised by the Member States which had enacted competition 
laws that it was becoming increasingly difficult to deal with anti-competitive practices 
emanating from outside national borders.  
 
22. To deal with these challenges, it became palpable that a law with supra-national 
jurisdiction had to be promulgated. Pursuant to Article 55(3) of the Treaty, the 
COMESA Competition Regulations (the Regulations) were developed to regulate 
competition in the Common Market. The COMESA Member States realised that 
market integration could only be achieved in a dynamic competitive economic 
environment where new trade barriers are not erected in place of those that have been 
dismantled. Suffice to mention that it has become practice to implant competition 
provisions in regional trade agreements to ensure that public obstacles to trade which 
would be eliminated will not be replaced by private obstacles to trade. The latter are a 
consequence of anti-competitive practices by Member States’ firms aiming to 
foreclose markets to firms from other Member States. This would result in the 
benefits of trade and investment liberalisation accruing only to private firms to the 
detriment of the consumers and negate the market integration agenda. 
 
1.2 Tension Between Supra-National Law and Domestic Law 
 
23. To appreciate the objective of the dissertation, it is imperative to understand in broad 
terms at this stage the relationship between the Regulations31 and the national 
competition laws. From the outset, it is important to have an understanding of this 
matter as the application of regional or international law raises key issues at municipal 
level and some of these issues may affect the effective regulation of cross-border 
 
29 See also Article 45 of the Treaty establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. 
30 The barriers to trade created by anti-competitive behavior of firms may in certain instances result in 
significant harm to markets than the tariff and non-tariff barriers erected by governments. 




mergers. In the case of COMESA the tension may emanate either from 
conceptualising the Regulations as supra-national law or from the practical 
application of the Regulations and the Treaty or from both. Anecdotal evidence 
supports the conclusion that the tension mainly emanates from the practical 
application of the Regulations and the Treaty.  
 
24. From a conceptual point of view, it does appear that Member States agreed by their 
volition to establish COMESA through the Treaty and the COMESA Competition 
Commission (the Commission) through the Regulations. This can be attested from the 
wording of the Treaty in the preamble where Member States have agreed with the 
contents therein and none ratified the Treaty subject to reservations. It is true that 
some Member States have attempted to raise the importance of their national policies 
like public interest above the objectives of the Regulations, therefore challenging the 
conceptualising of the Regulations as supra-national law but this may on a balance of 
probability lie more on the practical application than the conceptualising of these 
laws. Some Member States have questioned the practical application of the 
Regulations and the Treaty in their jurisdictions as these are not treated as binding law 
therein.  
 
25. This tension is not far-fetched as recently the adjudicative bench of the Trade 
Competition and Consumer Protection Authority (the Bench) rendered a judgement 
on 27 June 2019 in which it expressly challenged the application of the Regulations 
and the Treaty in Ethiopia. The brief background to the matter is that in 2015, the 
Commission approved a merger involving the Coca-Cola Beverages Company 
(CCBA) and the Coca-Cola Authorised Bottlers collectively referred to as SABCO. 
Among the bottlers under SABCO were East Africa Bottling Share Company 
(EABSC); an entity operating in Ethiopia. Further, CCBA through its parent company 
held a controlling interest in Ambo Co., an entity operating in Ethiopia as well. 
Therefore by virtue of the Commission’s merger approval of 2015, EABSC and 
Ambo Co. became a single economic unit whose commercial interactions could not 
be faulted in competition law from the settled principle that an agreement between 






26. The Bench however, disregarded the jurisdiction of the Regulations and concluded 
that the parties had engaged in an unlawful merger in Ethiopia. The bench remarked 
thus:32 
 
“In this regard, the Bench was able to acknowledge that Ethiopia signed the 
COMESA Treaty in 1994 and that it was ratified by the House of the 
People’s Representatives and issued into law under proclamation no. 
90/1984 [E.C]. However, as the agreement deals with COMESA in general 
and it does not have a clear or specific provision that is relevant for 
reviewing and passing a decision on the issue of the merger at hand, it 
would be appropriate to look at other legislations that are relevant to the 
issue. Accordingly, the Bench has considered whether the Regulations are 
applicable to the matter. In this regard, in order for the Regulations to be 
applicable in Ethiopia, Article 9(4) of the Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia Constitution provides that it should be submitted to and ratified by 
the appropriate legislative body. However, as these Regulations have not 
been submitted to and ratified by the Ethiopian House of People’s 
Representatives, the Bench has found that it is not part of the country’s law 
and as such it is not applicable to the matter at hand”.  
 
27. The determination by the Bench is troublesome as it threatens the existence of cross-
border merger control by a supra-national institution in the Common Market. The sad 
part is that the Bench recognised the fact that the Treaty is part of law in Ethiopia but 
chose to interpret that the Regulations which are a creature of the Treaty and not 
recognised in Ethiopia. The foregoing is also consistent with some early unfounded 
avowals that insinuated that the application of the Regulations in the Common Market 
usurped the jurisdiction of national competition laws. However, the correct position at 
law is that the Regulations were not promulgated to usurp the jurisdiction of national 
competition laws. The two pieces of law apply to distinct types of conduct. The 
Regulations can only be invoked where there is cross-border impact, i.e. the merger 
 
32 Judgement of 27 June 2019 of the Adjudicative Bench of the Trade Competition and Consumer protection 




should be able to affect two or more Member States. National competition laws will 
generally apply where the merger does not have effects extending beyond the borders 
of a particular country.  
 
28. However, such assertions are not unusual and unique to COMESA. They are raised 
even in advanced jurisdictions like the European Union where the encroachment of 
sovereignty is at the surface of fierce policy debate. The BREXIT is a good example 
of this were the United Kingdom (the UK) voted to exit from the European Union on 
account that they wanted to take back control of their national issues like immigration, 
the supremacy of the UK law and Judiciary, among other matters. The tension 
between community law33 and domestic law is not new. For example the attempt to 
enforce the judgments of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
Tribunal, a supra-national institution, contributed to its demise.34 
 
29. Further, the world is witnessing a scenario where the assertion of national interest is 
enjoying considerable revival and the utility of supra-national institutions is being 
questioned. This has particular relevance for merger control where some countries 
wish to elevate national policies in the consideration of mergers for example public 
interest considerations. The latest amendments35 to the South African Competition 
Act are one example of this. The dissertation shall also determine whether the rise of 
national interests can be accommodated within the structure of supra-national merger 
control or whether it is a threat to the durability of these arrangements. 
 
1.3 Meaning of ‘Merger’ in Competition Law 
 
30. The competition law element of central focus in this dissertation is merger regulation. 
Therefore, it is imperative to have a good comprehension of what amounts to a 
 
33 While appreciating that international law and community law are sometimes defined and described 
differently, for purposes of this dissertation, the two are taken to mean the same. Further, in this dissertation 
community and regional law mean the same thing. This is for purposes of convenience as the focus of the 
dissertation is not on such distinction and this categorization is not fatal to the dissertation.  
34 R. Phooko, “The Direct Applicability of SADC Community Law in South Africa and Zimbabwe: A call for 
supra-nationality and the Uniform Application of SADC Community Law”. 
35 For a quick synopsis of the amendments, see the Competition Alert by Lara Granville of Cliffe Dekker 
Hofmeyr. under 
“Settings,”https://www.cliffedekkerhofmeyr.com/en/news/publications/2019/Competition/Competition-alert-




merger from the outset of the dissertation. A detailed account of transactions that 
amount to mergers and why undertakings engage in mergers have been discussed in 
chapters two and three of this dissertation.  
 
31. The term merger has several definitions depending on the discipline. For example, in 
company law, the term may have a definition different from its definition in 
competition law. Even in competition law, the term may have several definitions. 
Sometimes the definitions in different competition legislation may reflect the policy 
considerations of a particular jurisdiction. This notwithstanding, in competition law, it 
is generally accepted that a merger occurs when two or more undertakings that were 
independent pre-merger cease to be independent post-merger.  
32. At this stage of the research, we shall look at the definition of a merger in the 
Regulations. This is because it would be unrealistic to look at the definitions of the 
term ‘merger’ in the competition laws of all COMESA Member States in the 
introduction. Therefore, we may liberally assume that the definition in the 
Regulations reflects consensus among Member States. The Regulations under Article 
23(1) define a merger as: 
 
“For the purpose of this Article, merger means the direct or indirect 
acquisition or establishment of a controlling interest by one or more 
persons in the whole or part of the business of a competitor, supplier, 
customer or other person whether that controlling interest is achieved as 
a result of: 
 
a) the purchase or lease of the shares or assets of a competitor, 
supplier, customer or other person; 
b) the amalgamation or combination with a competitor, supplier, 
customer or other person; or 





33. The common feature of these transactions is that two (or more) undertakings36 that 
were autonomous pre-merger cease to be autonomous post-merger. This view is aptly 
supported by Jones and Sufrin who posited that “a number of different transactions 
and agreements concluded by undertakings could result in the unification of 
independent undertakings’ decision-making process”.37 
 
34. The question that follows then is why do undertakings merge? Undertakings merge 
for several reasons inter alia, because they want to reduce costs through efficiencies 
and synergies and because they are in financial anguish such that without the merger 
they would cease to exist.38 The above intentions for merging are viewed favourably 
by competition authorities the world over as in most cases they result in enhanced 
consumer welfare and are in the interest of the public. Other reasons that may 
motivate undertakings to engage in mergers include, globalisation, increasing 
competition in both domestic and international markets, increased dynamism of the 
economies, and the firms’ internal pressure from management.39 
 
35. The foregoing notwithstanding, undertakings may also merge because of ulterior 
motives. Some undertakings may want to eliminate effective competition from 
another undertaking. Post-merger, the merged entity may no longer be mindful of the 
reactions of its competitors and customers should it engage in anti-competitive 
behaviour. Such conduct is pernicious to the process of competition and erodes 
consumer welfare. This leads us to the reason why mergers are regulated.  
 
36. While it is generally accepted and empirical evidence reveals that most mergers are 
not harmful to competition, there is a small number of mergers that may result in a 
substantial prevention or lessening of competition (SPLC) and harm consumer 
welfare and the optimal operation of markets. Therefore, to avoid such outcomes, 
mergers need to be regulated. The OECD stated in 1999 that “some mergers would 
seriously harm competition by significantly increasing the probability of exercising 
 
36 For purposes of this dissertation, the term ‘undertaking’ is used interchangeably with the terms ‘company’, 
‘enterprise’ and ‘firm’. 
37 Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EC Competition Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 847.   
38 Such mergers are generally approved by competition authorities on the premise of ‘failing firm defence’.  





market power”. The COMESA Merger Assessment Guidelines40 (the Guidelines) 
have also recognized this supposition under paragraph 7.3 where they have stated that 
“in some circumstances, mergers can substantially weaken the incentives of 
undertakings to engage in competition. Such mergers may result in higher prices, 
lower output, reduced variety or reduced innovation and will therefore likely lead to 
an adverse effect on consumers”. These are mergers that competition authorities seek 
to identify and prohibit. 
 
1.4    Objectives of the Study 
1.4.1 General Objective 
 
37. The general objective of the research was to determine if the creation of supra-
national competition authorities addresses the challenges of cross-border merger 
regulation in DEEs with a focus on COMESA 
 
1.4.2 Specific Objectives 
 
38. The specific objectives of the research were: 
 
a) To review the merger laws of selected COMESA Member States; 
 
b) To review selected cross-border mergers in COMESA that were implemented 
before the establishment of the Commission; 
 
c) To review selected cross-border mergers in COMESA that have been 
implemented after the establishment of the Commission; 
 
d) To explore and understand the policy imperatives that go beyond the 
conventional consideration of mergers under the economic test of a substantial 
prevention or lessening of competition; 
 
e) To review the merger control provisions in the Treaty and the Regulations;  
 





f) To analyse the legal systems of selected COMESA Member States; and 
 
g) To review the legal status of the Treaty and the Regulations in COMESA 
Member States. 
 
1.5     Hypothesis 
 
39. In order to realise the objectives of the study, the following hypotheses were tested: 
 
HO: The creation of the COMESA Competition Commission has not resolved the 
challenges of cross-border merger regulation in the Common Market 
 
H1: The creation of the COMESA Competition Commission has resolved the 
challenges of cross-border mergers regulation in the Common Market 
 
40. The analysis of the hypotheses was informed by the consideration of the following 
questions: 
 
(a) Do the Regulations conform to international best practice? 
(b) Do the legal systems of the COMESA Member States allow the application of the 
Regulations in their territories? 
(c) Do the Regulations have exclusive jurisdiction on the review of cross-border 
mergers in the Common Market?  
(d) Is the jurisdictional test/nexus of the Regulations sufficient for Member States to 
cede jurisdiction to the Commission on certain mergers?  
(e) How should jurisdictional disputes between national and supra-national authorities 
be resolved? 
(f) Is the institutional framework of the Commission adequate/sound enough to 
effectively regulate cross-border mergers i.e. how is the institution built to secure 
legitimacy (independence, efficiency, impartiality, etc.)? 
(g) How about resources, both financial and human; are they adequate and do they 




(h) What does the experience of COMESA thus far teach us? 
 
1.6    Significance of the Research 
 
41. As observed earlier in the dissertation globalisation has increased, the number of anti-
competitive activities related to cross-border mergers. There is evidence that national 
competition authorities (NCAs) cannot cope with this development as they are unable 
to effectively address anti-competitive practices emanating therefrom. Credible 
research reveals that at the same time, the number of jurisdictions with competition 
law enforcement increased by more than 600% between 1990 and 2015, from fewer 
than 20 to about 125.41 In Africa, the number of jurisdictions with competition 
regimes has rapidly expanded from 13 in 2000 to more than 30 in 2017.42 The same is 
true for COMESA which had less than 5 national competition authorities before the 
year 2000 and in 2019, it had over 10 national competition authorities.43 The spread of 
competition law is a positive development, but cooperation has become more 
complicated as a result. Between 1990 and 2011, an index of complexity of 
cooperation on cross-border cases increased between 23 and 53 times.44  
 
42. John Davis, Antonio Capobianco and Sean F. Ennis have observed that as “cross-
border business activity increases in the future, and young competition authorities 
become more active, effective cooperation will become even more complicated. 
Ultimately, complexity of cooperation can lead to undesirable outcomes, such as 
inconsistent decisions and unchallenged illegal conduct”45. The problem of failure of 
cooperation is more serious in regional economic communities where countries have 
agreed to abolish borders in order for goods and services to move freely as this may 
also mean the free movement of anti-competitive practices. Further, in some instances 
cooperation without binding legal obligations may not always be effective. 
 
41 Kovacic W.E and Mariniello, M. (2016). ‘Competition Agency Design in Globalised Markets’. E15Initiative. 
Geneva: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development and World Economic Forum. under 
“Settings,”http://e15initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/E15-Competition-Kovacic-and-Mariniello-
FINAL.pdf (accessed on 17 May 2019) 
42 Daniel Schwarz. The Internationalization of Competition Law in Africa, August 2017. under “Settings,” 
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/the-internationalization-of-competition-law-in-africa/ 
(accessed on 17 May 2019)  
43 Author’s own research 






43. Cooperation has shown significant deficiencies in addressing anti-competitive 
conduct because it does not impose absolute legal obligation on the involved parties. 
This situation has posed challenges for national merger control laws especially that 
they lack extra-territorial application. Further, this situation has presented challenges 
to merging parties due to the need to comply with different national competition laws. 
To address these challenges, some RECs like COMESA have pursuant to binding 
legislation established supra-national competition authorities. However, the extent to 
which such institutions have resolve identified challenges of cross-border merger 
regulation especially in DEEs has not been widely explored. 
 
44. The study explored this inquiry and determined that the creation of a supra-national 
merger control regime has not fully resolved the challenges of cross-border merger 
regulation in COMESA. The study therefore proposed recommendations to address 
the challenges.  
      
 
1.7      Conclusion 
 
45. The preceding chapter has laid down the foundation of the dissertation. The 
successive chapters shall expound on most of the issues raised in Chapter One in 
order to achieve the objectives of the dissertation. Chapter Two discusses in greater 















2.0                                    What are Mergers, Acquisitions and Takeovers? 
 
2.1 Definition of Mergers, Acquisitions and Takeovers 
 
1. What are mergers, acquisitions and takeovers? If this question was posed to a student 
of company law, Business Administration and most likely economics the answer 
would be different if the same question was posed to a student and/or practitioner of 
competition law. This is because in the former disciplines, the terms have different 
definitions whereas in the latter the terms may mean the same thing. What is critical 
in competition law is the competitive effect on the market of any transaction called 
merger, acquisition or takeover. In competition law, the effects of these transactions 
on the market are likely to be the same. 
 
2. In market economies, where free competition is the principal rule for establishment 
and extinction of enterprises, a third natural process, the concentration of companies 
can be observed. In the widest meaning, concentration is the gaining of control over 
the other company, gaining influence on the decisions of the other company and the 
joining of companies. In a narrower sense, only the achievement of influence above a 
certain extent and the joining of companies can be considered as concentration. 
Corporate mergers and acquisitions are among the forms of concentrations.46 
 
2.1.1   Definition of Mergers, Takeovers and Acquisitions in Competition Law 
 
2 The regulation of cross-border mergers is undertaken within the overarching competition 
law framework. Therefore, it is important that the dissertation limits itself to the 
definition of mergers, takeovers and acquisitions in competition law. It is generally 
accepted that despite being diverse operations in company law, mergers, takeovers and 
acquisitions are essentially the same phenomenon from the perspective of economic 
 
46 The preceding paragraph is liberally borrowed from a 2006 PhD Paper by Csaba Balogh titled: Analysis of 
Factors Determining Success of Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions. under “Settings” http://phd.lib.uni-




theory as well as competition law that takes the former as its basis.47 These transactions 
result in a reduction of firms operating in the market because after their consummation, at 
least one or more firms, party to the transaction loses its autonomy to determine its 
commercial strategy and direction in the market place. 
 
3 The important word to note in the preceding paragraph is ‘autonomy’. Whenever such a 
transaction occurs, the loss of autonomy by one or more firms becomes the subject. 
Therefore, since all these transactions raise autonomy as a subject, for simplicity of 
exposition, all such transactions are generally referred to as mergers in competition law 
and accordingly in this dissertation. However, this is a very broad definition of the term 
merger and therefore it is important to narrow it down by looking at how this autonomy is 
curtailed. Looking at definitions in some notable competition statutes would be 
instructive. 
 
4 The European Union Merger Regulations (EUMR) is the starting point for this purpose.48 
Therein, ‘concentration’ is defined under Article 3(1) as below: 
 
1. “A concentration shall be deemed to arise where a change of control on a 
lasting basis results from: 
 
a) the merger of two or more previously independent undertakings or parts 
of undertakings; or 
b) the acquisition, by one or more persons already controlling at least one 
undertaking, or by one or more undertakings, whether by purchase of 
securities or assets, by contract or by any other means, of direct or 
indirect control of the whole or parts of one or more other undertakings”.  
 
8. Close to home, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa offer definitions from jurisdictions 
which have enjoyed longer periods of enforcing model competition laws in the region and 
 
47 PhD Paper by M. Fevzi Toksoy titled: Competition Law Aspects of Mergers and Acquisitions in the EU and 
Turkish Law. Does Turkey call for a Merger Reform? The Answer and a Policy Proposal. (2007) 
48 The EUMR have been chosen as the starting point because they are the longest established supra-national 
competition legislation that provides sound comparison for the Regulations which are the second true 




Africa in general.49 The Zambian Competition and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 
(CCPA) under section 24 provides that: 
 
1. “For purposes of this Part, a merger occurs where an enterprise directly 
or indirectly, acquires or establishes, direct or indirect, control over the 
whole or part of the business of another enterprise, or when two or more 
enterprises mutually agree to adopt arrangements for common ownership 
or control over the whole or part of their respective businesses.  
 
2. A merger contemplated in subsection (1) may be achieved in the following 
circumstances: 
 
a) where an enterprise purchases shares or leases assets in, or 
acquires an interest in, any shares or assets belonging to another 
enterprise; 
b)  where an enterprise amalgamates or combines with another 
enterprise; or 
c) where a joint venture occurs between two or more independent 
enterprises”.  
 
9. The definition of a merger in the Competition Act of Zimbabwe is to a greater extent 
similar to the definitions above. Section 2 of the Competition Act of Zimbabwe 
defines a merger as: 
 
“the direct or indirect acquisition or establishment of a controlling 
interest by one or more persons in the whole or part of the business of a 
competitor, supplier, customer or other person whether that controlling 
interest is achieved as a result of – 
 
(a) the purchase or lease of the shares or assets of a competitor, supplier, 
customer or other person; 
 
(b) the amalgamation or combination with a competitor, supplier, 
customer or other person; or 
 
 





(c) any means other than as specified in paragraph (a) or (b)” 
 
10. The 1998 Competition Act of South Africa defines a merger in section 12. It provides 
that: 
 
12(1)(a) “For purposes of this Act, a merger occurs when one or more firms 
directly or indirectly acquire or establish direct or indirect control over the 
whole or part of the business of another firm. 
 
  (b) A merger contemplated in paragraph (a) may be achieved in any manner, 
including through – 
  
(i) purchase or lease of the shares, an interest or assets of the other firm 
in   question; or  
(ii) amalgamation or other combination with the other firm in question”. 
 
11. An examination of the definition of the term merger would be incomplete if the 
dissertation does not take a close look at its definition in the Regulations as they are 
the focus of this dissertation. The term ‘merger’ is defined under Article 23 of the 
Regulations. Specifically, Article 23(1) of the Regulations provides that: 
 
“For the purpose of this Article, merger means the direct or indirect 
acquisition or establishment of a controlling interest by one or more 
persons in the whole or part of the business of a competitor, supplier, 
customer or other person whether that controlling interest is achieved as 
a result of: 
a) the purchase or lease of the shares or assets of a competitor, 
supplier, customer or other person; 
b) the amalgamation or combination with a competitor, supplier, 
customer or other person; or 
c) any means other than as specified in sub-paragraph (a) or (b)”.  
 
12. This definition is to a very large degree, constructed and worded similarly to 




that the definition of the term merger in the Zimbabwean Competition Law is worded 
exactly the same as in the Regulations. It is not far-fetched therefore to conclude that 
the Zimbabwean definition of the term merger was simply exported to the 
Regulations. This situation may appear encouraging as it already shows consensus 
and effort to achieve harmonisation of competition laws among the Member States. 
However, wholesome import of provisions may also be worrying because sometimes 
provisions are simply imported without addressing the challenges they have raised as 
regards enforcement in their jurisdictions. For example, the definitions of merger in 
the Regulations and the Zimbabwean Competition Act does not use the term ‘control’ 
a term that is commonly used by most competition laws but uses the terms 
‘controlling interest’. Are these terms intended to mean the same? The merger control 
provisions of the Regulations appear to be fraught with fundamental ambiguities as 
will be discussed later. These ambiguities may raise challenges in the application of 
the Regulations to cross-border mergers. Ambiguities contribute to inadequacy of 
legal frameworks. 
 
2.2  Definition of ‘Control’. 
 
13. A close review of definitions from the competition laws referred to above i.e. the 
EUMR, CCPA and South African competition laws reveal that the word ‘control’ is 
critical. It is clear that for a merger to be construed, control has to be established. 
Conversely, where control is not established, a merger cannot be construed. It is 
therefore important to understand this term to have a conclusive definition of the term 
‘merger’. 
 
14. The EUMR has provided the definition of control under Article 3(2) which provides 
that: 
 
“Control shall be constituted by rights, contracts or any other means which, 
either separately or in combination and having regard to the considerations of 
fact or law involved, confer the possibility of exercising decisive influence on an 





(a) ownership or the right to use all or part of the assets of an undertaking 
 
(b) rights or contracts which confer decisive influence on the composition, voting 
or decisions of the organs of an undertaking”. 
 
15. What should be borne in mind is that the control contemplated in Article 3(2) of the 
EUMR is that which leads to the acquiring undertaking having an influence on the 
target undertaking’s commercial strategy, detailed financial management and policy 
direction in the market place. It is those actions that affect the competitiveness of an 
undertaking in the market place. It follows therefore that those rights that simply refer 
to proprietary protection of investments especially in the short run may not define a 
merger as in most cases they do not confer the possibility of exercising decisive 
influence over the affairs of an undertaking. Control should be on a lasting basis. 
What is ‘lasting’ is not defined in most legislation but generally a period of more than 
5 years would be considered ‘lasting’.  
 
16. The definition of the term ‘control’ appears to be very wide and vague in the EUMR. 
Its definition in the Zambian legislation appears specific and definite. Section 24(3) of 
the CCPA provides that: 
 
“For purposes of subsection (1), a person controls an enterprise if that person— 
 
(a) beneficially owns more than one half of the issued share capital of the 
enterprise; 
 
(b) is entitled to vote a majority of the votes that may be cast at a general 
meeting of the enterprise, or has the ability to control the voting of a majority 
of those votes, either directly or through a controlled entity of that 
enterprise; 
 
(c) is able to appoint or to veto the appointment of a majority of the directors of 
the enterprise; 
 
(d) is a holding company and the enterprise is a subsidiary of that company; 
 
(e) in the case of an enterprise which is a trust, has the ability to control the 
majority of the votes of the trustees, to appoint the majority of the trustees or 





(f) has the ability to materially influence the policy of the enterprise in a manner 
comparable to a person who, in ordinary commercial practice, can exercise 
the elements of control referred to in paragraphs (a) to (e); or 
 
(g) has the ability to veto strategic decisions of the enterprise such as the 
appointment of directors, and other strategic decisions which may affect the 
operations of the enterprise”. 
 
  
17. Section 24(3) of the CCPA provides both a quantitative and qualitative definition of 
the term ‘control’.  For example in (f), there is no need to demonstrate the quantum of 
the parameter under consideration as long as material influence is clearly manifest. 
Further, there is a general misconception that only an acquisition of majority assets, 
shares or any other interest amounts to control. This view is not correct. An 
acquisition of minority interests may result in an acquisition of control. It follows 
therefore that under (c), (f) and (g) for example, the acquisition of a minority 
shareholding may be sufficient to amount to control. The dissertation will not labour 
to look up the definition of the term ‘control’ in the South African Competition 
legislation as it is significantly similar to that of its definition in the Zambian 
Competition legislation. Further, the Zimbabwean Competition legislation has not 
been reviewed in this respect because ‘control’ has not been defined therein but has 
been used to define ‘controlling interest’. Therefore, a detailed review of these 
legislation with regard to the term would either be repetitive in the case of the South 
African Competition legislation or indeed superfluous in the case of the Zimbabwean 
Competition legislation.  
 
18. Model competition legislation require that the term ‘control’ is precisely defined in 
order to determine whether a competition authority has jurisdiction to intervene in a 
transaction that presents characteristics of a merger. Sadly, the Regulations do not 
define the term ‘control’. Article 23(1) uses other related terms called ‘controlling 
interest’ which curiously are defined with reference to the term ‘control’. The terms 
‘controlling interest’ are defined in Article 23(2) as: 
 





a) any undertaking, means any interest which enables the holder thereof to 
exercise, directly or indirectly, any control whatsoever over the activities or 
assets of the undertaking; and 
 
b) any asset, means any interest which enables the holder thereof to exercise, 
directly or indirectly, any control whatsoever over the asset”. 
 
19. A closer look at Article 23(2) above informs us that the control contemplated is broad 
and ambiguous when it uses the terms ‘….control whatsoever…’ Control as applied in 
competition law should be precisely defined and qualified. What therefore is ‘control’ 
within the meaning of the Regulations? An inspection was conducted in the 
Guidelines. The Commission regards ‘control’ as being constituted by rights, 
contracts or any other means which, either separately or in combination and having 
regard to the considerations of fact or law involved, confer the possibility of 
exercising decisive influence on the undertaking or asset concerned. Whether or not a 
person has the possibility of exercising decisive influence on an undertaking or asset 
concerned should be assessed on a case by case basis. Regard should be had to the 
overall relationship between the person and undertaking or asset concerned in light of 
the commercial context, in particular in relation to the competitive conduct of the 
relevant business, including its strategic direction and its ability to define and achieve 
its commercial objectives.50 
 
20. The Guidelines provide that “when determining whether a person has the possibility 
of exercising decisive influence over an undertaking, the Commission will take into 
account, among other factors, whether the person directly or indirectly:51 
 
(a) has the ability to determine a majority of the votes that may be cast at a general 
meeting of the undertaking; 
 




50 Section 2.5 of the Guidelines 




(c) has the ability to determine the appointment of senior management, strategic 
commercial policy, the budget or the business plan of the undertaking; or 
 
(d) has a controlling interest in an intermediary undertaking that in turn has a 
controlling interest in the undertaking”. 
 
21. The definition of the term ‘control’ in the Guidelines is similar in specificity to the 
Zambian CCPA when it defines decisive influence with reference to elements (a) to 
(d) under section 2.6. What is clear is that the Guidelines have defined the term 
‘control’ in line with international best practice and this is not unusual in law.  
 
22. It is important to note that the definition of ‘control’ has arisen as a problem for the 
EC in a number of cases. There has been very little of such problems in COMESA for 
a number of reasons among them, the enforcement of the Regulations is in its nascent 
stages, the unambiguous definition of the term under the Guidelines and poor culture 
of litigation in the Common Market. Nevertheless, since the Guidelines, in many 
respects, borrow the definition of the word ‘control’ from the EUMR, it is important 
to review some cases where the term raised problems as lessons may be drawn for the 
Commission which is likely to encounter such challenges as it grows in its 
enforcement of the Regulations.  
 
2.2.1 Interpretation Difficulties of the term ‘Control’: A Comparative Excursus 
 
23. Despite the definition of the term ‘control’ in competition legislation, its 
interpretation has not been free from difficulties. Even the European Courts52 have 
faced similar challenges on some cases that have come before them. The assessment 
of control is clearly devoid of pure objective criterion. Subjective considerations are 
taken into account albeit on the basis of law and facts involved. It should be noted 
that control may either be sole or joint. Where one undertaking acquires more than 
one-half of the voting rights in another, sole control is assumed unless otherwise, for 
example where the minority right holders are given the power of veto over strategic 
decisions of commercial significance.  
 
52 European Courts have been mentioned here as they have dealt with several cases where the issue of control 
was in dispute. Further, the European Courts have rich experience on the determination of merger cases and 





24. In order to determine whether or not sole control has arisen in such circumstances, 
there should be an accurate assessment of matters of fact and law existing at the time. 
Therefore, in the case involving Air France and the Commission53 the Community 
Court stated that having regard to the factors which may, according to the wording of 
Article 3(3) of the EC Merger Regulation, constitute control, the EC was correct in 
finding that an undertaking, although exercising a substantial influence, only 
controlled another undertaking jointly with a third undertaking, since the holding of 
shares in the controlled undertaking and the conferment of powers laid down by its 
statutes were such that major decisions could only be taken with the consent of the 
third undertaking. The Court added that the appraisal by the EC of the compatibility 
of a concentration between undertakings with the common market must be carried out 
solely on the basis of the matters of fact and law existing at the time of notification of 
that transaction, and not on the basis of hypothetical factors, such as the acquisition of 
total control by the exercise of an option to purchase shares not yet held, the economic 
implications of which cannot be assessed at the time when the decision is adopted. 
 
25. Problems have also arisen with regard to sole control and minority right acquisition. 
Some minority right acquisition may confer sole control. The minority right 
acquisition may be so large compared to the other right holders that it may be able to 
exert significant influence in shareholder meetings for example. This is supported by 
the decision in the Electrabel/Compagnie Nationale du Rhone (CNR)54 merger where 
the Commission determined that Electrabel had acquired sole control over CNR 
despite being a minority shareholder, on the basis of a number of different 
considerations, including that it was assured of a de-facto majority at CNR’s General 
Meeting. This position was affirmed by the General Court and the Court of Justice on 
appeal. 
 
26. Similarly, in the Eridania/ISI case,55 Eridania increased its shareholding in ISI to 65% 
by purchasing 15% from another shareholder, a sugar beet growers’ co-operative, 
Finbieticola, which retained 35%. The EC decided that before the transaction had 
 
53 Case T-2/93 Air France v. Commission [1994] ECR II-323 
54 Case M 4994, decision of 10 June 2009. 




occurred Eridania exercised joint control with Finbieticola because the ISI Board of 
Directors, on which Eridania had no absolute majority, exercised a number of 
important rights, including the appointment of a managing director and the making of 
decisions on the sale of plants and on plant closures. After the transfer, the rights 
retained by Finbieticola considerably reduced and merely enabled it to veto major 
changes to the structure of the company, such as the issue of new capital or a transfer 
of its head office. It was held, therefore, that, as a result of the 15% transfer of shares, 
Eridania had now acquired sole control in place of the previous joint control with 
Finbieticola. The transaction therefore amounted to a merger.  
 
27. From the Eridania/ISI case, it is clear that a merger may be construed where the 
acquirer is an existing joint controller which acquires a further holding in the target 
company bringing it to a higher percentage, conferring sole control. Suffice to 
mention that joint control does not just exist where two undertakings have equal 
shareholding in the target. Joint control may exist where one undertaking has less than 
50% as long as the shareholding allows it to exercise decisive influence on the 
undertaking’s strategic policies on the market.56  
 
28. Another jurisdiction where divergent interpretation of the term ‘control’ has raised 
issues is Eswatini. In the case57 involving the Swaziland Competition Commission 
and Kirsch Holdings Limited (Kirsch), the former contended that the latter engaged in a 
merger without notifying it as required by the Competition Act No.8 of 2007 of Swaziland 
(the Act). The brief facts were that in 1972 Kirsch entered into an agreement with the 
Swaziland Industrial Development Corporation (SIDC) to form a 50/50 shareholding joint 
venture called Swaki (Pty) Ltd (Swaki). In 2006, the relationship between Kirsch and SIDC 
broke down irretrievably that led to the demise of their joint venture in Swaki. It is common 
cause that when the joint venture between Kirsch and SIDC was formed, the Articles 
provided for the Chairman of the Meeting to have a casting vote in an event that there was 
equality in voting. It is also common cause that this casting vote was never used in the more 
than 30 years that Kirsch and SIDC were in a joint venture. When the joint venture was 
 
56 Recall the Eridania/ISI, Air France v. Commission and the Electrabel/CNR cases discussed in the preceding 
sections. Further recall the discussion of control in the EUMR, the Zambian CCPA and the COMESA Merger 
Assessment Guidelines. 
57 At the time of writing the dissertation, the case was still before the Swaziland Competition Commission 
Board of Commissioners (the Board) for determination. The author was one of the experts advising the Board 




terminated, SIDC exited and Kirsch remained the sole shareholder. The Swaziland 
Competition Commission contended this transaction amounted to a merger in that there was a 
change on a lasting basis from joint to sole control. On the other hand, Kirsch disputed that it 
had always been in sole control in that it had the casting vote in an event that consensus in 
decision making was not secured. The Swaziland Competition Commission on the other hand 
argued that ‘control’ is construed from a de facto and de jure basis. From a de jure basis, it 
was indisputable that Kirsch had the casting vote which prima facie, gave it control. 
Nevertheless, from a de facto basis, Kirsch had never exercised this casting vote for over 30 
years because it does appear that the shareholders had strong common interests that exercising 
the casting vote would have resulted in the breakdown of the joint venture. As a matter of 
fact, it was the failure of the shareholders to come to a consensus in a different project in 




29. From this examination it is clear that the concept of change of control may sometimes 
prove difficult to determine. There may thus be situations that may prima facie appear 
to be mergers and yet they are not and the converse is equally true. For example, what 
would be the status of the acquisition of non-voting securities? Non-voting securities 
do not alone result in acquisition of control over an undertaking. Further, acquisition 
of voting rights does not always result in acquisition of control. For example, the 
Guidelines provides that “mere acquisition of a minority interest below 15 percent of 
the voting securities of an undertaking, held within a short period solely for the 
purpose of passive investment and without exercising influence over the affairs of the 
undertaking, is not capable of conferring the possibility of exercising decisive 
influence on an undertaking”.58 This is because in such transactions, the holders of the 
acquired interests would lack the ability to influence the budget, financial plan, and 
commercial strategy inter alia, over the undertaking. The time period in issue is also 
limited for someone to exercise decisive influence in the commercial context 
especially that the interest is merely for purposes of the proprietary protection of 
investment. However, caution has to be taken here to review each case on its own 
merit paying due regard to matters of law and/or fact involved. This may be a 
 




daunting task in DEEs where adequate legislation and experience to do so may not be 
available. 
 
30. In some cases, a minority interest in an undertaking may include certain rights, such 
as the ability to veto decisions which are essential to determining the strategic 
commercial behaviour of the undertaking. Any such rights must be considered as a 
whole to assess whether they amount to control. Such rights will typically not be 
considered to confer the possibility of exercising decisive influence unless they relate 
to decisions over the appointment of senior management, strategic commercial policy, 
the budget or the business plan. Whenever a minority interest in an undertaking is 
changed, the parties should consider whether the new minority interest amounts to a 
“control.” Where the new minority interest amounts to “control” a merger is 
construed.59 
 
2.2.2   Other Means of Control   
 
31. The Regulations under Article 23 allows for the construction of control by other 
means other than through purchase or lease of shares or assets or by amalgamation or 
combination with a competitor, supplier, customer or other person pursuant to Article 
23(1)(c) of the Regulations. Consistent with the foregoing, the Guidelines have also 
recognised that there are other means through which control is construed. According 
to the Guidelines this may happen for example through the exit of a shareholder or on 
a contractual basis. The critical requirement is that such means must confer the 
possibility of exercising decisive influence over another undertaking.  
 
2.3   Joint Ventures 
 
32. The competition legislation reviewed in the preceding sections save for the Zambian 
competition legislation and the EUMR have not expressly provided for joint ventures. 
What is true is that the assessment of joint ventures is key under most merger control 
regimes as some joint ventures may lead to similar effects on the market as those from 
the merger transactions defined above. Some joint ventures lead to a loss of 
 




independence between two or more undertakings and it is this loss of independence in 
terms of their commercial strategies that triggers the interest of competition 
authorities. The loss of this independent decision-making process may lead to a 
significant reduction or elimination of competition on the market. This 
notwithstanding, whether there is a significant reduction or elimination of competition 
on the market depends on the duration of the joint venture and the degree of 
autonomy it enjoys from its parent companies. 
 
33. In the case of the COMESA merger control regime, for a joint venture to constitute a 
“merger” within the meaning of Article 23(1) of the Regulations as explained under 
section 2.11 of the Guidelines, it must be a “full-function” joint venture. This means 
that it must perform, for a long duration functions of an autonomous economic entity, 
including:60 
 
• operating on the market and performing functions normally carried out by                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
undertakings operating on the same market; and 
• having a management dedicated to its day-to-day operations and access to 
sufficient resources including finance, staff and assets (tangible and 
intangible) in order to conduct for a long duration its business activities within 
the area provided for in the joint-venture agreement. 
 
34. A joint venture established for a purposefully finite period (e.g.: for a major 
construction project) will not be viewed as having a long duration.61 This position is 
true for most competition regimes including that of the EC from where the 
Commission draws its insight. A careful reading of Article 3(4) of the EUMR reveals 












2.3.1 Interpretation Difficulties of Joint Ventures that Amount to Mergers 
 
35. The determination of whether a transaction amounts to a full function joint venture is 
not free from trouble despite being adequately defined in most legislation. There are 
also situations where a joint venture that is likely to raise competition concerns may 
escape the application of merger laws simply because it is not full-function. In such 
instances, the parties may also escape the application of anti-trust laws such as Article 
16 of the Regulations and Article 101 of the TFEU that address agreements or 
cooperation between competitors. This is because a joint venture that is not full-
function may result in the construction of a single economic unit that may not be 
subject to anti-trust laws. This results in what is termed as the enforcement gap. This 
matter arose in the Austria/Asphalt Case.62 On 7 September 2017, the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment following the Austrian 
Supreme Court's (Oberster Gerichtshof) request for a preliminary ruling, seeking 
clarification on whether the change from sole to joint control over an existing entity is 
subject to the EU merger control regime only when the entity concerned is full-
function. The CJEU ruled that the full-functionality of the joint venture, whether 
newly created or not, is a pre-requisite for a transaction to fall under the EUMR. 
 
36. In other words, the acquisition of a controlling stake by a third party in an existing 
non-full-function undertaking is not caught by the EU merger control regime. In order 
to reach its conclusion, the CJEU analysed the wording, purpose and context of 
Article 3 of the EUMR. The CJEU found that the wording of Article 3 of the EUMR 
was imprecise on the referred question. Article 3(1)(b) EUMR states that a notifiable 
concentration arises where an undertaking acquires, on a lasting basis, "direct or 
indirect control of the whole or parts of one or more other undertakings". Under 
Article 3(4) EUMR, the creation of a JV amounts to a concentration if, on a "lasting 
basis", it performs "all the functions of an autonomous economic entity". The notified 
transaction concerns a lasting change in control, seemingly falling under Article 
3(1)(b). But it also relates to a JV, making it a notifiable concentration only if it is 
fully functional (Article 3(4) EUMR). The EC's legal service had argued before the 
CJEU that Article 3(4) EUMR can be interpreted as meaning that the concept of full-
 





functionality only applies to the creation of a new JV, but not to the conversion of an 
existing undertaking into a JV controlled by its parents. As such, the Commission’s 
legal service had argued that the present JV amounted to a notifiable concentration. 
 
37. The CJEU considered that a different interpretation of Article 3(4) EUMR could 
compromise the overall legislative context intended by the legislator. Only significant 
changes to the market structure are caught under the merger control rules. The 
conduct of undertakings which does not constitute a concentration, including non-full-
function JVs, falls under the general antitrust rules of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, as 
such conduct can lead to coordination between the parent undertakings. However, it is 
the view of this dissertation that herein lies the risk of the enforcement gap as Articles 
101 and 102 of the TFEU may lack jurisdiction due to the single economic unit 
doctrine in such circumstances. 
 
2.4 Importance of Defining the term ‘Merger’ 
 
38. The definition of a merger is important for a number of reasons. First, it enables a 
competition authority to focus only on those transactions that are likely to raise 
competition concerns on the market. This therefore enables a competition authority to 
save resources by avoiding the review of transactions that are not mergers within the 
meaning of competition laws but only exhibit characteristics of a merger. Secondly, it 
brings legal certainty and avoid costly and unnecessary litigation by both the parties 
and competition authorities.  
 
39. The third reason why it is important accurately define the term merger is that it lowers 
the regulatory burden on the merging parties. Over-regulation may have the effect of 
discouraging pro-competitive mergers and therefore deprive consumers and the 
general economy merger specific benefits like reduced prices and efficient allocation 
of scarce resources. This matter is therefore very important for DEEs where mergers 







2.5  Conclusion 
 
40. Chapter Two has discussed the definition of a merger in selected competition 
legislation and reviewed the definition in the Regulations. The chapter has reviewed 
that the definition of a merger in the Regulations is fraught with ambiguity but the 
Commission has attempted to address the ambiguity in the Guidelines, practice that is 
permissible at law as long as the Guidelines are not ultravires the Regulations. In this 
chapter, it has been clarified that it is important to have a definition of a transaction 
termed a ‘merger’ in order for competition authorities to claim jurisdiction. In the 
absence of such definitions, the competition authorities exercise a lot of discretion in 
determining which transactions amount to mergers. The danger of too much discretion 
in the administration of law is the increased probability of administrative mala fide, 
inconsistencies in its application and uncertainty on the parties. Chapter Two has also 
built the case that the substantive assessment of merger cases may not be easy as even 
the definition of the term merger presents challenges. This challenge appears to be 
more endemic the more a transaction is subjected to review in two or more 
jurisdictions. Further, competition authorities with less expertise and resources to 
engage in such an interpretation may end up leaving off the hook transactions that are 
mergers or over regulation by capturing transactions that are not mergers. 
 
41. Having defined transactions that amount to mergers within the ambit of anti-trust 
laws, the next chapter shall discuss the principle basis for mergers in order to 















3.0                                   Principal Basis for Mergers 
 
1. Mergers have become a popular and preferred mechanism of industrial organisation in 
recent times. This is largely due to globalization, liberalization, technological 
advancement and intense competition. Mergers are also a popular form of foreign 
direct investment as greenfield investments have arguably declined.   Corporate 
finance has witnessed increasing merger activity in recent times. Mergers have 
become an important avenue for financing the growth of firms rather than relying 
from traditional means of financing such as banks. Mergers are not the only way of 
financing the expansion of a firm. There are other methods like debt, equity, retained 
earnings and depreciation. However as observed by Thomas Karier, a firm must 
weigh the expected profits and risks associated with any investment relative to the 
dollar expenditure. The prospect with the greatest expected return per dollar, 
accounting for risk is most likely to attract the firm’s funds.63 The prospects with 
which the source of funding is readily available should also be a critical consideration. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that in recent times, obtaining financing from 
conventional sources have been elusive or at least difficult. Mergers have come to fill 
in this gap.  
 
2. Mergers affect business and government policy considerations. Mergers may either 
bring efficiencies and benefit the entire economy or to the contrary, they may harm 
markets. With regard to the former, mergers may play a fundamental role to the 
successful expansion of undertakings in their growth and development path. Entry 
into new markets by an undertaking may require such an undertaking to engage in a 
merger as de novo entry has its own challenges which are not discussed here as they 
are beyond the scope of the dissertation. 
 
 
63 Karier Thomas. Beyond Competition: The Economics of Mergers and Monopoly Power. M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 




3. Further, successful competition in international markets may depend on capabilities 
obtained in a timely and efficient manner through mergers.64 Michael C. Jensen65 has 
argued that mergers increase value, efficiency and move resources to their highest and 
best uses, thereby increasing shareholder value. However, other commentators are not 
so optimistic. For example, Magenheim and Muller have argued that undertakings 
acquired are already efficient and that their subsequent performance post-merger is 
not improved.66 Others are even more pessimistic on this matter. For example, 
Shleifer and Summer have contended that the gains to shareholders merely represent a 
redistribution away from labour and other stakeholders.67 
 
4. New market opportunities, increased competition, changing business models, 
privatisation, foreign direct investment, rapidly developing technologies, free trade 
initiatives, and trade liberalisation that are all associated with globalisation have 
resulted in organisations turning to mergers.68  The characteristics of globalisation 
have been described as “key drivers” in organisational restructuring.69 To achieve 
competitiveness in the new global order, firms are undertaking diverse strategic 
actions among them mergers. In turn, mergers are believed to have accelerated 
globalisation by way of FDI, which have inclined towards mergers rather than other 
types of investments.70 Furthermore, the increasing lack of trade barriers because of 
globalisation, as well as liberalisation and privatisation, have facilitated MNCs access 
to acquisitions in other countries which help them to secure new markets as well as to 
acquire human and technological resources from these countries.71  
 
64 Pradeep Kumar Gupta, Innovative Journal of Business and Management; Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A): 
The Strategic Concepts for the Nuptials of Corporate Sector, 2012. Under “Settings” 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/fd46/7529b9e1f22b39034e037613238dbe8c7c23.pdf (accessed on 17 October 
2019) 
65 Michael Jensen, Takeovers: Folklore and Science, Harvard Business Review, 62, November – December 
1984.    
66 Magenheim, Muller (1998) read as Hitt, M.A; (2001), “ Mergers and Acquisitions: A Guide to creating Value 
for Stakeholders”, Oxford University Press, New York. 
67 Weston, F.J., Johnson, B. (1999), “What it takes for a Deal to Win Stock Market Approval”, Mergers and 
Acquisitions, Philadelphia. 
68 Tasnim Bibi Kazi and Vartikka Indermun, The Impact of Globalisation, Mergers, Acquisitions, 
Reengineering and Downsizing, on Individuals and Organisations in South Africa: Interdisciplinary Journal of 
Contemporary Research in Busines,s Volume 5, Number 6, 2013. Under “Settings” https://journal-
archieves36.webs.com/681-698.pdf (accessed on 19 August 2018). 
69 Jones, M.T. (2002). Globalization and organizational restructuring: A strategic perspective. Thunderbird 
International Business Review, 44, 325-351.  
70 Kang, N. & Johansson, S. (2000). Cross-border mergers and acquisitions: Their role in industrial 
globalization. Working paper: OECD Science, Technology and Industry.   




5. In view of this, the correlation between the status of the global economy and the 
frequency of mergers as they have become popular due to globalisation is important. 
 
3.1    Correlation between the Status of the Global Economy and the Frequency of Mergers
  
6. The number of global mergers fell drastically in 2008 largely because of the global 
financial melt-down. The global economy took the path of recovery in 2009 and since 
then prospects for a better global economy are encouraging though growth remains 
sluggish.72 With this recovery from the global economic crisis, it has been observed 
that the number of mergers has been increasing. This perhaps is a signal by the 
corporate world that they have confidence in the resurging global economy as mergers 
are an integral component of corporate finance. It remains to be seen whether the 
resurgent increase in the number of global mergers and acquisitions shall continue 
under the Administration of President Donald Trump who has signalled a worrying 
protectionist disposition. Such policies raise scepticism and uncertainty to business 
who may halt their strategic decisions and adopt a wait and see approach. This view is 
supported by Christine Lagarde; the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Chief who 
warned at the 2018 Spring Meetings of the IMF and the World Bank Group that trade 
fuels growth and if trade is threatened markets lose confidence. The world can only 
speculate at this historical moment in time as the country which is perceived to be a 
champion of free market economies is seemingly in the reverse gear towards this path 
of protectionism. 
 
7. In the first three quarters of 2014, the value of global mergers and acquisitions hit 
$2.66 trillion, according to Thompson Reuters – a 60 percent increase on the same 
period in 2013. Many deals announced during this time were mega deals, pushing the 
number of transactions worth $5bn or more to a new high in September. Transactions 
such as Valeant Pharmaceuticals’ $55bn purchase of Botox-maker Allergan, 
Facebook’s $22bn acquisition of mobile messaging platform WhatsApp and 
 
72 It is important to note that at the time of writing this dissertation, the post 2008 global economic recovery is 
been threatened by the protectionist tendencies exhibited by some major economies including near trade wars 




Comcast’s proposed $70bn deal for Time Warner Cable, all helped to bring mergers 
back to the fore.73 Figure 1 below shows the trend of global mergers shortly before the 
global financial crisis in 2007 and after the financial crisis of 2008. 
Figure 1: Mergers & Acquisition Review74 
 
8. In 2015, the world continued to see phenomena increase in the number and value of 
mergers even beating the pre-financial crisis period of 2007. Globally, companies had 
spent $3.1 trillion dollars buying one another by Aug. 31, 2015. That’s already more 
than was spent on buyouts in five of the past six full years. The total amount of money 
companies spent on buying other companies in 2015 reached an all-time record.75 
 
9.  The prospects of increasing numbers of global mergers have increased post-global 
economic crunch. However, 2016 saw a slowing trend. Merger Market's 2016 Global 
Trend Report shows that dealmakers were forced to navigate a sea of change during 
2016, as the populist vote swept across the global political stage. Despite a series of 
political shockwaves, global M&A activity (17,369 deals, US$ 3.2tn) managed to 
reach its third highest deal value since 2007 (US$ 3.7 trillion), despite value dropping 
 
73 Financier World, Cross-border M & A Boom. December 2014. “Under Settings” 
https://www.financierworldwide.com/cross-border-ma-boom/#.XairbfZuLIU accessed on 17 October 2019 
74 http://blog.thomsonreuters.com/index.php/mergers-acquisition-review-full-year/ (accessed on 22 April 2018) 




18.1% compared to 2015.76 The record in 2017 was impressive with some financial 
analysts putting the total value of deals at about US$3.71 trillion. 
 
10. As regards the Common Market, it is clear that the number of mergers has been 
increasing in correlation with the increase of the COMESA economy over the years.77 
This inference is drawn from the trends on the African continent as a whole. Over the 
last decade, mergers in Africa have surged, at one point reaching a record high value 
of US$44 billion in 2010. As a matter of fact, it is recorded that in 2015, the value of 
mergers in Africa hit an all high record in the last decade of US$64.9 billion.78  
 
11. While companies in developed markets face slowing prospects, some countries on the 
African continent have experienced growth rates of 7 percent or more. Combined with 
an expanding middle class and increasing trade with Asia, investors see in Africa the 
potential for fast and sustainable growth.79 However, there have been troughs and 
peaks in the trends, a situation that is not unusual in business and economics. For 
example, the total deal volumes and values of Merger & Acquisition (M&A) 
transactions in Africa fell sharply in the first half of 2018, declining 44% in deal 
volume and 57% in aggregate value, compared to the first half of 2017, according to 
analysis by Baker McKenzie of Thomson Reuters M&A data for Africa. The report 
notes that there were 485 deals valued at US$ 19,420 million in the first half of 2017, 
this dropped to 270 deals valued at US$ 8,318 million in the first half of 2018.80 
Clearly, this situation is not only as a result of the performance of the global or 
African economies but also other factors like political instability in some African 
countries, tougher laws against bribery and corruption in the United States among 
other things.81 On a positive note, intra-regional cross-border deals rose twofold in 
terms of aggregate value from US$ 418 million in the first half of 2017 to US$ 1,292 
 
76 https://www.mergermarket.com/info/research/2016-global-ma-report-press-release (accessed on 21 October 
2017) 
77 See Appendix One on the progression of the COMESA economy over the years. 
78 https://qz.com/africa/1195920/growth-in-energy-technology-for-sub-saharan-ma-despite-overall-drop/ 
(accessed on 17 August 2018). 
79 https://www.nixonpeabody.com/en/ideas/articles/2012/08/02/current-trends-in-mergers-and-acquisitions-in-
africa (accessed on 18 June 2017 at 16:30) 
80 https://www.cnbcafrica.com/news/east-africa/2018/07/20/fewer-mergers-and-acquisitions-are-taking-place-in-





million in the first half of 2018.82 All in all, one may surmise that with reference to 
economic performance, merger activity has been responding positively in Africa. 
 
12. These statistics reveal that there is a correlation between the status of the global 
economy and the mergers consummated. This is to say that when the global economy 
is buoyant, the number of mergers and acquisitions consummated are on the increase 
and the converse is true. It also shows that when the economy is doing well, firms are 
spending through corporate restructuring and corporate financing. With this in mind, 
the dissertation can now explore the question, ‘what motivates firms to engage in 
mergers?’  
 
13. A plethora of authorities have enunciated that mergers are an important area of capital 
market activity in restructuring a corporation and have lately become one of the 
favoured routes for growth and consolidation.83 Firms’ motives to merge vary ranging 
from acquiring market share to restructuring the corporation to meet global 
competition. Sometimes firms merge because they want to eliminate effective 
competition in the market place that threatens their own survival.   
 
14. To reiterate the views made in the preceding paragraphs mergers have become a tool 
for permeating into new territories84. To borrow the words of Richard Whish, a 
notable feature of mergers in recent years has been their increasing complexity, size 
and geographical reach.85 
 
3.2  Economic Motivation for Mergers 
 
15. The chapter shall now provide a deeper insight into the specific economic motivation 
for mergers. Most of these have been described in general terms above. Nevertheless, 
 
82 Supra-note 80  
83 Professor R. Ramakrishnan, Head, Department of Management Studies, Muthyammal College of 
Engineering: Corporate Restructuring Related to M & A, Amalgamations, Takeovers etc. 2006. See 
also GLOBALISATION AND ITS IMPACT ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITION IN INDIA – A LEGAL 
STUDY. under “Settings” http://maheshchamarty.blogspot.com/2012/06/globalisation-and-its-impact-on-
mergers.html (accessed on 19 June 2016). 
84 For example the SABMiller/ AB Inbev Merger involved two largest producers of beer in the world. 
SABMiller was very active in Africa while AB Inbev had very little presence in Africa. The merger could be 
seen as one way through which AB Inbev was increasing its foot print on the African continent.  




without running the risk of repetition, it is important that they are discussed in detail 
in this section. 
 
3.2.1 Economies of Scale and Scope 
 
16. In simple terms, an undertaking attains economies of scale when it reaches a stage 
where its per unit cost of output are falling the more it produces. Specifically, 
economists have posited that economies of scale are the cost advantages that 
enterprises obtain due to size, output, or scale of operation, with cost per unit of 
output generally decreasing with increasing scale as fixed costs are spread out over 
more units of output. Economies of scale may also be a function of globalisation. 
With globalisation, there has been a drastic reduction in tariff and non-tariff barriers 
especially in regional trading blocks. This coupled with startling technological 
advancement has opened new horizons for undertakings to venture into unchartered 
geographical markets which may result in lower marginal costs at least in theory. 
Whether this is true in practice remains debatable. Economies of scale may be 
achieved internally or indeed externally through merging with other firms.  
 
17. It has also been argued that mergers lead to economies of scope.  Economies of scope 
is an economic theory stating that the average total cost of production decreases 
because of increasing the number of different goods produced. Specifically, 
economies of scope describe situations in which the long-run average and marginal 
cost of a company, organization or economy decreases, due to the production of 
complementary goods and services. The output of item A, therefore, reduces the cost 
of producing item B.86 Merging with another company is one way to achieve 
economies of scope. 
 
3.2.2 Enhancing Dominance 
 
18. The attainment of dominance may be the objective behind a merger. Every firm’s 
natural desire is to grow and attain dominance. Sometimes it may be difficult to do 
this internally and a merger becomes a viable mode. Horizontal mergers which 
 




involve the acquisition of firms producing competing products are usually the mode 
firms use to enhance dominance. Thomas Karier has observed that by reducing the 
number of substitutes, horizontal mergers tend to raise monopoly power87 which is 
sometimes used synonymously with dominance in competition law. However, firms 
may want to enhance dominance for bad reasons like using it to exploit consumers or 
eliminate effective competition. 
 
19. To sum up on this specific motivation for mergers, the CBI-electric Cable Group 
stated after its recent merger involving ZAMEFA and Reunert that:88 
 
“Competition in the global arena requires a concentration of resources that in 
concert will have more influence than will individual parts. In particular, it positions 
the organisation to take advantage of the rapidly developing electrical and 
telecommunications industries”. 
 
3.2.3  Exiting the Market 
 
20. In industrial organisation and ordinary commercial practice, exiting the market may 
not always be easy because of the costs that may be incurred from such an exercise. A 
merger may be a better way through which a firm may exit the market.89 This results 
in many benefits like saving a failing firm, saving jobs, maintaining taxes to the 
government among other benefits. Mergers may also be a way of facilitating the 






87 Karier Thomas, Beyond Competition: The Economics of Mergers and Monopoly Power. M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 
80 Business Park Drive, Armonk, New York 10504. 1993. Page 137. 
88 Airlink Inflight Magazine, December 2017 Copy, page 68. The Commission also considered this merger and 
granted approval on 22 November 2016 
89 An example in the Common Market is the takeover in February 2017 by SBM Africa Holdings Ltd of Fidelity 
Commercial Bank Limited merger. Fidelity Commercial Bank was a failing firm. Another example is the 
merger notification between Copperbelt Energy Corporation and Liquid Telecommunications Holdings Limited 
made to the Commission on 13 June 2018. In this particular transaction, it was expressly submitted that the 
motivation behind the transaction was for Copperbelt Energy Corporation to pull out of the joint venture they 




3.2.4  National Champions 
 
21. This does not appear to be a pure economic reason for engaging in mergers. Political 
motives may also be behind this. Governments may encourage firms to merge to 
achieve the critical mass required to compete effectively in international markets. A 
word of caution has to be entered here. Where governments encourage the creation of 
national champions, it is usually the case that they may also want to shield these 
undertakings from competition. In the long-run this may not be beneficial because of 
the inefficiency that may result leading to creating firms that may be uncompetitive at 
domestic and international level.90 Being competitive at domestic level is a precursor 
to being competitive at international level. 
 
3.2.5  Management Efficiency and the Market for Corporate Control91 
 
22. The motivation behind some mergers is that one undertaking competes to run another. 
The threat of a successful takeover bid acts as an important influence upon the exiting 
management of a firm to ensure that it functions as efficiently as possible. Where the 
shareholders are satisfied with the current management’s performance, they will not 
sell their shares to another bidder, unless it is overbidding. The new regime would not 
be capable of generating greater profits than the existing one. If the shareholders are 
dissatisfied, they may prefer to sell at the price offered and to reinvest the proceeds 
elsewhere.92 
 
23. The main objective of Merger transactions may be summarized as follows:93 
(a) Proper utilization of all available resources. 
(b)  Forming a strong human base. 
(c)  Reducing tax burden.  
(d) Improving profits. 
 
90 The national champion motive may threaten the durability of supra-national merger control as such are 
inimical to the single market imperative. 
91 Richard Whish, Competition Law. 5th ed. Oxford: Reed Elsevier (UK) Ltd, 2003. Page 780. 
92 The Preceding paragraph is liberally borrowed from Richard Whish, Competition Law. 5th ed. Oxford: Reed 
Elsevier (UK) Ltd, 2003. Page 780. 
93 GLOBALISATION AND ITS IMPACT ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITION IN INDIA – A LEGAL 
STUDY. under “Settings” http://maheshchamarty.blogspot.com/2012/06/globalisation-and-its-impact-on-




(e)  Eliminating or limiting competition. 
(f) Achieving savings in monitoring costs. 
 
3.3      Conclusion 
 
24. In conclusion, a number of reasons exist why firms engage in mergers. Nevertheless, 
the general motive for mergers is to reduce costs, achieve efficiencies and control 
markets. For example, in the case of the collapsed deal between Pfizer and Allergan, 
it was widely thought that the deal was designed to lower the corporate-tax burden by 
relocating its headquarters to Dublin.94 The dissertation has also revealed that firms 
may merge because they desire to eliminate competition on the market which 
threatens their survival. It is for this reason among others why competition authorities 
regulate mergers. It is therefore important for competition authorities to comprehend 
the motive behind a merger as this may give an indication of the effects of the merger 
on the market. It is gratifying to see that the merger notification forms in some 
jurisdictions in the Common Market have a section requesting the merging parties to 
provide the motive behind the merger.95 
 
25. At this stage the dissertation is ready to elucidate the rationale for merger control 
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4.0                                                Rationale for Merger Control 
 
1. The prime objective of merger control is the preservation of competition which 
ultimately benefits consumers. Mergers involve structural, as opposed to transient 
behavioural issues.96 They have the potential to fundamentally affect future 
development in a sector of the economy as they alter the very structure of an industry. 
Moreover, from a public interest perspective, mergers cannot be classified with 
negative anti-trust conduct such as cartels and abusive dominance given that mergers 
will often produce positive effects.97 In most jurisdictions, mergers involve 
prospective inquiries and unlike prohibited practices, a firm does not stand accused of 
prohibited activity. This is because for mergers especially in jurisdictions with 
suspensory and ex ante merger review process, the effects of the merger have not yet 
materialised on the market. As regards prohibited anti-competitive conduct, the 
negative effects of the conduct would have already caused injury to the market by the 
time the competition law is enforced. 
 
2. Mergers typically involve significant commercial and financial risks, and often have 
an impact on financial markets and stock exchanges. This enhances their value from a 
business perspective and necessitates a special regulatory approach within the 
overarching competition law framework because such impact on financial markets 
and stock exchanges may affect the overall economic outlook.98 It is imperative 
therefore to narrow down the rationale for merger control within the framework of a 
competition law.  
 
3. There are a number of policy considerations and objectives that are advanced to argue 
for government intervention in merger transactions. The main policy consideration is 
 
96 Dabbah, Maher and Lasok, Paul, Merger Control Worldwide. Cambridge, 2005. See also OECD Policy 
Roundtables, Cross-border Merger Control: Challenges for Developing and Emerging Economies “under 
“Settings” http://www.oecd.org/competition/mergers/50114086.pdf (accessed on 18 October, 2019) 
97 Ibid 
98 OECD Policy Roundtables, Cross-border Merger Control: Challenges for Developing and Emerging 





to ensure that markets remain competitive. In view of this, it is almost universally 
accepted that this is a desirable social and economic goal with the result that mergers 
leading to the creation of monopoly conditions are subject to exceptions condemned 
by all jurisdictions that have adopted merger regimes.99 Conversely, mergers having 
little or no impact on the market are generally permitted. Beyond the extremes, debate 
rages over the extent to which mergers should be the subject of regulation and degree 
to which factors such as efficiencies, socio-economic effects or the facilitation of 
international competitiveness should be considered when determining whether to 
allow a merger to proceed.100 Julie Clarke has observed that as a result, some regimes 
go further than others in preventing mergers which reduce competition but fall short 
of creating a monopoly.101 
 
4. It has also been observed that competition laws, in practice prohibit conduct only 
where it both harms competition and conflicts with the underlying public policy 
goals.102 While the second rarely forms part of core legislation, it is often relevant for 
authorities in determining whether to investigate a merger and for regulators and 
courts in determining whether or not a merger should be blocked. In many 
jurisdictions, while it is unanimously agreed that competition laws were enacted to 
encourage competition, fierce and frequent aggressive debate persists about the reason 
why competition was sought to be encouraged and protected and whether and why it 
should continue to receive protection.103 The fiercest debate has centred on whether 
regulation should be formulated to value economic efficiency over all other possible 
objectives or whether the policy outlook should directly consider broader social 
objectives such as wealth distribution or protection of small businesses.104 
 
5. Julie Clarke has observed that “determining existing and appropriate objectives is 
complicated by the fact that the publicly articulated goal of merger policy almost 
 
99 See for example, Michael A Utton, The Economics of Regulating Industry (1986), 93. ‘The Inefficiency that 
can result from monopolies have been thoroughly analysed and well known’. 
100 See Robert H. Bork, the Anti-trust Paradox (Basic Books, 1978). See also OECD, Substantive Criteria used 
for the Assessment of Mergers (2003), DAFFE/Comp (2003) 5. 
101 Supra-note 3 
102 Joseph Farrell and Michael L. Katz, The Economics of Welfare Standards in Anti-trust: UC Berkeley, 
Competition Policy Center, Institute of Business and Economic Research, 20 July 2006. 
103 Julie Clarke. International Merger Policy: Applying Domestic Law to International Markets. 
104 Kathryn McMahon, Developing Countries and International Competition Law and Policy: Research Paper 




always stems from a political bargaining process that is subject to change with each 
successive government. In some jurisdictions, the policy objectives have become so 
obscured over time that it is difficult to discern what policy is being employed in the 
formulation of merger laws. In addition, the politically articulated goals do not always 
coincide with the practical application of the policy by merger regulators and judicial 
bodies”.105 For example, in Zambia, the CCPC has been given a mandate by the 
government to create jobs and each quarter, they are supposed to report on how many 
jobs they have created or saved. This is absurd as competition authorities are not 
established with the raison d’etre of creating or saving jobs. To attempt to achieve 
this policy objective, the CCPC imposes a condition on all merger approvals 
regardless of whether the merger is pro-competitive that no job should be lost as result 
of the merger. With the foregoing background, the dissertation shall in the next 
sections of this chapter explore the scope within which merger regulation is 
undertaken and the specific identified rationale for doing so. 
 
4.1 Merger Assessment is Forward Looking unlike other Anti-trust Assessments 
 
6. It should be noted that merger assessment is concerned with the likely effects of the 
merger on the market and the competition landscape and not the instant situation. 
Unlike other aspects of anti-trust laws, merger control in most cases save for 
jurisdictions that have ex-post merger review is prospective. This means that the 
analysis of a merger considers its effects in the future as opposed to effects that have 
already occurred. Merger assessment is concerned with the probable structure of the 
market and its resultant effects post-merger, and not with the present anti-competitive 
conduct of the market actors. 
 
7. Most merger laws are designed to deal with the likely state of competition post-
merger. This position was observed by the US Supreme Court in the Brown Shoe 
case. The US Supreme Court remarked that the US Congress used the words ‘may be 
substantially to lessen competition’ to indicate that its concern was with probabilities, 
not certainties.106 The Court noted that Congress settled on ‘may be’ to mean 
‘reasonable probability’ of anti-competitive effects and not absolute certainty. The 
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task of merger review is to predict on a high balance of probability whether a merger 
transaction would require intervention to avoid a substantial lessening or prevention 
of competition. This is predicated on facts and the legal and economic reasoning 
thereof.    
 
8. It is however, important to stress that merger assessment is not overwhelmingly 
presumptive. Merger assessment uses tested tools to predict with sufficient though not 
absolute certainty the future competitive outcome of a merger. Therefore, in order to 
ensure that the forward- looking nature of merger assessment is not speculative, 
competition authorities rest their focus on facts. A review of merger assessment 
reports by most competition authorities not only in the Common Market but most 
DEEs discloses that the assessments are very speculative, lacking sound evidence and 
critical thinking to arrive at conclusions. As noted by some renowned experts on the 
subject, predicting competitive conditions after a merger requires an understanding of 
market dynamics developing in real-time that will likely bear on future 
competition.107 This may not be an easy undertaking for young competition 
authorities in most DEEs including the Common Market due to limited experience in 
implementing merger laws.  
 
4.2  Merger Control is not Conducted to Enhance Shareholder Value 
 
9. While mergers affect the interests of shareholders in terms of enhancing shareholder 
value, governments are not interested in regulating mergers for this reason. Merger 
control is implemented with the rationale of safeguarding the process of competition 
and protecting the interests of consumers. The question that may arise is whether 
merger control is an intrusion in the operation of markets in a free economy. It is 
commonly accepted that enterprises are better placed to make rational decisions about 
the operation of markets than government and its regulations. Undertakings may 
advance an argument that merger control is intrusive in markets where commercial 
players should be free to engage in selling and buying of shares, assets and other 
 
107 Deborah L. Feinstein, Director, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission, The Forward-Looking 
Nature of Merger Analysis Advanced Antitrust U.S.  – San Francisco 2014. under “Settings” 
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interests. Nevertheless, it is in the interest of government to intervene where the 
interest of consumers and the masses is threatened. Therefore, since mergers result in 
the alteration of market structure that may facilitate the elimination or significant 
reduction of competition and/or the exploitation of consumers, they should be 
regulated.   
 
4.3  The Rationale of Merger Control is to Maintain Competitive Markets  
 
10. The basic premise of merger control as already observed is to safeguard and maintain 
competitive markets. Elementary economics informs us that competitive markets are 
more desirable than monopolistic ones because they lead to innovation, distributive 
and allocative efficiencies and enhance consumer welfare. On the contrary, 
monopolistic markets and their resultant deadweight loss erode consumer welfare. 
Therefore, merger control is aimed at preventing the creation of market structures that 
may lead to a substantial prevention or lessening of competition particularly as a 
result of the attainment or strengthening of a position of dominance or indeed a 
monopoly situation. A careful digestion of the preceding sentence may suggest that 
there is a dichotomy between merger control and provisions of anti-trust laws such as 
Article 102 of the TFEU or Article 16 of the Regulations which do not presuppose 
that the attainment of a position of dominance is an infraction of these respective 
laws. What is in contemplation under the aforementioned laws is that the position of 
dominance should be abused for these undertakings to commit a legal sin that would 
result in them falling from grace in the eyes of anti-trust agencies.108 Richard Whish 
puts it very well when he states that merger control is not an anticipatory regulation of 
abuse of dominance. This notwithstanding, this debate is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation.  
 
11. Merger control provisions are an instrument for the maintenance of competitive 
markets. This is consistent with the judgement of the Court of First Instance (now the 
General Court) in Gencor v. Commission109 where the court enunciated that:   
 
108 It should be clarified however, that equally merger control, does not presuppose that the attainment of a 
position of dominance is a violation of the law. Nevertheless, competition authorities should be cautious and 
scrutinize comprehensively such mergers. 





‘…….. while the elimination of the risk of future abuses may be a legitimate 
concern of any competent competition authority, the main objective in exercising 
control over concentrations at Community level is to ensure that the restructuring 
of undertakings does not result in the creation of positions of economic power 
which may significantly impede effective competition in the Common Market. 
Community jurisdiction is therefore founded, first and foremost, on the need to 
avoid the establishment of market structures which may create or strengthen a 
dominant position, and on the need to control directly possible abuses of a 
dominant position’.   
 
12. As already observed, in a free market economy, firms are free to engage in 
commercial practices. However, such practices are not always devoid of drama. 
Sometimes they lead to abuse of market power by way of anti‐competitive 
agreements, abuse of dominance, mergers and acquisitions among firms which may 
result in distortion of the market. Mergers attract the attention of competition 
authorities because they generally have implications for the concentration of, and 
ability to use, market power, which, in turn can impact negatively upon competition 
and harm consumer welfare by foreclosing other players from entering the market.110  
 
13. The basic principle for exercising merger control is that if a merger is likely to give 
rise to market power, it is better to prevent this from happening than to control the 
exercise of market power after the merger has taken place. This is because the 
exercise and abuse of the market power may cause considerable damage to the market 
and harm consumers by the time redress is implemented by way of anti-trust 
regulation.111 Further, firms should not be allowed to evade the competition law by 
using the merger route to achieve an agreement between themselves which would 
 
110 Mrudal Dadhic, Regulation of Vertical Mergers under the European Union Law: Lessons to be Learnt by 
other Jurisdictions. Staff Paper No 3/15, November, 2015. 
111 Note also that the social and economic cost of de-merging the firms after the merger is usually very heavy 
and thus not an easy option for competition authorities. In this regard merger control provisions differ from 
other provisions of competition law, i.e., anti‐competitive agreements and the abuse of dominance, in that they 
involve an ex-ante as opposed to an ex-post review, basically on account of the fact that ‘undoing’ a merger that 
has taken place presents great difficulties and involves high costs. Note though that some merger legislation 
have ex-post merger control provisions. For detail see Vinod Dhall, ‘Introduction to Competition Law’, in 
Vinod Dhall (ed) Competition Law Today: Concepts, Issues and the Law in Practice (1st ed, Oxford University 




have been found to be anti‐competitive by a competition authority. It is for these 
reasons that competition law concerns itself with mergers and many of the 
jurisdictions having a competition regime have provisions on merger control. This is 
very true for the competition regime of COMESA. 
 
4.4  Merger Control Assists Undertakings in Making Sound Commercial Decisions 
 
14. Though not the justification for government intervention on mergers, merger control 
also assists undertakings in making sound decisions in the design of long-term 
business and commercial strategies. This point is important for DEEs. Merger control 
in such economies can have positive impact in terms of structuring different sectors of 
the economy and enhancing the prospects of stronger economic performance, in 
addition to protecting competition and consumers.112 With this in mind, it is 
immediately observed that well designed mergers may lead to economic growth, 
enhanced consumer welfare and the emergence of firms that are able to effectively 
compete on the global scale. Competition authorities are therefore an integral 
component in the design of mergers especially when they authorise mergers with 
behavioural and/or structural Undertakings. Such interventions lead to mergers that 
ensure efficient allocation of resources. Ultimately such efficiencies contribute to 
economic growth. Suffice to mention that in the case of COMESA and other regional 
economic blocks with supra-national competition authorities such as the EU, the role 
of merger control is beyond preventing less competitive outcomes and ensuring 
enhanced consumer welfare. The role of merger control to contribute to the realisation 
of the single market imperative. 
 
4.5  Non-Competition Reasons for Merger Control 
 
15. The reasons for merger control put across above are premised on the maintenance of 
competitive market structures. Sometimes merger control is undertaken by 
governments to serve other objectives beyond market structure concerns. Most of 
these reasons are premised on public interest and are briefly discussed below: 
 
112 ‘The analytical framework for merger control’ produced by the UK Office of Fair Trading for the 
International Competition Network Merger Working Group under “settings” 




4.5.1 Regulating Excess Wealth in Private Hands 
 
16. The rationale here is that private undertakings should not be left to have a lot of 
economic power as they may become too political and negate the equitable 
distribution of wealth. Critics especially those that subscribe to ordoliberal policies 
argue that mergers may result in the redistribution of wealth from labour and society 
in general to shareholders and other such private institutions. They view the State as 
an institution that offers an appropriate legal framework for the efficient functioning 
of markets. It emphasises that the State has a crucial role to play in fostering market 
competition, by preventing the rise of monopolies that can exert harmful economic 
and political power. At the same time, the State must also avoid distorting free 
markets.113  
 
4.5.2  Safeguarding Public Interest Concerns  
 
17. In order to achieve efficiencies, sometimes mergers may lead to job losses, a situation 
which attracts a lot of political debacle in DEEs and DCs alike. It is not a secret that 
the creation of jobs is one of the major tools politicians use to sell their agenda. It 
follows therefore that anything that negates this agenda is not viewed favourably. It is 
not surprising therefore that in some cases mergers are reviewed to ensure that they do 
not lead to job losses. In COMESA, most of the Member States’ National 
Competition Authorities have adopted a standard approach that mergers are approved 
on condition that no job is lost as a result of the merger. Kenya, Malawi and Zambia 
are very good examples where this is the case. Perhaps in Africa, a country with the 
most robust pursuit of public interest consideration (among others, jobs) in its 
assessment of mergers is South Africa. Public interest is so central in the assessment 
of mergers in South Africa to the extent that sometimes it appears irrational.  
 
18. Some cases have raised drama that they are subject to international debate when it 
comes to discussions regarding the extent to which public interest should be 
considered in merger cases. The infamous case as regards this matter in South Africa 
 
113 http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/what-is-ordoliberalism-in-economics/article19099601.ece (accessed 




is the Walmart Stores Inc and Massmart Holding Ltd114. The case is infamous in 
that it attracted vocal critics who argued that the public interest consideration in this 
merger was extended beyond levels reasonably required in merger analysis and that it 
created bad precedent where mergers could be rejected not because they are anti-
competitive but on unreasonable public interest grounds. Suffice to say that the 
determination also has proponents who argue that the public interest consideration 
was reasonable under the circumstances and it was in the context of South Africa’s 
history of apartheid where some groups were disadvantaged and therefore public 
interest consideration should be used to address that historical problem.  
 
19. The concept of public interest may be very elastic, i.e. it may be limitless. Without 
digressing from the focus of the dissertation, a few things are worth observing. This 
dissertation is not advocating for unfettered consideration of public interest as it may 
be a dubious justification for rejecting pro-competitive mergers or approving anti-
competitive mergers. It is the view of the dissertation that excessive public interest 
consideration may discourage mergers or they may result in inefficiencies that are 
detrimental and lead to more undesirable outcomes the authorities were intending to 
avoid in the first place. There is no comprehensive and conclusive research thus far 
especially in DEEs that has been conducted to determine the long-term impact of 
public interest considerations in merger cases. For example, one may argue that in 
order to achieve efficiencies, the merged entity may have to scale down on redundant 
labour in the short-run. This may allow it grow in the long-run and engage more 
labour than was the case pre-merger. This may sound theoretical but highly probable 
and a dedicated study should be undertaken on this specific subject.115 
 
 
4.6        Conclusion 
 
20. The preceding chapter has revealed that the most important reason for regulating 
mergers is to ensure competitive markets. Anti-competitive mergers would lead to an 
 
114 Case no: 73/LM/Nov10 
115 This dissertation is of the settled view that public interest consideration in merger assessment poses serious 
threat to the durability of the COMESA supra-national merger control system as Member States may dubiously 




inefficient allocation of resources and the ultimate poor economic performance of an 
industry, country or region as a whole. Merger control is therefore especially pertinent 
for DEEs whose markets are so concentrated and cannot afford to have misallocation 
of resources thereby stifling growth in already poor economies. 
 
21. The rationale for merger control may be summed up by borrowing from the settled 
holdings in the celebrated cases of United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 
983 F. Supp.121, 136 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) and United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. 
Supp.2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004). In these cases, the courts held that as applied to 
mergers, anti-trust laws seek to ensure that such transactions do not create, enhance, 
or facilitate the exercise of market power, thereby giving one or more firms the ability 
to raise prices above competitive levels for a significant period of time. This holding 
is also echoed under Article 26 of the Regulations which makes the Substantial 
Prevention and Lessening of Competition test the central focus of assessment.  
 
22. The next chapter shall discuss the different types of mergers to which merger control 
applies. It is important to understand the different types of mergers because merger 
control applies differently to them in terms of vigour, focus and time spent on 
investigating them which has implications on the efficient utilisation of the resources 
of competition authorities and also implications for the merging parties. Some of the 
challenges faced by the merging parties is as a result of failure by competition 
authorities to distinguish mergers that require significant scrutiny from those that do 
not. Further, the different types of mergers have different impact on the competitive 














5.0            Types of Mergers 
 
1. Several types of mergers may be identified. Some of these are conglomerate mergers, 
horizontal mergers, market extension mergers, vertical mergers and product extension 
mergers. The term chosen to describe the merger depends on the purpose of the 
business transaction and the competitive relationship between the merging parties. 
Generally, competition laws have categorised mergers into three types. These are 
horizontal, conglomerate and vertical mergers. It is important to note that some 
mergers may have two or all the aspects of the three types of mergers like the General 
Electric/Honeywell Merger.116 
 
5.1.   Horizontal, Vertical and Conglomerate Mergers 
 
2. In simple terms, horizontal mergers are those that involve actual or potential 
competitors whereas vertical mergers are not mergers among competitors in the same 
market but between firms situated at a different level along the production, 
distribution and supply chain.  
 
3. Conglomerate mergers encompass pure conglomerate transactions where the merging 
parties have no evident relationship (e.g., merger between a tomato grower and a car 
manufacturer), geographic extension mergers, where the buyer deals in the same 
product as the target firm but does so in a different geographic market (e.g., when a 
baker in Blantyre buys a bakery in Lilongwe), and product-extension mergers, where 
a firm that produces one product buys a firm that makes a different product that 
requires the application of similar manufacturing or marketing techniques (e.g., when 
a producer of household detergents buys a producer of liquid bleach).117 Given these 
definitions of mergers, it is not far-fetched to conclude that most of the mergers the 
Commission has considered are conglomerate mergers as mostly they involve 
companies dealing in the same product lines but different geographic markets. The 
 
116 Case No COMP/M.2220. General Electric/ Honeywell. Date: 03/07/2001 
117The preceding paragraph is liberally borrowed from 




Commission has generally categorised these as horizontal mergers but from the 
foregoing, it does appear to be an erroneous categorisation.  
 
4. In summary, conglomerate mergers may be divided into three main types: product 
line extensions (where one firm, by acquiring another, adds related items to its 
existing products); market extensions (where the merged firms previously sold the 
same products in different geographical markets (typical of the Commission’s 
mergers)); and pure conglomerates (where there is no functional link whatsoever 
between the merging firms.118   
 
5.2 Competition concerns 
 
 Horizontal Mergers 
 
5. The three types of mergers raise competition concerns with varying degrees of 
alarm/seriousness. Empirical evidence informs us that horizontal mergers pose serious 
concern to competition than other types of mergers. These types of mergers may raise 
unilateral119 or coordinated effects concerns120 whose assessment is not always free 
from difficulty. Horizontal mergers raise two basic competition problems. The first is 
the elimination of competition between the merging firms, which, depending on their 
size, could be significant. The second problem is that, by increasing concentration in 
the relevant market, the transaction might strengthen the ability of the market's 
remaining participants to coordinate their pricing and output decisions. In this context, 
the obvious fear is not that the entities will engage in covert and clandestine conduct 
but that the reduction in the number of market participants may facilitate tacit 
coordination of behaviour. Chapter Six has a detailed discussion on unilateral and 




118 Richard Whish, Competition Law. 5th ed. Oxford: Reed Elsevier (UK) Ltd, 2003. Page 780. 
119 Unilateral concerns arise when a firm is singularly able to dictate conditions like prices and output in the 
market without regard to the reaction of competitors, customers and consumers. 
120 Coordinated concerns arise when the market becomes very transparent due to a very small number of market 







6. Richard Whish argues that vertical mergers may have harmful effects on competition, 
in particular if it gives rise to a risk of the market becoming foreclosed to third parties; 
an example of this would be where a firm downstream in the market acquires an 
upstream undertaking that has monopoly power in relation to an important raw 
material or input: there is an obvious concern here that competitors in the downstream 
market will be unable to obtain supplies of the raw material or input, or that they will 
be able to do so on discriminatory terms, with the result that they will be unable to 
compete effectively.121 However, care has to be taken when considering foreclosure in 
vertical merger assessment. This is because as observed by Simon Bishop and Mike 
Walker, it is tempting to consider as foreclosure any commercial practice that reduces 
the options for rival firms or adversely affects the ability of an individual firm to 
compete. This view point would consider any commercial practice that makes 
commercial life harder for a competitor as representing foreclosure and would result 
in a hostile interventionist approach towards non-horizontal mergers.122 
 
7. One thing that is important to note is that vertical mergers are unlikely to raise as 
pressing competition concerns compared to horizontal mergers. In most cases, vertical 
mergers are pro-competitive. As observed by Steven C. Salop and Daniel P. Culley, 
vertical mergers may increase the efficiency of this process by improving 
communication and harmonising the incentives of the merging firms. These benefits 
may include cost reduction and improved product design that can lead to lower prices, 
higher-quality products, and increased investment and innovation. By reducing the 
cost of inputs used by the downstream division of the merged firm, a vertical merger 
also can create an incentive for price reductions. In markets vulnerable to 
coordination, a vertical merger might lead to creation or enhancement of maverick or 




121 Richard Whish, Competition Law. 5th ed. Oxford: Reed Elsevier (UK) Ltd, 2003. 
122 Simon Bishop and Mike Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application and 
Measurement. 3rd ed. Sweet & Maxwell (UK) Ltd, 2010. 
123 Steven C. Salop and Daniel P. Culley, Potential Competitive Effects of Vertical Mergers: A How–To–Guide 






8. Conglomerate mergers involve firms that operate in different markets. Ordinarily, 
conglomerate mergers have no direct effect on competition. There is no reduction in 
the number of firms in either the acquiring or acquired firm's market. It is also highly 
unlikely that it raises foreclosure concerns as parties operate in unrelated markets. The 
Court of First Instance124 (the CFI) has also considered conglomerate mergers not to 
raise significant competition concerns. For example, in the case of Tetra Laval v 
Commission,125 the CFI recognised that the effects of conglomerate mergers were 
generally neutral, or even beneficial, for competition. Conglomerate mergers can 
supply a market or "demand" for firms, thus giving entrepreneurs liquidity at an open 
market price and with a key inducement to form new enterprises. The threat of 
takeover might force existing managers to increase efficiency in competitive markets. 
Conglomerate mergers also provide opportunities for firms to reduce capital costs and 
overhead and to achieve efficiencies.126 The Commission has dealt with pure 
conglomerate mergers and none of them raised competition concerns. Whether 
conglomerate mergers should be regulated remains controversial as there is a 
presumption that these mergers do not raise serious doubts as regards compatibility 
with competition laws. US law long ago abandoned any interest in the conglomerate 
effects of mergers.127  
 
9. Conglomerate mergers, however, may lessen future competition by eliminating the 
possibility that the acquiring firm could have entered the acquired firm's market 
independently. A conglomerate merger also may convert a large firm into a dominant 
one with a decisive competitive advantage, or otherwise make it difficult for other 
companies to enter the market. This type of merger also may reduce the number of 
smaller firms and may increase the merged firm's political power, thereby impairing 
 
124 The Court of First Instance was a court under the European Community. It was a trial court of original 
jurisdiction. It is now called the General Court which is a constituent court of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union. 
125 Case T – 5/02 [2002] ECR II – 4381, [2002] 5 CMLR 1182 
126 The preceding paragraph is liberally borrowed from 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Acquisitions_and_mergers.aspx (accessed on 17 July 2016) 
127 See Scherer and Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (Houghton Milfflin, 3rd ed, 




the social and political goals of retaining independent decision-making centres, 
guaranteeing small business opportunities, and preserving democratic processes.128 
 
10. In the past, the EC has expressed anti-trust concerns as regards conglomerate mergers. 
The most celebrated merger in this regard is the General Electric/Honeywell 
International.129 The basis of the EC’s fundamental concerns with the merger were 
foreclosure effects through packaged offers. The EC’s supposition was that the 
merged entity would have the ability to offer customers favourable discounts from the 
bundling of General Electric’s engines and Honeywell’s avionics and non-avionics 
products. In its July 3, 2001 decision, the EC specifically stated that:130  
 
“the merged entity will be able to offer a package of products that has never been 
put together on the market prior to the merger and that cannot be challenged by 
any other competitor on its own.”  
 
11. The EC was concerned that the merged entity would engage in “mixed bundling, 
whereby complementary products are sold together at a price which, owing to the 
discounts that apply across the product range, is lower than the price charged when 
they are sold separately.131 The case is also seminal in that it represents divergent and 
conflicting decisions by two well respected competition authorities viz the European 
Commission and the United States of America Department of Justice.  
 
12. The dissertation shall address the issue of divergent and conflicting decisions at a later 
stage. Nevertheless, a few comments are worth making on the decision in the 
GE/Honeywell merger. It does appear that the EC erred in its conclusion especially by 
finding fault with the merger on the basis that it would give favourable discounts to 
consumers. The ultimate goal of merger assessment is to ensure that consumers are 
not harmed, their welfare is not adversely diminished and that the merger benefits 
them. The favourable discounts would have enhanced the welfare of consumers. 
 
128 The preceding paragraph is liberally borrowed from 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Acquisitions_and_mergers.aspx (accessed on 17 July 2016) 
129 See case No. COMP/M 2220. 
130 See Commission Decision, General Electric/Honeywell, Case No. COMP/M.2220 at 84 (July 3, 2001), 
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/ competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m2220_en.pdf 




Further, it does appear or at least may be interpreted that the decision had the effect of 
protecting competitors who could not afford similar discounts. It is recalled that the 
aim of competition laws is not to protect competitors but the process of competition. 
It is the view of this dissertation that the EC erred in that decision and negated the 
enhancement of efficiencies by protecting competitors who should have become more 
innovative and efficient to counter the competition from the merged entity 
(GE/Honeywell). 
 
13. As regards the practice at the Commission, it is not settled whether or not the 
Regulations have jurisdiction to review pure conglomerate mergers. The Commission 
staff including this dissertation are of the view that the Regulations have jurisdiction 
to review conglomerate mergers. Others like the former Chairman of the 
Commission’s Board132 argued that the Regulations lack jurisdiction to review 
conglomerate mergers. In order to debate this issue further, there is need to 
intellectually diagnose the relevant provision of the Regulations. Article 23(1) of the 
Regulations may shed light and offer guidance in this respect. The aforementioned 
Article provides that: 
 
“For the purpose of this Article, merger means the direct or indirect 
acquisition or establishment of a controlling interest by one or more 
persons in the whole or part of the business of a competitor, supplier, 
customer or other person…..”.  
 
14. The key words in this Article for purposes of this inquiry are ‘competitor, supplier, 
customer or other person’. This is because they determine the nature of competitive 
relationship between the merging parties. For example, it is clear that when the 
merger involves competitors, then that merger is a horizontal merger within the 
meaning and definitions already elucidated above. Similarly, a merger between a 
supplier or a customer falls within the definition of vertical mergers given above. As 
for conglomerate mergers, Article 23(1) does not appear to expressly capture them. 
However, it is arguable that it is captured within the wide, general, natural and 
ordinary interpretation of the words ‘other person’. This is because person include 
 




any legal and natural person as defined in Article 1 of the Regulations. It therefore 
means that a merger that involves parties that have no functional relationship would 
still be captured as they would involve persons within the legal or natural context. 
What matters is not whether they are a competitor, supplier or customer but whether 
they are a person within the meaning of the Regulations. 
 
15. The foregoing notwithstanding, other commentators like Alexander Kububa, the 
former Board Chairman of the Commission have posited that Article 23(1) of the 
Regulations only applies to horizontal and vertical mergers as the terms ‘other 
person’ should be construed within the meaning of the rule of interpretation ‘Ejusdem 
Generis’. These commentators argue that the terms ‘other person’ in Article 23(1) 
does not broaden the scope but limits the persons to competitors, suppliers and 
customers. This interpretation sounds incorrect. It does not appear that the rules of 
statutory interpretation would support this position.  If competitors, suppliers and 
customers have been specifically mentioned in Article 23(1), then what could have 
been in the mind of the originators of the Regulations to have the terms “other 
person” refer to competitor, supplier and customer? Such an interpretation would 
render the words “other persons” in Article 23(1) of the Regulations otiose.   
 
16. The position is therefore not settled. Some authorities like George Lipimile and 
indeed this dissertation are of the strong view that such an interpretation of Article 
23(1) of the Regulations is erroneous and a misdirection at law. It does not appear this 
was the intention of those who developed the Regulations.133 However, the 
Commission has not yet faced any litigation as regards this part of the law. It is 
therefore only the courts that can interpret the exact meaning of this provision to settle 
such debates. In the normal and ordinary course of legal certainty, the Commission 
should seek the advisory opinion of the COMESA Court of Justice (the “CCJ”).  
However, it is manifestly sad that the Treaty that establishes the CCJ under Article 7 
does not give institutions such as the Commission an avenue to seek advisory 
opinions on the interpretation of the Treaty or indeed the Regulations promulgated 
pursuant to the Treaty. Article 32 of the Treaty embarrassingly omits this very 
 
133 It is surprising though to note that both Mr. Kububa and Mr. Lipimile were key people in the promulgation of 




important requirement as it provides that avenue only to the Authority, Council and 
Member States. Specifically, Article 32 of the Treaty reads: 
 
“The Authority, the Council or a Member State may request the Court to give an 
advisory opinion regarding questions of law arising from the provisions of this 
Treaty affecting the Common Market, and the Member States shall in the case of 
every such request have the right to be represented and take part in the 
proceedings”.134 
 
17. Getting back to the different types of mergers it is important to note that some 
competition legislation in the Common Market and beyond have not defined the 
different types of mergers. What is important is the effect of the merger on the market 
and not the form in which it is consummated. This appears to have been the intention 
of the pioneers of the Regulations as could be reflected and inferred from various 
provisions of the Regulations like Articles 2, 3 and 26 of the Regulations. Any 
ambitious argument with regard to the jurisdiction of the Regulations on 
conglomerate mergers is immaterial and merely academic. The raison d’etre of the 
Regulations and consequently the Commission is the assessment of the effects of any 
competition transaction on the market. 
 
 
5.3        Conclusion 
 
18. Having understood the different types of mergers and the competition concerns they 
raise, it is important to discuss the substantive elements that are taken into account 
when assessing the competitive effects of mergers. Most of these elements are 
generally applied even to non-cross border mergers. In addition, the next paragraph 
shall discuss one or more elements (not paramount in national merger assessment) 
that are taken into account when assessing cross-border mergers. It is important to 
understand to a competent degree the application of these elements as some of the 
challenges of cross-border merger regulation may be related to the assessment of 
these elements. 
 
134 This Lacuna is serious and may affect the adequate regulation of cross-border mergers where there is no 






6.0                            Substantive Assessment of Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
6.1       What is Merger Assessment? 
 
1. The dissertation has thus far given us an insight on the motivation behind mergers and the 
rationale of merger control. The dissertation is informative when it reveals that while 
most mergers are not pernicious to the optimal operation of markets, there are some firms 
whose motive to merge is to distort competition in the market. Others may not explicitly 
have the motivation to distort competition but the effects of such transactions are 
distortive nevertheless.  It is such mergers that create the rationale to regulate mergers so 
that those that are deleterious to the process of competition in the market are prohibited or 
cleared with undertakings and/or conditions.135 
 
2. However, in order to systematically identify and establish those mergers that are harmful 
to the process of competition, it is important to conduct a structured and methodical 
assessment. As already observed in this dissertation, the review of the competitive effects 
of a merger may be speculative if this structured and methodical approach is not 
undertaken. It is this approach that prevents the authorisation of mergers that are anti-
competitive or conversely the rejection of mergers that are pro-competitive. It is 
important to note that the process of merger assessment is not linear. There are a number 
of elements that are taken into consideration in order to arrive at an accurate and sound 
determination and it should be stressed that such a process is in most circumstances 
devoid of mathematical precision. There are two generally accepted tests used in the 
substantive assessment of mergers. These are the substantial lessening of competition 
test and the dominance test. A third test called the public interest test may also be 
invoked. In some jurisdictions, the public interest test is applied expressly and enshrined 
in legislation. Other jurisdictions, especially those that consider themselves purists in 
 
135 In this dissertation, undertakings is used synonymously with the terms ‘company, enterprise and firm’. The 
term is also however used in a completely different context when it refers to the submissions the merging parties 
make to the competition authority in order to address the competition concerns raised by the competition 
authority. The converse to this is the term condition which refers to the terms the competition authority imposes 




terms of competition assessments, claim not to consider public interest136 in their merger 
assessment. Anecdotal evidence reveals otherwise, as public interest is considered albeit 
in an implicit manner. What may differ from jurisdictions that expressly consider public 
interest is the degree and importance attached to this test. 
 
3. The dissertation shall thus discuss in brief some of these elements in the following 
sections. It is not the intention of this research to delve into greater detail as regards the 
assessment of mergers, but it is important to have a holistic comprehension of merger 
control in order to appreciate the objectives of this dissertation. The assessment of 
mergers may not always be smooth and easy that it may present challenges especially to 
new and inexperienced competition authorities and this may be true for the Commission. 
 
6.2  Relevant Market Definition  
 
4. Relevant market definition is fundamental to the accurate disposition of any anti-trust 
case including mergers. It forms an important starting step, but it is not an end in itself. In 
other words, it is a necessary but not sufficient requirement in the determination of 
merger cases. A plethora of authorities have enunciated the importance of the relevant 
market definition. Among these authorities is the European Commission’s Notice on the 
Definition of the Relevant Market for the Purposes of Community Competition Law (the 
“Notice”). Paragraph 2 of the Notice explicates why market definition is important: 
 
‘Market definition is a tool to identify and define the boundaries of competition 
between firms. It serves to establish the framework within which competition policy is 
applied by the Commission. The main purpose of market definition is to identify in a 
systematic way the competitive constraints that the undertakings involved face. The 
objective of defining a market in both its product and geographic dimension is to 
identify those actual competitors of the undertakings involved that are capable of 
constraining those undertakings’ behaviour and of preventing them from behaving 
independently of effective competitive pressure’. 
 
 
136 In its later chapters, the dissertation shall analyse the challenges the consideration of public interest has raised 




5. This  rationale for defining the relevant market is instructive. It informs us that the inquiry 
about the  market within which a competition authority applies its competition law and 
policy should not be infinity. The market should have boundaries so that only those firms 
that have an effect on the competitive behaviour of the firm(s) in question should be 
considered. Failure to do so may result in an inaccurate definition of the market. An 
erroneous definition of the relevant market may be fatal to the ultimate disposition of a 
merger case in that it may result in a rejection of a pro-competitive merger where a very 
narrow market has been erroneously defined. This is because the merging parties may end 
up showing higher market shares with a possibility of substantial lessening of competition 
when in fact not. An erroneous widely defined market may also result in clearing an anti-
competitive merger because the merging parties may appear to have lower market shares 
thereby giving an illusion of less likelihood of a substantial lessening of competition.  
 
6. It is worth noting that this Notice captures the EC’s experience on market definition over 
many years of competition law enforcement. The Notice is also without prejudice to 
extensive and rich jurisprudence on the subject. However, the Notice appears to have its 
own shortcomings and among the fundamental shortcomings is its focus on actual 
competitors only. It is settled in practice that potential competition is likely to exert 
effective competitive restraint to the behaviour of incumbent firms especially where the 
barriers to entry are not insurmountable. 
 
7. The Notice advises that in order to arrive at an accurate relevant market, it is important to 
define both the relevant product and geographic markets. These are the two constituent 
elements of the relevant market.  
 
6.2.1  Relevant Product Market 
 
8. In determining whether a merger is likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition, it 
is important to define the relevant product market. In the Continental Can v. the 
Commission, it was the EC’s failure to define the relevant product market that caused the 
ECJ to quash its decision.137  The relevant product market includes all those products that 
 
137 Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc. v Commission of the European 
Communities was the first appeal case heard by the ECJ on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty of Rome 




are in actual or potential competition with the product under consideration. This is 
important because if the product under consideration has several and effective actual and 
potential competing products, then competition concerns are less likely to arise from a 
merger. The converse is very true. From the foregoing, it does appear that the central 
point of consideration is substitution. Those products which consumers can substitute 
with the product under consideration form part of the same product market. Several 
authorities have provided guidance on relevant product market definition. The authority 
to begin with for purposes of this inquiry is the Notice. This document is particularly 
chosen because the EC has established and long-standing experience in the enforcement 
of competition law. The Notice has defined the relevant product market as:    
 
‘A relevant product market comprises all those products and/or services which are 
regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the 
products' characteristics, their prices and their intended use’. 
 
9. The Notice is instructive when it uses the terms interchangeable or substitutable. All 
substitutable products in the perception of a consumer therefore form part of the same 
product market. Substitutes, actual and/or potential are in competition with the product in 
issue. The definition of the relevant product market is therefore essentially a matter of 
interchangeability. Where the goods or services can be regarded as interchangeable, they 
are within the same product market. This supposition is supported by the holding in the 
landmark judgment of the United Brands v Commission case where the applicant was 
arguing that bananas were in the same market as other fruits. The ECJ remarked that this 
issue depended on whether the banana could be: 
 
‘singled out by such special features distinguishing it from other fruits that it is 
only to a limited extent interchangeable with them and is only exposed to their 
competition in a way that is hardly perceptible’.138 
  
10. Similarly, in the Continental Can case, the ECJ enjoined the Commission, for purposes of 
delimiting the market to investigate those characteristics of the products in question by 
virtue of which they are particularly apt to satisfy an inelastic need and are only to a 
 




limited extent interchangeable with other products. The issue of 
interchangeability/substitutability is not an exact science and has value and subjective 
judgments in the minds of different consumers. However, economists have devised tools 
to determine substitutability.139 Among these tools is the hypothetical monopolist test also 
called the Small but Significant Non-Transitory Increase in Price (SSNIP).140 It makes an 
assumption that the product in issue is a monopoly product. It provides that if the price of 
X were to increase by 5% -10%, would consumers switch to buying Y. If the answer is 
yes, then Y is in the same relevant product market with X. If not, then the X is a distinct 
relevant product market. The process is repeated with so many other products until all the 
potential candidates are eliminated. A comprehensive discussion to review the SSNIP 
falls outside the scope of this dissertation. However, it should be noted that the world we 
live in especially in DEEs is not ideal so data is not always available to accurately 
compute the SNNIP.  
 
6.2.2  Relevant Geographic Market 
 
11. The definition of the relevant geographic market may equally have a decisive impact on 
the determination of a merger case. Geographic dimension involves identification of the 
geographical area within which potential and actual competition takes place. Relevant 
geographic markets could be local, national, regional or even world-wide, depending on 
the facts of each case. Some factors pertinent to geographic market definition are 
consumption and shipment patterns, transportation costs and perishability. For example, 
in view of the high transportation costs in cement, the relevant geographical market may 
be the region close to the manufacturing facility. It is however important to note that with 
the advance in technology, some of the traditional considerations in defining the relevant 
geographic markets are being defied as markets are becoming seamless in space. This 
situation may present challenges for young competition authorities without sufficient 
experience to consider such factors. The Commission is not immune to this.  
 
 
139 Substitutability and interchangeability are used synonymously in this dissertation for purposes of market 
definition. 
140 Note that the SSNIP test makes an assumption that the prices of all the other products remain constant except 
the hypothetical monopolist’s product. This may not always be realistic to achieve in the actual world and 




12. The principle of geographic market is similar to that of product market. The geographic 
market is defined by purchasers’ views of the substitutability or interchangeability of 
products made or sold at various locations. In particular, if purchasers of a product sold in 
one location would, in response to a SSNIP switch to buying the product sold at another 
location, then those two locations are regarded to be in the same geographic market with 
respect to that product.141 If not, the two locations are regarded to be in different 
geographic markets.142  
 
13. That the geographic market should be identified is clear from the ECJ’s judgement in the 
United Brands v the Commission.143 It said that the opportunities for competition under 
Article 82 of the Treaty of Rome (now Article 102 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU)) must be considered: 
 
‘with reference to a clearly defined geographic area in which [the product] is 
marketed and where the conditions are sufficiently homogeneous for the effect of 
the economic power of the undertaking concerned to be able to be evaluated’. 
 
14. In the United Brands case, the ECJ said that the geographic market must be an area in 
which the objective conditions of competition are fundamentally the same for all traders 
or undertakings. In this particular case, this was not true of the United Kingdom, Italian 
and French Markets, because of the special arrangements for bananas there. 
 
15. The holding in the United Brands Case on the definition of the relevant geographic 
market has been echoed in the Notice and most competition authorities the world over 
follow the principles laid therein. The Notice has provided the following as regards the 
relevant geographic market: 
 
‘The relevant geographic market comprises the area in which the undertakings 
concerned are involved in the supply and demand of products or services, in which 
the conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous and which can be 
 
141 http://www.circ.in/pdf/Relevant_Market-In-Competition-Case-Analyses.pdf (accessed on 6 November 2016 
at 19.13) 
142 Ibid 




distinguished from neighbouring areas because the conditions of competition are 
appreciably different in those areas’. 
 
16. It is evident that the Notice on this aspect is informed by the ECJ’s pronouncement in the 
United Brands Case thereby supporting the argument that the Notice reflects the EC’s 
long experience on the enforcement of competition law. 
 
6.3 Market Shares and Market Concentration 
 
17. After carefully delineating the boundaries of the market within which competition law 
and policy should be applied, the next issue to establish is the market position of the 
parties in this delineated market. This will assist a competition authority to determine if 
unilateral or coordinated effects will arise from a merger. A useful but not conclusive 
indicator to establish this are the market shares of the undertakings in issue and the 
market concentration ratio in the relevant market. The higher the market shares of the 
merging parties, the higher the likelihood that the merger may raise competition concerns. 
The converse is true. However, in order to determine whether the merger will raise 
unilateral or coordinated effects, it is imperative to determine the market concentration 
ratio in the relevant market/s. 
 
18. A plethora of authorities have posited that mergers that result in high levels of market 
concentration are not presumed to be anti-competitive. Rather high levels of market 
concentration are merely the starting point for identifying cases that require detailed 
scrutiny. The most commonly used measures of market concentration are the Herfindahl 
Hirschman Index (HHI) and the three or four firm concentration ratio (CR3 or CR4). 
These measures are described below. 
 
6.3.1   Concentration Ratio (CR3 or CR4) 
 
19. The concentration ratio is the sum of the market shares of the largest firms in the relevant 
market. Therefore in the CR3, the sum of the market shares of the three largest firms are 
taken into account while in the CR4 it is the sum of the four largest firms in the relevant 




not a precise science but depends on a number of factors such as the policy consideration 
of a competition authority, the nature and size of a given economy, arbitrary choice 
among other factors. Countries like Singapore and regional competition authorities like 
the COMESA Competition Commission use the CR3 to compute the market 
concentration ratio.  
 
20. For example, the Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore is generally of 
the view that competition concerns are unlikely to arise unless the merger results in 
 
(a) a merged entity with a market share of 40% or more; or 
(b) a merged entity with a market share of between 20% to 40% and a post-merger 
CR3 ratio of 70% or more.144 
 
21. As regards the Commission, this is inferred from the language of the Guidelines which 
provides that the Commission is unlikely to find concern in horizontal mergers, be it of a 
coordinated or of a non-coordinated nature, where the market share post-merger of the 
new entity concerned is below 15% and the sum of the market shares of the top three 
firms is less than 70%145. The reference to the top three firms in the Guidelines expressly 
confirms that the Commission uses the CR3 in the computation of market concentration 
ratio. The research further confirmed this position by reviewing the Commission’s merger 
assessment reports. However, the research revealed a worrying approach in the 
application of the CR3 inconsistent with the Guidelines. In most of the Commission’s 
merger assessment reports, the focus was just on the 70% CR3 and not the 15% post-
merger market share of the merged entity. For example, in most cases, the Commission 
concluded that the merger would not raise competition concerns simply because the CR3 
was below 70% even where the merged entity’s market share exceeded 15%. The 
application of the test in the Guidelines needs to be considered in toto and not in part if 
the results are to be reliable. 
 
22. In the Common Market, countries like Zambia also use the CR3 to determine the 
concentration ratio. This is stated under paragraphs 70 and 71 of the Competition and 
 
144 http://www.singaporelaw.sg/sglaw/laws-of-singapore/commercial-law/chapter-27 (accessed on 4 May 2017) 





Consumer Protection Commission Guidelines for Merger Regulations (CCPC 
Guidelines). These Guidelines provide that the CCPC normally uses concentration ratios 
for three firms, showing the proportion of the market dominated by the three leading 
enterprises.  
 
6.3.2   Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) 
 
23. The CR3/CR4 has an advantage in that it does not require knowledge of the market shares 
of all the firms operating in a relevant market and it is simple to compute. One may argue 
that it is a more reliable tool in DEEs where data is notoriously insufficient. It however 
appears to suffer from one shortcoming in that it does not give us an indication of the 
dispersion of the market shares in a relevant market. It is therefore possible to conclude 
that the merger will not raise competition concerns when as a matter of fact it would. The 
converse is equally true.  
 
24. In order to address the above identified shortcoming of the CR3/CR4, some competition 
authorities use the HHI. The HHI is the sum of the squares of the market shares of all 
firms in the market. In contradistinction to the CR3/CR4, the HHI is affected by both the 
quantum of firms in the relevant market and the dispersion of their market shares. The 
value of the HHI decreases as the number of firms in a market increase. Consistent with 
the foregoing mathematical logic, the value of the HHI is greater the larger the 
differences in the market shares of the firms under consideration. It is not the intention of 
the dissertation to engage into an extensive mathematical demonstration of how the HHI 
plays out given different firm sizes. Reference to the HHI in the dissertation is simply to 
provide a platform for a clear understanding of what competition authorities take into 
account when assessing a merger and this should ultimately contribute to achieving the 
overall objective of the dissertation. The foregoing notwithstanding, it is important to 
understand the thresholds or safeguard levels most competition authorities consider as red 





25. The European Commission Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers,146 set 
out the HHI safe harbours that the EC applies. The safe harbours applied by the EC, also 
adopted by the Commission are: 
 
a) if the post-merger HHI is below 1,000, competition concerns are unlikely to arise; 
b) if the post-merger HHI is 1,000 to 2,000 and the delta is below 250, competition 
concerns are unlikely to arise except in special circumstances; or 
c) if the post-merger HHI is above 2,000 and the delta is below 150, competition 
concerns are unlikely to arise, except in special circumstances. 
 
26. It is important to make a few observations about safe harbours. Paragraph 20 of the EC 
Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers, provides that for mergers in highly 
concentrated markets, a change of below 150 points is unlikely to raise significant 
competitive concerns. Nonetheless, in United States vs Philadelphia National Bank, it 
was observed that “if concentration is already great, the importance of preventing even 
slight increases in concentration and so preserving the possibility of eventual 
deconcentration is correspondingly great.”147 This is because it is easier to prevent the 
creation of a dominant position than to attempt to deal with its abusive conduct and the 
effects thereof once it is already dominant. It is however important to reiterate that 
measures of concentration are only a starting point in merger assessment and in practice, 
most mergers which exceed the safe limits are cleared. Therefore, there is no presumption 
that when the thresholds are exceeded, an adverse conclusion will always be arrived at by 
the competition authority. 
 
27. The draw back or difficulty identified with the application of the HHI is the need to have 
information on the market shares of all firms in the market. In DEEs where market 
information is absent or occasionally insufficient, HHI may not be an appropriate 
measure to use. Nevertheless, it is also important to note that firms with small market 
shares do not greatly affect the result because larger firms have a greater weighting in the 
calculation of the HHI. It is not the intention of this dissertation to engage in 
 
146 Much reference is made to the EU in this dissertation because it is the only other true functional supra-
national competition authority and the Commission has a lot to learn from it in its nascent stages. 





mathematical muscle flexing but it is possible even in the absence of all the market shares 
of the market participants to have an indication of the change to the HHI post-merger. As 
long as the market shares for the merging parties are known, then an indication of the 
change can be estimated and the likely effects of such a merger determined on the basis of 
the safe harbours discussed above. 
 
28. Let us assume that that the market share of company A is x and that of company B is y. If 
these two companies decide to merge, their contribution to the HHI pre-merger is x2 + y2. 
Post-merger, there contribution to HHI would be (x + y)2. Therefore, the change in HHI 
would be  
 
            (x + y)2 – (x2 + y2) = 2xy.  
 
29. Therefore in simple terms, the change in HHI as a result of the merger is simply the 
product of the merging parties’ pre-merger market shares multiplied by 2. It follows 
therefore, that even the seemingly complex HHI is not that complex after all as we can 
still get some meaningful indication even in the absence of complete information on 
market shares of the marker participants. 
 
6.4  Barriers to Entry/Exit 
 
30. After putting the market in context by defining the boundaries and understanding its 
structure through the determination of the relevant market and market concentration, 
competition authorities look at other elements that assist in the accurate determination of 
a merger case. Among these elements are barriers to entry and exit. Barriers to entry are 
the conditions of a specific industry which tend to keep out prospective competitors.148 
Barriers to entry are a critical element of consideration in determining potential 
competitors who would provide competitive restraint to the merged entity should it 
attempt to conduct itself in an anti-competitive manner.  
 
31. The assessment of barriers to entry is separate but closely related to market concentration 
assessment. Markets characterised by high barriers to entry are expected to be highly 
 




concentrated due to limited levels of new players entering the market. Further, if a market 
is characterised by low barriers to entry, the incumbent players are unlikely to engage in 
anti-competitive conduct as such behaviour would trigger an incentive for potential 
competitors to enter the market. There is empirical evidence that competition concerns in 
a prima facie concentrated market may be assuaged by establishing that the barriers to 
entry are not insurmountable. For example, in United States v. Baker Hughes, it was 
held that in the absence of significant entry barriers, a company probably cannot maintain 
supra-competitive pricing for any length of time. In the Common Market, a notable case 
where a competition authority made a decision on a merger transaction taking serious 
account of barriers to entry is the Zambian Breweries Plc/Northern Breweries Plc 
merger. In this case, ZCC considered that the relevant market was characterised by 
significant barriers to entry and that merger would result in the enhancement of the 
market power of Zambian Breweries Plc. ZCC therefore approved the merger with 
undertakings to address the competition concerns.  
 
32. The barriers to entry are usually Structural and Behavioural nature. The Structural 
barriers as explained in The Official Journal of the European Union149 are solely due to 
conditions outside the control of market participants. Structural barriers to entry include 
basic costs of production, adequacy of capital markets, and activities of governments and 
regulators. The Behavioural barriers are endogenous and are erected by incumbent firms 
to frustrate market access to would be competitors.   
 
33. In the consideration of possibility to enter a market, care has to be taken not to construe 
any entry as signalling low barriers to entry in a given market. For example, under the 
Canadian Merger Assessment Guidelines, it is stated that “the assessment of barriers to 
entry is directed towards determining whether entry by potential competitors would be 
likely to occur on a sufficient scale in response to a material price increase or other 
change in the relevant market brought about by the merger, to ensure that such a price 
increase could not be sustained for more than two years”. The Canadian Merger 
Assessment Guidelines further stipulate that one must assess cost advantages available to 
 
149 Official Journal of the European Union, Commission Recommendation of 11th February 2003 on relevant 
product and service markets within the electronic communication sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in 
accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory 





incumbent firms, sunk costs and the effect of mergers on barriers. In summary, in order to 
arrive at the conclusion that a given market does not have significant barriers to entry, a 
competition authority should be satisfied that entry would be likely, timely, and sufficient 
to offset any anti-competitive effects of the merger. Most DEEs are characterised by high 
market barriers to entry and most competition authorities appear not to have the 
competence to effectively determine this thereby sometimes approving mergers on 
account of low barriers to entry.  
 
34. In this inquiry, it is also important to consider barriers to exit. Markets that have high 
barriers to exit are also to a large extent concentrated markets. This is because barriers to 
exit are highly cognate to barriers to entry. Firms may consider as a disincentive to enter a 
market if they are of the view that it may not be easy for them to exit should a need to do 
so arise. Sunk costs usually result in barriers to exit. It is recalled that one of the principal 
basis for firms to engage in mergers is to exit the market. This exit may not always be 
easy and one way of doing it is through a merger. This notwithstanding, most competition 
authorities do not engage in an ambitious exercise to assess barriers to exit may be 
speculative. 
 
6.5   Import Competition 
 
35. Import Competition is critical to competition case analysis because it provides a profound 
competitive discipline on local firms.  This is especially true if imports have a significant 
and sustainable share of the market, and/or the threat of imports prevents local firms from 
pricing their products above a competitive level as stated in the Manual on the 
Formulation and Application of Competition Law by UNCTAD150. As a matter of fact, 
import competition is closely related to the definition of the relevant geographic market. 
If imports have the potential to enter a domestic market in response to anti-competitive 
conduct by incumbent firms, then the areas or origins of the imports ceteris paribus could 
be included in the determination of the relevant geographic market. This may lead to 
widening the market and diluting any perceived economic strength incumbent firms may 
have. It is the considered view of this dissertation that import competition should not be 
looked at as an isolated element of assessment but should be considered during the 
 
150 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) – Manual on the Formulation and 




determination of the relevant geographic market. This view supports the supposition 
earlier in this dissertation that the assessment of a merger case is not done in a linear 
fashion. 
 
36. Competition authorities the world over have approved certain mergers on the premise that 
the potential for import competition is great should the merged entity engage in anti-
competitive conduct. The converse is true. For example, in the Zambian Breweries 
Plc/Northern Breweries Plc merger, ZCC raised competition concerns inter alia, 
diminutive import competition. Another example is that of the merger of Qantas 
Airways Limited (PCC) (Frequent Flyer) and Hazelton Airlines Limited determined 
by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). In this case, import 
competition was absent to assuage the competition concerns of ACCC. Consequently, 
Qantas aborted its merger intention as a result of the competition concerns raised by 
ACCC. The converse is where competition authorities have approved transactions that 
raise competition concerns on the basis that there is a sufficient level of imports to 
discipline the anti-competitive behaviour of incumbent firms. In the Email Limited and 
Southcorp Limited merger the ACCC determined that the market was characterised by 
high barriers to entry. This notwithstanding, ACCC authorised the merger on the premise 
that potential import competition was likely to ensure the merger would not substantially 
lessen competition.  
 
37. A few remarks have to be made as regards the consideration of import competition in 
merger assessment at regional level. At regional level, the imports to be considered 
should be those that come from outside the region as opposed at looking at individual 
Member States’ imports. This is because this may be misleading to conclude that there is 
import competition and yet it is intra-regional trade. Where imports come from outside 
the regional market but into one Member State, their significance should be assessed and 
determined if they can address concerns of a regional nature otherwise, such a Member 
State may be treated as a distinct market which is not impermissible in community 







6.6   Countervailing or Buyer Power 
 
38. Buyer power has been defined by some authorities as the ability of one or more buyers, 
based on their economic importance in the market in question to obtain favourable 
purchasing terms from their suppliers. Buyer power is an important aspect in competition 
analysis, since powerful buyers may discipline the pricing policy of powerful sellers, thus 
creating a ‘balance of power’ on the market concerned. A firm is apt to charge high prices 
in the market if the buyers are insignificant in economic strength. Therefore, where a firm 
faces few or no strong buyers, it is likely to have its market power manifest and in most 
cases engage in exploitative abuse. However, buyer power does not necessarily always 
have a positive effect. Where a strong buyer faces weak sellers, for example, the outcome 
can be worse than the where the buyer is not powerful.151 The later situation gives rise to 
what economists call ‘monopsony power’.  
 
39. Most competition authorities assess the bargaining strength customers have due to their 
size, commercial significance to the supplier and their ability to switch. The question is 
whether this is sufficient to offset the increase in market power that the merged entity will 
otherwise obtain through the merger.152 In the decision of the South African Competition 
Tribunal in the Franco-Nevada Mining Corporation case153 one of the factors for 
clearing the merger in the gold mining industry was that a single producer of gold could 
not influence prices in the international market. Gold producers were effectively price 
takers. In contrast, one of the factors which lead the South African Competition Tribunal 
to block the merger in JD Group Limited/Ellerine Holdings Ltd154 was that the 
customers of these two furniture companies were the least powerful of South African 
customers.155 
 
40. So how is countervailing power considered in merger assessment? Where a competition 
authority determines that a merger shall result in dominance on the market, but 
 
151 Shilpa Bhadoria, “Glossary of Terms in Indian Competition Law”, C/f 
http://www.cci.gov.in/images/media/ResearchReports/shilpa_report_20080730103931.pdf, 
(last visited on December 5, 2009) 
152 Paula Riedel, Postgraduate Diploma/Masters in EC Competition Law 2008 – 2009. Unit 6; Merger 
Regulation 
153 Franco Nevada Mining Corporation  Ltd/Gold Fields Ltd (CT 77/LM/Jul00, 28.9.2000) 
154 CT 78/LM/Jul00, 5.9.2000) 




countervailing power exists, a competition authority may allow this merger as it is 
unlikely that the merged entity may abuse its dominance. The merging parties may also 
advance the argument of countervailing power as a defence to avoid a competition 
authority from arriving at the conclusion that a merger would lead to a substantial 
prevention or lessening of competition. Where countervailing power lacks in the market, 
a competition authority is more likely to prohibit such a merger or approve it with 
conditions/undertakings.  
 
41. Buyer or countervailing power may also be used to reject a merger that results in the 
merged entity facing very weak sellers. This is in the context of the monopsony power 
referred to above. Such a merger may distort competition in a similar manner as a merger 
that leads to a monopoly situation. Therefore, it is not every buyer power that results in 
the desired results or the optimal and efficient operation of markets as mostly depicted by 
scholars on the subject. Buyer power should be looked at in context taking into account 
the specifics of each relevant market under consideration. 
 
6.7 Removal of a vigorous competitor/Maverick 
 
42. A vigorous competitor or maverick as the Americans would call it is an undertaking that 
despite its small size has the capability to offer substantial competitive restraint to market 
leaders. Such an undertaking might have particularly low marginal costs, may be more 
innovative relative to its competitors or has better products. Such an undertaking may also 
have a better corporate control.156 However, such a determination requires competent 
economists at competition authorities with sufficient data, a situation that appears 
notoriously absent at competition authorities in DEEs. The Commission is not an 
exception on this matter. The shockingly low number of economists at the Commission 
poses a great challenge to the successful determination of such matters.  As stated in the 
Guidelines, “mergers involving a maverick are more likely to result in a significant and 
sustainable increase in the unilateral market power of the merged undertaking or increase 
the ability and incentive of a small number of undertakings to engage in coordinated 
conduct. Vigorous and effective competitors may drive fundamental aspects of 
competition, such as pricing, innovation or product development, even though their own 
 




market share may be modest. These undertakings tend to be less predictable in their 
behaviour and deliver benefits to consumers beyond their own immediate supply, by 
forcing other market participants to deliver better and cheaper products. They also tend to 
undermine attempts to coordinate the exercise of market power. A merger that removes a 
vigorous and effective competitor may therefore remove one of the most effective 
competitive constraints on market participants and thereby give rise to competition 
concerns”.157   
 
43. A competition authority is more likely than not to prohibit a merger that results in 
dominance and would remove a vigorous competitor from the relevant market. This is 
because such a merger would significantly impede effective competition in the market 
place. Conversely, a competition authority is likely to approve a merger that results in 
dominance if the market is characterised by a maverick or vigorous competitor. Such a 
determination is not free from difficulty especially in DEEs as one would need to look at 
the historical data in terms of past pricing, innovation, corporate control among other 
things of the vigorous competitor and the reaction of other firms in the market including 
those involved in the merger in issue. 
 
44. In the proposed merger between Tongaat-Hulett and Transvaal Suiker Beperk (TSB), 
the South African Competition Commission rejected the transaction on the premise that 
the merger would remove a maverick. TSB appeared to be a maverick and it was the firm 
most likely to compete in packaging fees and credit terms.158 
 
6.8   Consideration of Dominance/Unilateral Effects 
 
45. In order to determine whether a merger is likely to result in a substantial lessening and 
prevention of competition in the relevant market, one of the most critical elements to look 
at is dominance. Mergers that result in the creation or strengthening of a dominant 
position are more likely than not to result in a substantial lessening and/or prevention of 
competition. It is therefore important that the meaning of dominance is understood. 
 
157 Supra-note 156 
158 See Media Release 9 of the Competition Authority of South Africa issued on 22 September 2000 and the 
decision of the Tribunal. Standard Bank was also viewed as an effective competitor by the South African 




Where a firm behaves, to a large and/or sustainable extent, as though it had no 
competitors, such a firm would be rightly referred to as a “dominant” and or “monopoly” 
undertaking, regardless of its market share.  
 
46. Dominance is in most cases inferred from market shares. This notwithstanding, 
domination of a given market cannot solely be based on the market share held by an 
undertaking. Doing so would amount to an astonishing intellectual approach palpably 
devoid of elementary comprehension of the principles of dominance. It is also important 
that an undertaking is considered in light of its ability to exercise an appreciable influence 
on the functioning of the market and on the behaviour of other firms. In its judgment of 
14 February 1978 [Decision 72/21] in the case of "United Brands Company v. 
Commission" the ECJ upheld and enlarged the definition of the dominant position 
adopted by the Commission as early as its decision of 9 December 1971 [Decision 72/21] 
in the "Continental Can Company" case [Case 6-72]. It thus stated that: 
 
“the dominant position referred to in Article 86 (EEC, new Article 102 
TFEU)"relates to a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which 
enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market 
by giving it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its 
competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers”. 
 
47. The High Court of Australia has also defined market power “as the ability of a firm to 
raise prices above the supply cost without rivals taking away customers in due time, 
supply cost being the minimum cost an efficient firm would incur in producing the 
product”159. The foregoing appears to suggest that market power is synonymous to 
dominance. The position is not very settled. Others argue that the terms are used 
interchangeably while others have posited that it is possible to be dominant and yet lack 
market power. Those who hold the latter view argue that dominance is a quantitative 
measure which shows the size of the firm while market power is a qualitative measure 
that shows the ability of a firm to influence the market conditions without regard to the 
reaction of competitors and consumers. What is important is to interpret dominance 
within the meaning of the legislation being applied at the time. For example, the 
 
159 High Court of Australia: Queensland Wire Industries Proprietary Company Limited and Another (1989) 167 




Regulations under Article 17 appear to suggest that the two terms are synonymous when 
it defines dominance as a position of economic strength that enables an undertaking to 
operate in the market without effective constraint from its competitors or potential 
competitors. The definition in the United Brands case unequivocally expresses this 
position. In this dissertation, the two terms are therefore used interchangeably. 
 
48. Care has to be taken when considering whether or not an undertaking is dominant in a 
given relevant market. There are some markets that may show some semblance of 
competition but if this competition is not effective, then it does very little to constrain the 
abusive behaviour of a dominant undertaking. Therefore, in order to address situations 
where undertakings would escape the application of the law because of some semblance 
of competition in that market, the ECJ in the Hoffman La-Roche case extended the 
definition of dominance enunciated in the United Brands case. The ECJ reiterated the test 
and added: 
 
“Such a position does not preclude some competition, which it does where there is 
monopoly or a quasi-monopoly, but enables the undertaking which profits by it, if 
not to determine, at least to have an appreciable influence on the conditions under 
which that competition will develop, and in any case to act largely in disregard of it 
so long as such conduct does not operate to its detriment”.160  
 
49. A word of caution should be entered when discussing dominance. It is important that 
mergers are not rejected simply because they lead to dominance. The converse is equally 
true as mergers are not cleared because the merging parties are already dominant and the 
merger does nothing to change the status quo. The primary test is the substantial 
prevention or lessening of competition or a significant impediment of effective 
competition as it is known in the European Union. Practice and case law are abound with 
interpretations to this effect. As a matter of fact, it is this situation that led to the 
promulgation of the European Union Merger Regulations. Hitherto, the EC had been 









50. To reiterate the point, the test now focusses on whether a merger is likely to substantially 
lessen competition in particular through the creation or strengthening of a dominant 
position. This shift in the test is intended to capture non-coordinated effects as well as 
coordinated effects cases. Some respected scholars have observed that the continued 
reference to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position is intended to preserve 
guidance on that test that is available from past Court judgments. 
 
6.9   Consideration of Coordinated Effects 
 
51. The preceding sub-section discussed unilateral effects. This simply means that an 
undertaking unilaterally influences the conditions of competition in the relevant market. 
This notwithstanding, it does not follow that where unilateral effects cannot be 
determined or foreseen, then the merger is unlikely to lead to a substantial prevention or 
lessening of competition. As a matter of fact, that is why currently the focus is on the 
SLC test and not dominance. The SLC test enables competition authorities to capture 
coordinated effects. Mergers may still lead to an adverse effect on competition in the 
relevant market through coordinated effects by making the market so transparent. The 
determination of whether coordinated effects are likely flows directly from the 
determination of market concentration. In a highly concentrated market, the probability of 
coordination and cartelisation among the market players is high. A merger removes at 
least one autonomous player from a relevant market. Depending on the market strength of 
the acquired firm, the number and motives of the remaining firms in the relevant market, 
and the conditions of competition in which the remaining firms compete, a merger may 
result in an increased incentive for the remaining firms to coordinate their market conduct 
through interdependent behaviour on the basis of rational prediction of the behaviour of 
the remaining competitors. Such a situation eliminates and/or significantly diminishes the 
possibility of serious competition in the relevant market. 
 
52. Coordination is simplified when the number of market participants is small and the likely 
responses of competitors are easier to forecast. As stated in the Canadian Guidelines, 




about a price increase through interdependent behaviour increases as the level of 
concentration in a market rises and as the number of firms declines”.161 
 
53. The removal of a firm through a merger may facilitate coordination, express or tacit, 
among the remaining firms in the market, leading to reduced output, increased prices or 
diminished innovation. Therefore, it is important to meticulously review a market with 
high levels of concentration.  
 
54. Some cases can be cited as regards coordinated effects and again reference shall be to the 
EC from whence the dissertation draws much inspiration. The case that immediately 
comes to mind here is the Nestle/Perrier.162 In that case, Nestle and Perrier shared about 
60% of the French bottled mineral water market, whilst BSN had 22% and the remainder 
of the market was shared by several insignificant undertakings. This situation raised the 
concern of European anti-trust authorities and Nestle was willing to shed off the Volvic 
brand to BSN in order to dilute its market shares. However, even with this proposal, the 
aggregate market share between Nestle and BSN would have been in the region of 82%. 
The EC decided that the merger would create a duopoly which would facilitate anti-
competitive parallel behaviour leading to collective abuses. The EC observed that there 
was market transparency, which facilitated tacit co-ordination of pricing. It further noted 
that Nestle and BSN had similar strength in the market and already cooperated in some 
sectors of the food industry. The EC noted that there was reciprocal dependence between 
the two companies which created a strong common interest and incentive to maximise 
profits by anti-competitive conduct. To dispose the matter, Nestle was required to divest 
itself of a major brand, not to BSN, but to a third party, so as to weaken the duopoly 
power of the two major companies. 
 
55. The criteria to be satisfied to establish coordinated behaviour were laid down in the 
Airtours/First Choice163 merger. In this case the EC blocked Airtours’ proposed merger 
with First Choice on grounds that the merger would create a collective dominant position 
amongst the three largest travel companies in the United Kingdom, who together would 
hold 80% of the UK short-haul foreign package holiday market. 
 
161 Canadian Guidelines section 4.2.1 
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56. Airtours appealed the EC’s decision and in 2002, the CFI overwhelmingly disagreed with 
the EC’s decision and overturned the ruling. The CFI criticised the EC’s poor economic 
analysis and established three conditions which the EC needed to satisfy before it could 
reach the conclusion that the merger would create or strengthen a collective dominant 
position. The CFI stated the criteria as: 
 
a) the firms engaging in the coordinated behaviour must be able to monitor whether 
the terms of coordination are being adhered to; 
b) there must be credible deterrent mechanism to deter any firm from deviating from 
the coordination; and  
c) the results expected from these common policies must not be at risk of foreseeable 
reaction from competitors or consumers.  
 
57. This is not a simple task for a competition authority especially in DEEs where experience, 
competence and resources required to undertake such an assessment are seriously lacking. 
Take for example at the Commission where at the time of writing the dissertation, there 
were only 3 officers responsible for mergers in the whole Common Market. Such 
numbers are not just absurd to allow for such an assessment but clearly impractical. It is 
observed in the above Airtours/First Choice merger that such an exercise is daunting even 
for advanced competition authorities. 
 
6.10 Consideration of Efficiencies 
 
58. In most competition legislation, efficiency claims are considered by competition 
authorities to authorise otherwise anti-competitive mergers. However, not all efficiency 
claims should be considered as defence for an otherwise anti-competitive merger. Only 
those efficiencies that outweigh anti-competitive effects and benefit consumers are taken 
into account. Care has to be taken when considering efficiency claims from the merging 
parties. It is common to see long stories of efficiency claims submitted by the parties to 
justify their merger transactions. Most of these efficiency claims are very theoretical, 
academic, narrative and indeed speculative without any fundamental basis of reasonable 





59. The EUMR provides guidance that the efficiency claims should be merger specific and 
there should be no other less anti-competitive means of achieving the claimed 
efficiencies. Further, the efficiencies should be verifiable. In addition, the efficiencies 
should benefit the consumers as opposed to only increasing the dividends of the 
shareholders. Benefits to consumers can be in the form of reduced prices or increased 
quality of the products. Such efficiency claims should also not frustrate the process of 
competition in the relevant market. The burden, therefore, is on the merging parties to 
justify their efficiency claims. The research is of the view that the standard of proof for 
the efficiency claims appears to be very high that it is not easy for a merger that leads to 
an anti-competitive outcome to satisfy the criteria and standard required. For example, a 
merger that is anti-competitive is suggestive of one that frustrates competition. It is 
however, not patently clear how efficiency claims from such a merger would escape 
frustrating competition. It is improbable though not impossible to immediately conceive 
without sounding academic a situation where efficiency claims would lead to the 
authorisation of a merger that is anti-competitive as one of the requirements is that such 
efficiencies should not be a hindrance to the process of competition in the market place. 
The determination of such a situation would require long experience of competition law 
enforcement with sound and competent analysis a requirement stubbornly absent in most 
young competition authorities. 
 
60. The efficiency defence is contained under Article 26(1)(a) of the Regulations. Article 
26(1)(a) stipulate that: 
 
“Whenever called upon to consider a merger, the Commission shall initially 
determine whether or not the merger is likely to substantially prevent or lessen 
competition ………, and if it appears that the merger is likely to substantially 
prevent or lessen competition , the Commission shall then determine whether the 
merger is likely to result in any technological efficiency or other pro-competitive 
gain which will be greater than and offset the effects of any prevention or 
lessening of competition that may result from the merger and would not likely be 





61. Article 26(1)(a) above gives an interesting reading in that it expressly provides for the 
requirements of the efficiency defence stated in the preceding paragraphs, the efficiency 
claims can be used as a defence and that there should not be any other less anti-
competitive alternative of obtaining similar efficiencies.  
 
62. The consideration of efficiencies in the Regulations is not unique to COMESA only. 
Article 2(1)(b) of the EUMR has similar wording. It provides that: 
 
“Concentrations within the scope of this Regulation shall be appraised in 
accordance with the objectives of this Regulation and the following provisions 
with a view to establishing whether or not they are compatible with the Common 
Market. In making this appraisal the Commission shall take into account the 
market position of the undertakings concerned and their economic and financial 
power, the alternatives available to suppliers and users, their access to supplies 
or markets, any legal or other barriers to entry, supply and demand trends for 
the relevant goods and services, the interests of the intermediate and ultimate 
consumers, and the development of technical and economic progress provided 
that it is to the consumers’ advantage and does not form an obstacle to 
competition”.  
 
63. Reference to the development of technological and economic progress in Article 2(1)(b) 
of the EUMR is suggestive of efficiency claims. Article 2(1)(b) of the EUMR is more 
instructive than Article 26(1)(a) of the COMESA Competition Regulations when it 
expressly provides that the development of such technical and economic progress should 
not form an obstacle to competition. Arguably, this requirement makes the efficiency 
defence superfluous due to the views advanced above. Consistent with this view, in 
Danish Crown/Vestjyske Slagtrier,164 the EC said at paragraph 198 that, “since the 
concentration in question would create a dominant position, the efficiency arguments 
of the parties cannot be taken into account”. The EC has therefore similarly in some 
cases either determined that a transaction would not create or strengthen a dominant 
position such that Article 2(1)(b) of the ECMR is not invoked or has disagreed with the 
 




parties’ submission that efficiencies shall emanate from the concentration and benefit the 
consumers.165 
 
6.11   Public Interest Considerations 
 
64. The consideration of public interest is not free from controversy because of its 
susceptibility to other vested interests inter alia, politics. Further, what amounts to public 
interest varies widely across jurisdictions. This raises challenges especially for regional 
merger control like in COMESA where merger assessment may have to take into account 
the different views of what amounts to public interest in different jurisdictions. Public 
interest is an amorphous concept in that it may be limitless. It is quite clear that the 
consideration of public interest is a controversial topic in most jurisdictions. Defining 
public interest too wide renders a competition authority susceptible to political 
interference. In some jurisdictions, employment preservation is the main public interest 
consideration. Since jobs usually are on the lips of politicians when they campaign, such 
an agenda becomes very important to them and would intervene at every slightest 
instance that presents itself.  
 
65. Although the debate is not yet settled, it does appear as a rule of the thumb in most 
jurisdictions that an anti-competitive merger may be cleared if the public benefits 
emanating from such a merger outweigh its anti-competitive detriment. In some 
jurisdictions, this principle is actually explicitly or implicitly embedded in legislation. 
This notwithstanding, a careful review of the consideration of public interest in some 
jurisdictions for example, South Africa shows or at least indicates that a pro-competitive 
merger in that jurisdiction may be rejected if it results in job losses which is a public 
interest consideration. A point in example is the Walmart/Massmart Merger.166  
 
66. Zambia is another jurisdiction where prima facie, a pro-competitive merger may be 
rejected because it is not in the interest of the public. Section 31 of the Zambian 
 
165 For example, see Case No IV/M.477 Mercedes Benz/Kassbohrer OJ [1995] L 211/1; Case No IV/M.53 
Aerospatiale – Alenia/de Havilland OJ [1991] L 334/42, [1992] 4 CMLR M2, para 65-68; MSG/Media Service 
OJ [1994] L 364/1, paras 100-101; Bertels Mann/Kirch/Premiere OJ [1999] L 53/1, [1999] 4 CMLR 700, paras 
119-122. 
166 South African Competition Commission case number: 2010Nov5445; South African Competition Tribunal 
case number: 73/LM/Nov10 (29 June 2011); South African Competition Appeal Court: 110/CAC/Jun11 and 




Competition and Consumer Protection Act provides that the Zambian competition 
authority may, in considering a proposed merger, take into account any factor that bears 
upon the public in the proposed merger. The language of the law suggests that in such 
consideration, if the Zambian competition authority raises public interest concerns, then 
the merger may be rejected on those grounds. This matter was put across to officials from 
the Zambian competition authority at a workshop on Analysing Competitive Effects, 
Public Interest Issues and Drafting Effective Remedies in Merger Investigations 
organised by the Commission and the Federal Trade Commission of the USA on 22 – 23 
October 2018 in Eswatini. The Zambian officials confirmed that in Zambia it is possible 
to reject a pro-competitive merger on public interest grounds. 
 
67. Ideally, merger analysis should be free from other considerations except the competitive 
effects of a merger. Public interest consideration raise uncertainty especially to the 
merging parties and therefore negate the generally accepted tenets of merger control of 
certainty, timeliness and transparency. This approach stems from a purist analytical point 
of view. Even the ICN in its Recommended Practices for Merger Analysis states that the 
legal framework for competition law merger review should focus exclusively on 
identifying and preventing or remedying anti-competitive mergers.  Merger review law 
should not be used to pursue other goals. 
 
68.  Nevertheless, merger analysis the world-over is not pure. Even advanced jurisdiction like 
the EU do place some reliance on public interest. In its nascent stages of enforcement, the 
EC took a strong position to consider only competition related matters in merger 
assessment. In Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland167 merger, the EC was criticised for 
rejecting the merger on pure competition grounds and for not considering industrial 
policy matters that the merger would have resulted in the world’s largest manufacturer of 
turbo propeller aircraft, and it would be domiciled in Europe. This is reminiscent to the 
non-economic motivation for mergers identified in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
Similarly, in the Volvo/Scania merger, the Prime Minister of Sweden personally visited 
the EC in support of a merger that would create an international champion in the market 
for trucks.168 The EC prohibited the merger on the premise that competition 
 
167 Case No. IV/M.53 OJ [1991] L 334/42, [1992] 4 CMLR M2 




considerations were paramount to industrial policy considerations. In contradistinction to 
the Volvo/Scania merger, the EC cleared the Mannesmann/Vallourec/Ilva169 merger in 
suspicious circumstances that appeared to be a real possibility of serious injury to 
competition. It is widely believed that the EC was influenced by political consideration in 
approving this merger.  
 
69. It should also be pointed out that the EUMR allows Member States to consider public 
interest matters in merger control to the extent that it does not impair the functioning of 
the internal market. Under Article 21(4) of the EUMR, EU Member States are permitted 
to take appropriate measures to protect “legitimate public interests” that are not taken into 
consideration under the EUMR, provided those measures are compatible with the general 
principles and other provisions of EU law; that is they remain non-protectionist and do 
not undermine principles such as the operation of the EU internal market and freedom of 
movement of capital. Similarly, the Enterprise Act 2002 (UK) (as amended) permits the 
UK Secretary of State to intervene in mergers which do not fall within the jurisdiction of 
EUMR where an “exceptional public interest” such as national security, media plurality 
or the stability of the UK financial system may be adversely affected.  
 
70. As already pointed out, uncertainty is the main challenge in the consideration of public 
interest. For example, in Zambia, the repealed and replaced CFTA did not define what 
amounted to public interest. This gave the Commission wide discretion to determine what 
amounted to public interest. Such wide discretion may result in administrative malafide, 
uncertainty and inconsistent decisions. The CCPA which has since replaced the CFTA 
has brought some certainty as to what amounts to public interest under section 31. It 
includes issues like exports and international competitiveness. It is important to note that 
even section 31 of the CCPA does not conclusively avert the possibility of disputes of 
interpretation as to what constitutes public interest. Section 31 is still wide and may create 
such disputes. Section 31 (g) and (h) of the CCPA provides that: 
 
“The Commission may, in considering a proposed merger, take into account any 
factor which bears upon the public interest, including— 
 
 




(g) socioeconomic factors as may be appropriate; and 
(h) any other factor that bears upon the public interest”. 
 
71. The above provisions were invoked by the CCPC in the case of the takeover of Equinox 
the largest shareholder in Lumwana Copper Mine by Barrick Gold Corporation of 
Canada. The CCPC resolved that the 2.2% that ZCCM-IH held on behalf of government 
in Equinox should not be disposed of by virtue of the transaction.170 It was the CCPC’s 
view that government representation in mining firms was in the interest of the public 
since mining was an industry of sentimental value in Zambia. Certain stakeholders argued 
that CCPC overstepped its boundaries to consider this as public interest. CCPC waived 
this condition171 but later there was public outcry from the public among them traditional 
chiefs in Solwezi172 who decried inter alia that it was not in the interest of the public for 
government to dispose of its 2.2% shares. This is just an illustration of how disputes may 
arise even where public interest factors have been expressly laid out in legislation. It also 
clearly shows how real political interference can be within the realm of public interest. 
CCPC’s earlier decision to approve the merger conditionally was changed within 24 
hours to an unconditional approval after government intervened as can be seen from the 
two staff papers in the footnotes.   
 
72.  In conclusion, it should be stated that while public interest is a wide concept and may 
bring in dubious consideration during merger review, it is improbable not to consider it in 
today’s changing global economic environment. This is true for both developed and 
DEEs. What would be important is that the consideration of public interest does not 
negate the fundamental tenets of merger review of transparency, certainty and timeliness. 
This view has been supported by the ICN which has stated that “if a jurisdiction’s merger 
test includes consideration of non-competition factors, the way in which the competition 
and non-competition considerations interact should also be made transparent. Therefore, 
to the extent that merger control goes beyond serving the economic objectives of efficient 
resource allocation and enhancing consumer welfare so as to include other public interest 
factors, these other factors should be clearly articulated so that they can be considered 
 
170 CCPC Staff Paper No. 416. May 2011. 
171 CCPC Staff Paper No. 417. May 2011. 




alongside the core of competition policy”.173 Further, in order for competition policy and 
its enforcement to remain legitimate especially in DEEs, it should be seen to support 
other broad policy objectives of national governments otherwise it risks being side-lined. 
Anecdotal evidence reveals that most governments in DEEs do not think competition 
policy is a priority therefore, it is important for competition authorities to undertake 
efforts to justify and legitimise their existence. 
 
73. As already pointed out, for COMESA, the challenge is even more daunting. This is 
because there is no universal definition for public interest and each Member State may 
have its own definition. Consideration of all Member States’ Public Interest may dilute 
and render competition assessment otiose as the determination may end up being made 
only on the basis of these varied public interest matters. At the same time, the 
Commission should walk the tight rope to avoid infuriating Member States by ignoring 
their public interest submissions as it may lead to the collapse of the entire regional 
merger control system. It is a delicate balance to undertake but the Commission should 
consider only those public interest that affect the Common Market or a substantial part of 
it. Anything short of this standard should not be entertained. 
 
74. In COMESA, the challenge appears to be beyond what has been discussed above. While 
the foregoing has reviewed that the main challenge of public interest considerations is the 
uncertainty it brings, the legal framework is there for the consideration of public interest 
in most jurisdictions. At COMESA level, the Regulations do not have a sound basis for 
the consideration of public interest and yet recently, the Commission has increasingly 
taken into account public interest considerations in its merger assessments. One reason 
for this is the tight rope that the Commission must walk in order not to lose its legitimacy 
from the Member States where public interest consideration is paramount. However, the 
risk is that the Commission may be challenged by the parties on the basis that there is no 
legal framework for public interest consideration under the Regulations. Fortunately, this 
has not happened yet. If the Commission wishes to continue to pursue the public interest 
agenda, it should amend the Regulations so that it is on firm legal ground to pursue public 
interest considerations.  
 
173 Dave Poddar and Gemma Stook: Consideration of Public Interest Factors in Anti-trust Merger Control, 
March 2015. Under “settings,” https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/consideration-of-public-





75. The question that begs the answer is why the dissertation is stating that there is no 
framework for public interest consideration under the COMESA merger control regime? 
The answer lies in reviewing the provisions that deal with merger control in the 
Regulations and this is part 4. Article 26 of the Regulations prohibits mergers likely to 
substantially prevent or lessen competition. Specifically, Article 26 (1) of the Regulations 
provides that if the merger is likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition, the 
Commission must determine whether there is offsetting “technological efficiency or other 
procompetitive gain” and “whether the merger can be justified on substantial public 
interest grounds by assessing the factors set out in paragraph 4.”  Article 26 (3) provides 
that “A merger shall be contrary to the public interest if the Commission is satisfied 
that the merger  
 
 a)  has lessened competition substantially or is likely to do so, or 
b)   has strengthened a position of dominance or is likely to strengthen dominance 
which is or will be contrary to the public interest.” 
 
76. Article 26 (4) further provides that “in order for the Commission to determine 
whether a merger is or will be contrary to the public interest, the Commission shall 
take into account all matters that it considers relevant in the circumstances and shall 
have regard to the desirability of:  
a) maintaining and promoting effective competition between persons producing 
or distributing commodities and services in the region;  
b)  promoting the interests of consumers, purchasers, and other users in the 
region, in regard to the prices, quality and variety of such commodities and 
services;  
 
c)  promoting through competition, the reduction of costs and the development of 
new commodities and facilitating the entry of new competitors into existing 
markets”. 
 
77. The research reveals that the only examples of public interest provided in Article 26(4) 




rule of interpretation ejusdem generis (restricting the meaning of general words to the 
class or nature of the specific examples), the dissertation interprets Article 26(4) to 
allow only pro-market justifications. Under Article 26, it appears therefore that the 
Commission should not take into account non-competition considerations when 
reviewing a merger.  
 
78. However, it appears the Commission has been taking public interest into account by 
widely interpreting the definition of competition under Article 1 of the Regulations. 
Article 1 defines competition as “the striving or potential striving of two or more 
persons or organisations engaged in production, distribution, supply, purchase or 
consumption of goods and services in a given market against one another which 
results in greater efficiency, high economic growth, increasing employment 
opportunities, lower prices and improved choice for consumers”. Reference to 
employment especially that it is the main public interest matter pleaded by national 
competition authorities appear to justify the Commission’s consideration of public 
interest in merger review. The foregoing notwithstanding, even this appears to be a 
dubious way of including public interest in the assessment of mergers. Nevertheless, it is 
important to have this weak provision than not having any at all.   
 
6.12   Failing Firm Defence 
 
79. In some jurisdictions, the failing firm defence is treated as a separate element of 
assessment while in others it is under the umbrella of public interest. In some instances, 
competition authorities may approve mergers where one of the merging firms is in 
financial distress and the only way of continued operations in the market is through a 
merger. This may be the case even if a merger is likely to be anti-competitive. The 
reasoning behind this is that even if a merger is rejected, the failing firm would still exit 
the market and this would lead to reduction in competition equal to a reduction in 
competition resulting from the merger. However, not all situations that present 





80. There are three criteria, established in the Kali und Salz case174 which must be met in 
order for the failing firm defence to apply. These are: 
 
• “in the absence of acquisition, the failing firm would be forced out of the 
market in the near future;175 
• there is no less anti-competitive alternative purchase than the notified merger; 
and  
• in the absence of a merger, the assets of the failing firm would inevitably exit 
the market”. 
 
81. Important though is to ensure that such mergers are approved with conditions or 
undertakings to address the potential competition concerns. In the Common Market, the 
1998 Zambian Breweries Plc/Northern Breweries Plc merger is a good case in 
example. The transaction raised serious competition concerns. However, the target 
company, Northern Breweries, was in financial distress and it appeared delays in 
implementing the transaction would result in the company’s liquidation and significant 
loss of jobs. ZCC accepted the failing firm defence and approved the transaction. 
 
82. The Commission has also authorised a merger on the basis of a failing firm in the merger 
involving SBM Africa Holdings Ltd and Fidelity Commercial Bank Limited of Mauritius 
and Kenya respectively in February 2017. In the foregoing merger case, the principles 
espoused in the Kali und Salz merger were applied diligently. It should be noted however 
that the burden of proof is on the firm invoking the defence (emphasis). 
 
6.13   The Single Market Imperative: Consideration of Effect on Trade between Member 
States 
 
83. For regional competition authorities like the Commission and the EC, their objectives are 
much wider than those at national level. The fundamental objective is to contribute to the 
single market agenda. As Richard Whish has observed, “agreements and conduct which 
might have the effect of dividing the territory of one Member State from another will be 
 
174 Case IV/M190,[1993] 4 CMLR M17. 




closely scrutinised and may be severely punished. The existence of ‘single market’ 
competition rules as well as ‘conventional’ competition rules is a unique feature of 
community competition law”.176  
 
84. Therefore, the consideration of effect on trade between Member States is central in the 
disposition of merger cases under community competition law. In Société Technique 
Minière177, the ECJ indicated that for an agreement to affect trade between Member 
States: 
 
“it must be possible to foresee with sufficient degree of probability on the basis of a 
set of objective factors of law or fact that the agreement in question may have an 
influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between 
member states”  
 
85. Though the above ruling was in the context of agreements and not mergers, the same 
analogy may be applied to regional merger assessment. Mergers that are likely to lead to 
an appreciable effect on trade between Member States are those that result in high market 
shares and/or foreclosure concerns. Where there are foreclosure concerns, it is highly 
likely that firms may find it difficult to operate in some Member States and goods and 
services may not easily move from one Member State to another. Mergers making it 
difficult for other firms to establish themselves in the Common Market are likely to have 
an appreciable effect on trade between Member States. Such mergers are likely to be 
prohibited by a regional competition authority like the Commission whose raison detre is 
the single market imperative.  
 
6.14       Conclusion 
 
86. This  chapter has shed light on the elements taken into account to assess a merger. It is 
evident that a merger cannot be cleared or assessed based on the consideration of one 
factor. All factors are taken into account before a decision is arrived at. It is therefore 
 
176 Richard Whish, Competition Law. 5th ed. Oxford: Reed Elsevier (UK) Ltd, 2003. Page 780. 
177 Case 56/65 Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH [1996] ECR 235 at page 249; See also - 
Case 42/84 Remia BV and others v European Commission, Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 11 July 





important for competition authorities to have a comprehensive understanding of these 
elements in order to arrive at an accurate determination of mergers cases as erroneous 
decisions may be detrimental to the merging parties or to the competitive landscape. The 
determination of mergers using the elements discussed in this chapter may not always be 
easy and may require sound legal framework, adequate resources, experience and 
competence on the part of competition authorities. These factors are absent in most DEEs 
and the problem is compounded when dealing with multi-jurisdictional mergers. 
  
87. The same elements of assessment are taken into account when assessing cross-border 
mergers with the view of single market imperative. Therefore, it is important that regional 
competition authorities handling cross-border mergers have a thorough appreciation of 
these concepts and their practical application. It however does appear that regional 
competition authorities in DEEs face similar challenges of inadequate experience and 
competence and ambiguous legal frameworks as those faced by national competition 
authorities. A review of the COMESA Merger Control Regime shall establish whether or 
























7.0                                                       Cross-Border Mergers 
 
7.1  What are Cross-Border Mergers? 
 
1. The dissertation has thus far laid a rich foundation and background to the 
understanding of mergers, their assessment, their likely effects on the market and 
indeed that merger transactions may sometimes involve more than one country. 
Cross-border mergers, the focus of attention of this dissertation fall within the realm 
of merger transactions that involve more than one country. The foregoing taxonomy 
of cross- border mergers sounds very broad, ambiguous and vague. Given to an 
elementary scholar of competition law, this classification may do less to help him/her 
appreciate the real nature of cross-border mergers. Therefore, because dissertations of 
such a magnitude and expectation are supposed to thoroughly investigate and research 
into identified subjects, a deeper examination of this subject has been undertaken in 
this chapter. 
 
2. As already stated above, simply put, cross-border mergers are those that involve more 
than one country. The question that begs the answer is what amounts to involvement 
of more than one country? The most obvious form of merger transactions that involve 
more than one country are between firms established and domiciled in two or more 
different countries. For example, a merger between Global Food Products registered 
and resident in Zambia and Kampinda Ltd registered and resident in Eswatini may 
qualify to be classified as a cross-border merger. Some scholars have posited that a 
classification of cross-border mergers using the foregoing criteria is based on 
structure (structural). 
 
3. However, involvement of two or more than one country through establishment or 
structure is evidently not the only way a merger may be classified as cross-border. 
The wave of globalisation, technological advancement and indeed the 




located in one part of the world to be felt by consumers and producers of similar and 
related products in far-away countries. Therefore, while true, it is an 
oversimplification to conclude that only mergers that involve firms established in two 
or more countries can be classified as cross-border mergers.  
 
7.1.1 How do the Regulations Define Cross-Border Mergers? 
 
4. Mergers between undertakings located in one and the same country may be classified 
as cross-border mergers if the effects of such mergers are felt beyond the borders of 
the country where these two companies are located. This is a classification of cross-
border mergers by effect. For example, a merger of Google and Yahoo even if both 
are not domiciled/incorporated in Africa is likely to have effects in Africa because 
their services are consumed in Africa. Put differently, these firms operate178 in Africa 
as they derive turnover therefrom. Turnover is the test for establishing whether or not 
a merger is cross-border if it is derived in more than one country. What amounts to 
cross-border mergers has been implicitly neatly laid down by Courts in some 
landmark cases like the Gencor v. Commission179 where the CFI held that a 
concentration with a Community dimension does not necessarily have to be one 
where the undertakings concerned are resident or established in the European 
Community or have their production assets located there. The CFI went on to state 
that the test of jurisdiction is that of turnover, i.e. sales carried out within the common 
market. The CFI arrived at this conclusion by applying the jurisdictional principles 
laid down in the Wood Pulp180 case that the application of the Regulations is justified 
under public international law when it is foreseeable that a proposed concentration 
will have an immediate and substantial effect on the Community.    
 
5. Since the focus of the dissertation is on COMESA, how does it define and view cross-
border mergers. The starting point to this inquiry is to recall that the Regulations are 
only applicable to conduct that affects two or more Member States. This is instructive 
from the construct and wording of Article 3(2) of the Regulations which provides that 
 
178 The Guidelines have also defined the word operate to mean the derivation of turnover in a particular 
jurisdiction or market.   
179 Case t-102/96, [1999] ECR II - 753 
180 Re Wood Pulp Cartel: A. Ahlstrom OY and others V. E.C Commission (Wood Pulp) [89/85, 114/85, 116-




the Regulations are applicable to conduct covered under Parts 3, 4 and 5 of the 
Regulations which have an appreciable effect on trade between Member States and 
which restrict competition in the Common Market. The terms ‘between Member 
States’ incontrovertibly suggest the involvement of more than one Member State. This 
is also consistent with the analysis above that for a merger to be defined as cross-
border, more than one country should be involved.  
 
6. In order to comfortably and without any doubt appreciate the meaning of cross-border 
mergers, it is important to review Part 4 of the Regulations and the answer appear to 
lie in the wording and construct of Article 23(3)(a) which provides that it shall apply 
where both the acquiring firm and the target firm or either the acquiring firm or target 
firm operate in two or more Member States. Article 23(3)(a) is explicit when it 
provides that two or more Member States have to be involved thereby laying to rest 
any doubts that may arise as regards the categorisation of cross-border mergers in 
COMESA. 
 
7.1.2 Not all mergers that have operations/effects in more than one Member State are 
captured by the Regulations. 
 
7. The next question to consider is whether every merger that involves two or more 
countries should be classified as cross-border. This assessment shall begin at looking 
at mergers that should be notified to the Commission. Basically, these are mergers 
that are clothed with regional dimension. In the European Union, they are referred to 
as mergers with a community dimension. Article 23(5)(a) of the Regulations provides 
that: 
 
“notifiable merger’ means a merger or proposed merger with a regional 
dimension with a value at or above the threshold prescribed…..”. 
 
8. Argument by analogy would dictate that a non-notifiable merger as defined in Article 
23(5)b) would not be classified as cross-border from a COMESA point of view 
because it may lack sufficient nexus and effect to be construed as one. The effects in 




cross-border merger regardless of how much it may have elements that may enable it 
disguise as one. The thresholds are therefore there to guide the process of qualifying 
what amounts to cross-border transactions consistent with the requirements of Articles 
3 and 23 of the Regulations. The purpose of merger notification thresholds is to help 
in identifying those transactions that are likely to have an effect on competition and 
additionally in the case of regional competition regulation, those that are likely to 
affect trade between Member States. Consistent with the definition of cross-border 
mergers above i.e. that it is those mergers that affect or are likely to affect two or 
more Member States, it follows that mergers below a certain level of thresholds are 
not likely to have this effect and therefore lack regional dimension or indeed are not 
cross-border mergers. The Commission has therefore promulgated merger notification 
thresholds under Rule 4 of the Rules on the Determination of Merger Notification 
Thresholds and Method of Calculation. The foregoing Rule provides that the 
threshold of the combined annual turnover or assets for the purposes of Article 23(4) 
of the Regulations is exceeded if:   
 
a) the combined annual turnover or combined value of assets, whichever is higher, in 
the Common Market of all parties to a merger equals or exceeds COM$50 
million181; 
 
b) the annual turnover or value of assets, whichever is higher, in the Common 
Market of each of at least two of the parties to a merger equals or exceeds 
COM$10 million,  
 
unless each of the parties to a merger achieves two-thirds of its aggregate turnover or 
assets in the Common Market within one and the same Member State. 
 
9. It is puzzling that between 15 January 2013 and 27 March 2015, the Commission 
implemented a zero-merger notification threshold regime (more than two years from 
the time the Commission issued its Commencement Notice). Arguably this was illegal 
as it appears it was against the spirit of the Treaty and the Regulations under Articles 
55 and 3 respectively. Article 55 of the Treaty enjoins the Member States to prohibit 
 




any practice that negates the objective of free and liberalised trade. It goes on to 
proscribe any agreements between undertakings or concerted practices which have as 
their object182 or effect the prevention, restriction of distortion of competition in the 
Common Market. It is difficult to comprehend how a merger of insignificant size and 
commercial importance could negate the objective of free and liberalised trade. 
Similarly, Article 3(2) also introduces a jurisdictional limit when it demands that the 
Regulations should only apply to conduct that has an appreciable effect on trade 
between Member States and that restricts competition in the Common Market. Article 
3(2) is fundamental and the pinnacle of the jurisdiction of the Regulations. Anything 
purported to be commissioned or omitted beyond this jurisdictional limit is illegal. 
Therefore, consistent with this analysis, it is the considered position of this 
dissertation that the zero-merger notification regime was unlawful as evidently some 
mergers of a certain magnitude were unlikely to meet the requirements of Article 3(2) 
of the Regulations.  
 
10. The foregoing notwithstanding, a clash of practice and law is clearly observable. The 
law was very clear that mergers needed to have a certain level of effects to be 
captured by the Regulations but it was not clear how this effect would be determined 
without experimenting and testing the market before the Commission assessed any 
mergers.183 Therefore, in order to commence operations and later on determine an 
optimum level of merger notification thresholds, the Council of Ministers approved 
the Rules on the Determination of Merger Notification Thresholds of November 2012 
at COM$0. This threshold was meant to be temporal until the Commission was able 
to find the right policy balance and promulgate meaningful merger notification 
thresholds.184  
 
182 Note that the Treaty has used the term objective and not object. In modern competition law, object is the term 
used for such purposes and there is a lot of rich jurisprudence on the subject matter especially in the European 
Union. Nevertheless, it does not appear there is any problem likely to arise from the use of this term and indeed 
it does appear the intended mischief to address is the same. 
183It is however the dissertation’s view that laws should be respected and observed at all times especially by 
those entrusted with the responsibility of enforcing them. The rational thing to have been done therefore was to 
undertake an economic and legal study to determine some reasonable level of thresholds before commencing to 
enforce the law. Beginning with the zero-notification thresholds manifestly revealed that COMESA was not 
ready to commence operations then. The Zero-notification threshold under any conceivable situation and 
argument was absurd. 
184 Meaningful thresholds in the sense that the zero-notification threshold was not a threshold for all intents and 
purposes. It is astounding that a man of Mr. George Lipimile’s levels of commendable and respectable 




7.1.3 What is the Law and Practice at the European Commission? 
 
11. As has been the case throughout this dissertation, insight and reference can be drawn 
from the EU. In the EU, not all mergers that present themselves with cross-border 
characteristics are considered by the EC. Only those that meet laid down criteria to 
satisfy the community dimension. The EU has two categories of thresholds, the 
primary and secondary turnover thresholds. These categories have both the EU wide 
turnover and the worldwide turnover thresholds. The primary turnover thresholds 
stipulate that a merger has Community dimension where: 
 
a) “the combined worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned exceeds 
EUR 5,000 million and 
b) the aggregate turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned 
exceeds EUR 250 million,   
  
unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its 
aggregate EU-wide turnover within one and the same Member State”.185 
 
12. One reason of introducing a ‘one stop shop’ is to reduce multiple filings under 
national competition laws thereby creating predictability, certainty and reducing the 
regulatory burden on the parties. The possibility of multiple filings even in the wake 
of the primary turnover thresholds was foreseen by the promulgators of the EUMR. 
Therefore, to address this, they included the secondary turnover thresholds. Mergers 
that do not meet the primary turnover thresholds may still be captured by the EUMR 
where: 
 
a) “the combined worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned exceeds 
EUR 2,000 million; 
b) the combined turnover of all the undertakings concerned exceeds EUR 100 
million in each of at least three Member States 
 
competition law fora that the Commission had a threshold then except it was at Zero. Some of these fora include 
the Bowman Gilfillan and Webber Wentzel Competition law conferences of 2013.  




c) the aggregate turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned 
exceeds EUR 25 million in each of the same three Member States, and  
d) the aggregate EU-wide turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings 
concerned exceeds EUR 100 million 
 
unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its 
aggregate EU-wide turnover within one and the same Member State”.186 
 
13. While it is not the intention of this dissertation to review the EU merger regime, it is 
tempting in some instances to do so. It is to be noted that the EU includes the world-
wide turnover in its thresholds. It is difficult to comprehend let alone imagine how 
worldwide turnovers help in the determination of local nexus in the clear presence of 
EU-wide turnover thresholds. It is the EU-wide turnover that should matter as it 
reflects the level of activity of the concerned undertakings through their sales in the 
EU. The research inquired on this matter from some practitioners in the EU and the 
answers have not been convincing or simply some practitioners do not understand the 
reason either. Maybe it would be important to conduct an in-depth inquiry by 
engaging those who were there when the EUMR were promulgated. This is however, 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. What appears to be the position of this 
dissertation is that the COMESA merger regime which focuses on the COMESA wide 
turnover or value of assets only is sounder than that of their EU counterparts because 
it represents a true reflection of COMESA nexus than world-wide turnovers.  
 
14. Concluding this section without further dissecting Article 23(3)(a) on matters that 
have captured the research’s attention as regards regional dimension would be leaving 
some questions unsettled. Article 23(3)(a) is irregular in that it presupposes a situation 
where a merger between a firm with operations in COMESA and one with operations 
outside would be notifiable. Article 23(3)(a) can be delineated into three components 
to appreciate the concern. The first component is that the Article is applicable where 
both the acquiring firm and the target firm operate in two or more Member States. 
This means that if we have company A187 operating in Comoros and Djibouti and 
 
186 Article 1(3) of the EUMR 




Company T188 operating in Libya and Eritrea, the first component of the Article is 
satisfied, and regional dimension is not in dispute. Each of the parties to the 
transaction operate in two and separate Member States making the number of Member 
States involved four. 
 
15. The second scenario under the first component of Article 23(3)(a) is where A operates 
in Comoros and Djibouti and T in Libya only. In this instance, regional dimension 
may be in in dispute because only one party has operations in two Member States (the 
minimum requirement) while the other party has operations in only one Member 
State. A closer view and careful reading of the Article would suggest that A should 
have operations in a minimum of two Member States so should T, otherwise the 
transaction may fall short of the standard required to be termed a cross-border merger. 
It does not appear this was the intention of the Regulations as evidently the firms 
operate in the Common Market in this second scenario. The Commission has 
considered mergers falling in the instant scenario notifiable reflecting the intention of 
the Regulations. However, to avoid potential legal disputes, the Article need to be 
amended. This discussion is however deferred to later chapters of the dissertation.    
 
16. The interesting scenario under this component would be where A operates only in 
Comoros and T operates only in Libya. Would the first component be satisfied in this 
scenario? Evidently no. This is because while two Member States are involved pre-
merger, each of the parties to the merger operates in only one Member State. The 
second and third components of Article 23(3)(a) are arrogantly worrying, and no 
imaginative levels of legal interpretation can save them from falling outside the 
objective and scope of the Regulations under Article 3(2). The second component 
presupposes that a merger is notifiable only where the acquiring firm operates in the 
Common Market. This means that if A operates in Madagascar and Egypt and T on 
the Island of Vanuatu, the merger is notifiable. Under any reasonable circumstances 
this is absurd and not only inconsistent with international best practice but the spirit of 
the Treaty and the Regulations which makes the effect of trade between Member 
States and the restriction of competition in the Common Market prerequisites for 
jurisdiction to be invoked. Similarly, the third component which presupposes that a 
 




merger is notifiable where only the target firm has operations in the Common Market 
with the acquiring firm devoid of any form of presence either through assets or 
turnover is clearly flawed and lack the blessings of fundamental principles of 
competition law, i.e. local nexus and the intended mischief to be addressed.   
 
17. This absurdity has however been addressed in Rule 4 of the Rules on the 
Determination of Merger Notification Thresholds and Method of Calculation. 
However, one may argue that that the Rules are ultra vires the Regulations. The Rules 
are subservient to the Regulations and if they are inconsistent, then they become ultra 
vires to the extent of the inconsistency. The second-tier threshold which requires each 
of at least two parties to the merger to derive COM$ 10 million in the Common may 
eliminate the possibility of having a merger notified with only one party operating in 
the Common Market. The Mischief to address the local nexus issue may have been 
addressed albeit in an unlawful manner. A careful reading of Rule 4 of the Rules on 
the Determination of Merger Notification Thresholds and Method of Calculation 
reveals that the issue of nexus has not been completely resolved. This matter has been 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter Eleven of the dissertation.  The Regulations 
need to be amended! 
 
7.2       Conclusion 
 
18. The dissertation has deliberately taken some time to comprehend cross-border 
mergers and that not all mergers that involve two or more countries are considered 
cross-border unless they have or are likely to have effect to a certain magnitude. The 
dissertation shall accordingly focus only on those mergers that are likely to have a 
substantial effect in two or more Member States. At this moment, it is now important 
to have an intellectual and sound consideration of the regulation of cross-border 











8.0                                  The Regulation of Cross-Border Mergers 
 
8.1   Overview of Cross-Border Merger Regulation and Challenges it Poses 
 
1. All merger legislation the world over (whether national or regional) have dealt with or 
will at one point in time deal with cross-border mergers. As already observed cross-
border mergers may be subject to the review of two or more merger laws. Therefore, 
challenges arise as a result of their exposure to a minimum of two national 
competition laws. Further, the rapid establishment of competition authorities has 
compounded the problem as cooperation and coordination of activities among the 
countries involved has increased in complexity. Countries may differ in the 
procedural and substantive treatment of mergers which though infrequent raises the 
possibility of inconsistent decisions in the same cases.189 
 
2. In Africa, this was observed in the 2011 Massmart/Walmart merger involving some 
countries in Sub-Sahara Africa including Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and 
Zambia. While the merger was approved without conditions in Botswana and Zambia, 
it raised concerns in Namibia and South Africa. Another example is the merger 
between Coca-Cola Beverages Africa Limited and Coca-Cola SABCO 
Proprietary Limited which was notified to the Commission on 15 April 2015 and 
cleared unconditionally on 29 July 2015 but took several months to be conditionally 
cleared in South Africa due to divergent considerations. Several reasons account for 
this and shall be explored later in the dissertation. The other puzzling occurrence in 
cross-border merger regulation is the continued dubious and controversial application 
of national legislation lacking extra-territorial application to mergers of cross-border 




189 Note here that the word ‘inconsistent’ as opposed to ‘different’ has been used. This is because it does not 
mean that when there is cooperation and coordination then countries shall arrive at the same decision. Countries 
have different and unique market structures and sometimes policy considerations that may lead to different 




3. Further, effective merger control of cross-border mergers requires that the countries 
involved have effective merger control regimes. However, this may be a challenging 
task in many DEEs (including those in COMESA) given the complexities of 
enforcing competition laws in these countries190. In particular, DEEs face many 
challenges in their efforts to build effective merger control regimes, including lack of 
resources, inadequate legal framework, absence of competition culture, difficult 
transition towards a market-based economy, the dominance of industrial policy, 
problems with implementation, and the role of foreign direct investment (FDI)191. As 
regards the Common Market, this research revealed that most countries lack effective 
competition authorities and adequate legal frameworks. After careful consideration 
and assessment of a number of factors, out of 21 Member States only Kenya and 
Zambia revealed some semblance of effectiveness. 
 
8.2  Convergence in International Merger Control 
4. For an effective review of cross-border transactions, and to ensure consistent 
approaches to merger assessment, international cooperation between the competition 
authorities involved is essential. Increased co-operation should be encouraged 
between competition authorities particularly in the design of remedies in cross-border 
merger cases.192  The reasoning behind this argument is that remedies to address 
certain competition concerns in a particular jurisdiction may have far reaching 
consequences on the pattern of competition, structure of markets and on consumers in 
another country. This outcome was very evident in the 2001 merger between 
Chilanga Cement Plc and Lafarge SA in Zambia. In that merger, ZCC approved 
the takeover on condition that the merged entity would only be allowed to export 
cement after saturating the Zambian market.  
 
5. From a public interest perspective, this sounded justifiable. However, this remedy had 
far reaching consequences in the Great Lakes Region which was the major importer 
of Chilanga Cement Plc products. 
 
190 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Policy Roundtables, Cross Border Merger 
Control: Challenges for Developing and Emerging Economies (posted on 13th February 2012) under “settings,” 







6. It may be argued that the effects did not only affect the Great Lakes Region, but 
Zambia and probably a significant part of the Common Market too. Economic theory 
teaches that allowing firms to operate freely in the market encourages them to reach 
optimum levels of output due to the efficient allocation of resources. Such an outcome 
results in increased economic activity of undertakings which contributes to the 
economic outlook of a country and indeed a region in a regional economic block. 
Measures that constrain undertakings from operating efficiently have an opposite 
effect. To this effect, it may appear that cooperation with competition authorities in 
the Great Lakes Region193 at that time would have prevented such a sub-optimal 
outcome from a regional welfare point of view. The affected authorities could have 
raised concern with the conditions proposed by the Zambian authorities and probably 
a better remedy would have been designed.   
 
9. It is manifestly clear to any practitioner of competition law and indeed those subject 
to its regulation that there are so many other challenges that the regulation of cross-
border mergers poses. The challenges have already been identified and can be 
summarised as follows:   
 
a) Inadequate Legal Framework 
b) Limited skills and expertise 
c) Limited resources 
d) Poor coordination and cooperation arrangements among the jurisdiction 
involved 
e) Unnecessary costs on the merging parties 
f) Lack of extra-territorial reach of national competition laws 
 
10. In order to address these challenges, the answer may lie in cooperation among the 
jurisdictions involved. 
 
11. There are three main types of co-operation: multilateral, regional and bilateral. While 
all three are relevant to DEEs, bilateral contacts are a key element for effective review 
 
193 Suffice to mention that most countries in the Great Lakes Region did not have competition authorities let 




of cross-border mergers194. Scholars, practitioners and regulators may have different 
views on this last point. This was very evident at the annual African Competition Law 
Forum held by Bowmans in 2016 where Mr. Elton Jangale, a practitioner from 
Malawi criticised the Commission for having entered into bilateral cooperation 
agreements with the National Competition Authorities in the Common Market. Mr. 
Jangale observed that this model was likely to fail as the Commission risked entering 
into 19 cooperation agreements with all the Member States.195 Mr. Jangale advised the 
Commission to adopt the model of SADC which had a multilateral cooperation 
agreement with its Member States. However, it should be observed that efforts 
towards cooperation in SADC were not a new thing. SADC has attempted this 
cooperation pursuant to the SADC Protocol on Trade and the SADC Declaration on 
Regional Cooperation in Competition and Consumer Policies and this has not yielded 
the expected results. Multilateral cooperation agreements are too broad and different 
countries have different and unique needs and challenges. This research revealed that 
cooperation agreements usually work when they are symbiotically beneficial and 
when the institutions involved have confidence in each other’s systems.  
 
12. The last point could be the reason why the South African Competition Authority has 
been procrastinating to enter into a cooperation arrangement with the Commission. 
Despite being approached by the Commission in 2013 immediately after operations 
commenced, the South African Competition Authority has not responded positively, 
while it has entered into cooperation agreements with the Competition Authority of 
Kenya,196 Competition Authorities in SADC197 and those under the auspices of the 
BRICS.198  There is irrefutable evidence that in 2014, the Commission officials visited 
 
194 Supra-note 190 
195 At the time, there were only 19 Member States as Tunisia and Somalia had not yet acceded to the COMESA 
Treaty. 
196 A Memorandum of Understanding on Bilateral Cooperation between the Competition Commission of South 
Africa and the Competition Authority of Kenya; October 2016. “Under Settings” www.compcom.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/CCSA-and-CAK-MOU.pdf  (accessed on 27 February 2019) 
 
197 https://globalcompliancenews.com/african-competition-law-update-20170407/ (accessed on 27 February 
2019) 
198Competition Commission Signs Accord with Fellow Brics Nations. Under “Settings” 





the South African Competition Authority in an attempt to kick start the process of 
entering into such a cooperation agreement but alas, to date nothing has happened.199  
 
13. It is therefore, clear that international cooperation in merger regulation is replete with 
its own challenges and its effectiveness questioned at a number of competition fora, 
and by a number of competition scholars. As a matter of fact, the mere fabric and 
construction of the cooperation agreements are brought into question. Cooperation 
agreements generally lack binding effect on the participating parties and are vague. It 
is quite evident that even bilateral cooperation may not always be effective. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that were one jurisdiction has no significant interest in the matter, it 
will have no incentive to cooperate even when the other party to the agreement is 
significantly affected by the merger. Further, cooperation in some cases become 
difficult due to the confidentiality obligations that different competition authorities are 
subject to under their respective national laws. Additionally, cooperation on some 
cases may not yield much fruit despite hard core evidence being collected against the 
parties. This is because the manner in which this evidence is collected may not be 
compatible with the laws of evidence in some countries and may therefore be 
inadmissible. Rules used to determine the admissibility of evidence vary by 
jurisdiction.200 
 
23. What then is the solution to challenges in cross-border merger regulation? The 
solution appears to lie in the promulgation of a Multilateral Treaty on the regulation 
of not only cross-border mergers but also other cross-border anti-trust cases. Several 
efforts have been made to have some form of a supra-national competition order but 
mostly these efforts have failed on account of lacking clarity and in some cases 
simply because of lack of will and different levels of development of the prospective 
 
199 Mr. Vincent Nkhoma, the first and former Head of the Enforcement and Exemption Division together with 
Mr. George Lipimile visited the South African Competition Authority in 2014 for this purpose. 
200 It should be noted that despite these challenges, cooperation on merger cases has fundamental advantages. 
With regard to the merging parties, it is in their interest where their transactions are subject to multi-
jurisdictional review, that the authorities involved do cooperate to avoid inconsistent outcomes and unnecessary 
delays. Further, case cooperation in the definition of the market, construction of theories of harm and remedies, 
inter alia, facilitates the transfer of knowledge and experiences from the mature and experienced competition 
authorities to new competition authorities lacking experience. It is shocking that none of the Commission staff 
has ever visited the EC, a system on which the COMESA Merger Control Regime is mirrored. It is still strange 
that the Commission has not even made an attempt to have any staff exchanges with any of the advanced 





contracting parties. For example, attempts were made to include competition matters 
under the Doha Round201 but such efforts failed especially from the protest of less 
developed countries who argued that such a development would be catastrophic as 
their firms had not yet reached a level where they would fairly compete with firms in 
the developed countries. As observed by some scholars, a general approach to 
international trade agreements suggests that DEEs had nothing to gain from the 
proposal that was on the table.202 
 
24. It has been observed that the multilateral economic system contains a major 
shortcoming. Although governments have committed themselves to a rule-based 
multilateral trade policy regime in the World Trade Organisation, private companies 
that operate in the global market face no such multilateral discipline. To address this 
gap, a series of bilateral and regional agreements have been concluded both to 
facilitate competition enforcement in transnational cases and to avoid the drawbacks 
of the lack of extra-territorial application of national anti-trust legislation. Still on the 
multilateral level, it has been impossible to agree on a coherent framework for 
competition rules.203 Going as far back as the days of the Havana Charter, through to 
the Doha Round, efforts to introduce competition policy into plurilateral trade systems 
have largely been a failure. There was a sigh of relief in 1996 when the Singapore 
Ministerial Declaration revived talks on the need for a plurilateral competition policy. 
Alas, it was short-lived because in August 2004, the WTO decided to remove 
competition matters from the Doha Agenda.    
 
25. The adoption of a Multilateral Treaty to regulate international anti-trust cases is close 
to impossible. This is largely due to the differences in the economic, political, social 
and legal order of the countries involved.204 Borrowing the words of some 
 
201 The Doha round of trade talks was an attempted multilateral trade agreement. It would have been 
between every member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). It was launched at the Doha, Qatar, WTO 
meeting in November 2001. It sought to lower trade barriers for almost every country in the world. 
https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-the-doha-round-of-trade-talks-3306365 Under “Settings”, (accessed on 
17th December 2017 at 6.21 pm) 
202 Aditiya Bhattacharjea, “The Case for a Multilateral Agreement on Competition Policy: A Developing 
Country Perspective”, Journal of International Economic Law 9(2), 293 – 323. May 2006. under “Settings” 
https://academic.oup.com/jiel/article/9/2/293/870642 (accessed on 18 October 2019) 
203 https://www.jstor.org/stable/27800267?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents (accessed on 27 February 2019) 
204 OECD Reports. Global Forum on Competition 2001. under “Settings” 





commentators, the failure of the Doha round of negotiations has increased bilateral 
agreements because they are easier to negotiate.205 The failure of Doha also means 
future multilateral trade agreements are also probably doomed to fail for the same 
reasons as Doha.206 The same is true for a pure multilateral agreement on competition 
regulation. Even the OECD with a relatively small and homogenous group has failed 
to achieve this end. DEEs with their little experience of enforcing anti-trust laws and 
given the peculiar nature of their markets would even find it difficult to realise this 
dream. This coupled with sovereignty issues which countries are largely reluctant to 
cede, to a greater extent compounds the challenge. Additionally, a Multilateral Treaty 
would most likely entail more substantive reform at municipal level and not just 
procedural reforms. However, substantive reforms of such magnitude would require a 
greater preponderance of philosophical reform. The current tripartite negotiations 
among COMESA, EAC and SADC at regional level and the Continental Free Trade 
Agreement at the African Union level appear overzealous. Notable is that competition 
matters are among the elements of negotiations in these agreements. It remains to be 
seen how successful these negotiations shall be.  
 
26. However, not all hope is lost. This process can begin at a lower level within regional 
economic groupings where countries are already bound by an overarching Treaty and 
share common heritage and destiny. This has happened in the EU through the TFEU 
and for DEEs in COMESA through the Treaty establishing COMESA among other 
regional economic communities and their corresponding competition authorities. It 
however, remains to be seen in DEEs whether these developments have addressed 
some of the challenges identified above especially in the case of COMESA which is 
composed of DEEs and has a fully functional competition authority. Literature 






205 https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-the-doha-round-of-trade-talks-3306365 (accessed on 18 October 2019) 
206Susan C. Schwab, After Doha: Why Negotiations Are Doomed And What We Should Do About It, May/June 





8.3        Conclusion 
 
27. The Regulation of cross-border mergers can be done either through national law or 
supra-national law depending on the regulatory framework of a given region. 
However national laws may not effectively address cross-border mergers. Every 
practitioner of not just competition law but international law would agree that the 
regulation of cross-border mergers is not free from challenges. It has been noted that 
in order to effectively regulate cross-border mergers, there is need for effective 
cooperation among the countries involved. Nevertheless, this does not always yield 
the desired results as countries lack incentives to cooperate if it is not symbiotically 
beneficial or if they have no confidence in each other’s systems. Since cooperation is 
not absolute legal obligation, the countries involved may elect to ignore it without 
significant consequences. The solution to this challenge appears to lie in the 
promulgation of a multilateral Treaty to regulate competition. However, promulgating 
such a Treaty is improbable as seen from the failed Doha trade negotiations. 
 
28. It has been observed however, that though it has been difficult to promulgate a 
multilateral Treaty to regulate competition, regional laws in both developed countries 
and DEEs have been enacted to regulate cross-border mergers. In DEEs, this is true 
for COMESA among other RECs. In COMESA, it is yet to be seen if this has 
addressed the challenges of cross-border merger regulation. In the chapters that 
follow, the dissertation shall discuss in detail the challenges encountered in cross-
border merger regulation. For convenience of reading and logical flow of work, the 
challenges faced by the merging parties shall first be discussed, followed by those 
faced by national competition authorities. Suffice to reiterate the point here that the 
focus is on DEEs in particular COMESA notwithstanding the fact that developed 
countries may face similar challenges. However, developed countries have developed 
ways of addressing these challenges through accumulated years of experience. In this 
discourse, before discussing the challenges and whether they have been resolved by a 
supra-national merger control regime, the dissertation shall first discuss the genesis of 








9.0                                Genesis of the Regional Competition Law in COMESA  
 
9.1 Composition of COMESA 
 
1. COMESA207 is created under the Treaty establishing the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (the “Treaty”). It is composed of twenty-one Member States who 
have a common objective of regional/market integration through the enhancement of 
free and liberalised trade and the development of natural and human resources for the 
benefit of its inhabitants.  
 
9.2 Aims and Objectives of COMESA 
 
2. COMESA succeeded the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(PTA) which was established in 1981 within the framework of the Organisation of 
African Unity’s (OAU)208, Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos. The PTA 
was transformed into COMESA in 1994. COMESA was established on November 5, 
1993, in Kampala, Uganda when the Treaty was signed, and then ratified the 
following year in Lilongwe, Malawi, on 8 December 1994.209  
 
3. COMESA was established to take advantage of a larger market size, to share the 
region’s common heritage and destiny and to allow for greater social and economic 
cooperation.210 A number of economic benefits were expected to flow from the 
establishment of the Common Market. It envisaged the taking advantage and full 
exploitation of the principles of comparative advantage i.e. that goods and services 
could be produced in regions with the lowest opportunity cost to do so and sold in 
other regions where they were needed, while these other regions would also focus on 
the production of goods and services in which they had comparative advantage. This 
 
207 In this dissertation, Common Market is used synonymously to COMESA. 
208 OAU is the predecessor of the African Union. 
209 Country Memo Provided by: globalEDGE.msu.edu and EXPORT.GOV. under “Settings,” 
globaledge.msu.edu/trade-blocs/comesa/memo. (Accessed on 15 May 2016). 




would ultimately lead to improved welfare for the inhabitants of COMESA. Among 
other things, the Member States agreed on the need to create and maintain:211 
 
(a) A free trade area guaranteeing the free movement of goods and services produced 
within COMESA and the removal of all tariffs and non-tariff barriers; 
 
(b) A customs union under which goods and services imported from non-COMESA 
countries will attract an agreed single tariff in all Member States; 
 
(c) Free movement of capital and investment supported by the adoption of a common 
investment area to create a more favourable investment climate for the COMESA 
region; 
 
(d) Gradual establishment of a payment union based on the COMESA Clearing 
House and the eventual establishment of a monetary union with a common 
currency; and  
 
(e) The adoption of common visa arrangements, including the right of establishment 
leading eventually to the free movement of bona fide persons. 
 
4. COMESA’s vision is to be a fully integrated economic community that is prosperous, 
internationally competitive, and ready to merge into the African Union. 
 
9.3 Institutional Set Up of COMESA 
 
5. The decision-making structure of COMESA is as follows:212 
 
(i) The Authority of Heads of State and Government: This is the supreme organ 
of the Common Market and is composed of the Heads of States and Government 
of all the Member States. 
 





(ii) The Council of Ministers: This is composed of Ministers from the Coordinating 
Ministries of all the Member States. It is responsible for overseeing the 
functioning and development of the Common Market and ensuring the 
implementation of agreed policies. 
(iii)The Technical Committees: These are responsible for the preparation of 
comprehensive implementation programmes and timetables, which serve to 
prioritise the programmes with respect to each sector. In addition, they monitor 
and review the implementation of the programmes on co-operation and may 
request the Secretary-General to undertake specific investigations.  
 
9.4 Realisation of Aims and Objectives of COMESA 
 
6. In order to realise the objectives of the Common Market, goods, services, capital and 
bona fide persons should be free to move throughout the Common Market 
unrestricted by artificial national borders. Further, firms from other Member States 
should be free to establish themselves in any Member States unhindered by 
foreclosure attempts from incumbent firms. This therefore requires the abolition or 
significant reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers (de jure barriers to trade). This 
notwithstanding, the abolition or significant reduction of the de jure barriers to trade 
may not achieve the objectives of the Common Market if the firms operating in the 
Common Market engage in conduct that result in de facto barriers to trade. De facto 
barriers to trade may have far reaching consequences in terms of partitioning the 
market and may frustrate liberalisation policies such as the removal of than the de jure 
barriers to trade. Some examples of firm conduct that may lead to partitioning the 
market and frustrate the single market imperative include cartels, abuse of dominance 
and anti-competitive mergers. It would therefore be of no consequence to dismantle 
public obstacles to trade between Member States if these could be replaced by 
restrictive business practices, under which firms in different Member States may 
prevent the entry of other firms from other Member States. A regional competition 






7. Conduct restricting competition in the Common Market is regulated by the 
Regulations. It is therefore important to recall how the Regulations were promulgated. 
It is also important to recall that COMESA is established under the Treaty and 
therefore any legal instrument developed in the Common Market to further market 
integration should be born from the Treaty otherwise it is null and void. Therefore, the 
Regulations should draw their legitimacy from the Treaty. 
 
9.5 Promulgation of the Regulations 
 
8. Discussions leading to the promulgation of the Regulations began in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s in Livingstone, Zambia. The pioneers of this process among them 
George Lipimile213, Alexander Kububa,214 Kijira215 and Joseph Musonda216 saw the 
need of having a regional competition law when they noted the inadequacy of national 
competition authorities in addressing anti-competitive conduct that had effects in their 
countries but emanating from neighbouring countries. It also dawned upon these 
founding fathers that without a regional competition law, the market integration 
agenda may not be realised due to potential consequences of firm conduct identified 
above. It was also realised that certain merger remedies imposed in one jurisdiction 
could have serious consequences in other jurisdictions. Here the takeover of Chilanga 
Cement Plc by Lafarge SA217 was cited as a case in example where ZCC218 granted 
conditional approval which had negative effects in some Member States. The pioneers 
grappled with the question of how they were going to promulgate this supra-national 
competition order and one of the modes was through the negotiation of a regional 
Treaty to regulate competition.  
 
9. The pioneers however realised that the negotiation of a regional Treaty to regulate 
competition would be a difficult and insurmountable task to undertake drawing from 
 
213 George Lipimile is the current Chief Executive Officer of the COMESA Competition Commission and the 
former Chief Executive Officer of the Zambian Competition Authority. 
214 Alexander Juvensio Kububa is the founding head of the Competition and Tariff Commission of Zimbabwe 
and former Chairman of the Board of the COMESA Competition Commission 
215 Mr. Kijira was the at the time the head of the Monopolies and Prices Commission, a Division in the Kenyan 
Ministry of Finance 
216 Mr. Joseph Musonda is a former trade expert at COMESA. 
217 ZCC Staff Paper No. 0109 on the takeover of Chilanga Cement by Lafarge SA 
218 ZCC has since changed to the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission following the repeal of the 




past experience as rightly observed by Richard Whish and Diane Wood when they 
stated that “calls for more substantive action, such as the negotiation of a multilateral 
Treaty governing the regulation of mergers have been ignored or rejected”.219 Sensing 
this risk, the founding fathers had to look elsewhere. The original countries involved 
in this process were Zambia and Zimbabwe which are both SADC Member States so 
naturally they sort solace in the SADC Protocol on Trade (the Protocol). However, the 
Protocol did not help them much as its provisions on competition under Article 25 
were limited to cooperation and not enforcement. This is implicit in the language of 
Article 22 of the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (the 
“SADC Treaty”). Article 22 of the SADC Treaty calls for the conclusion of protocols 
as may be necessary in each area of cooperation within the Community. 
 
10. Therefore, since Article 25 of the SADC Protocol on Trade draws its authority from 
the SADC Treaty, it restricts itself to cooperation, the term used under Article 22 of 
the SADC Treaty otherwise any enforcement measure would be ultra vires the SADC 
Treaty. The central theme of cooperation is reflected and reiterated in the SADC 
Declaration on Regional Cooperation in Competition and Consumer Policies.  
 
11. Article 25 of the Protocol was not helpful as countries in the region had attempted to 
cooperate, but not much positive results were arising from this process. What the 
pioneers sought was supra-national enforcement and all they needed was to find a 
provision in one of the regional instruments that would give legitimacy and legal 
authority to the rules on competition that would be established. 
 
12. It is important to take cognizance of the fact that Kenya was one of the key pioneer 
countries advocating for a supra-national competition law. Kenya is a country from 
East Africa so at this stage, it was only prudent to look at an organisation that 
encompassed both eastern and southern Africa and COMESA was identified. The 
pioneers reviewed and searched the Treaty and lo and behold, a moment of eureka 
came when they came across Article 55 of the Treaty. Article 55 provides that: 
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1. The Member States agree that any practice which negates the objective of 
free and liberalised trade shall be prohibited. To this end, the Member States 
agree to prohibit any agreement between undertakings or concerted practice 
which has as its objective or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition within the Common Market. 
 
2. The Council may declare the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article 
inapplicable in the case of: 
 
(a) any agreement or category thereof between undertakings; 
 
(b) any decision by association of undertakings; 
 
(c) any concerted practice or category thereof; 
 
which improves production or distribution of goods or promotes technical or 
economic progress and has the effect of enabling consumers a fair share of 
benefits provided that the agreement, decision or practice does not impose 
on the undertaking restrictions inconsistent with the attainment of the 
objectives of this Treaty or has the effect of eliminating competition.  
 
3. The Council shall make Regulations to regulate competition within the 
Member States. 
13. It is important to examine Articles 55(2) and 55(3) of the Treaty. Article 55(2) 
provides that the Council may declare the provisions of Article 55(1) inapplicable in 
certain circumstances. This provision is troubling. It is observed that Article 55(2) of 
the Treaty invokes efficiency considerations. In competition law, standard practice is 
that after the competition authority has assessed a merger and determined that it raises 
competition concerns, it may take into account efficiency claims by the parties. If the 
competition authority is of the view that such efficiencies outweigh the competition 
concerns, the merger may be approved220. It is not clear in the case of Article 55(2) of 
 




the Treaty how the Council of Ministers which ordinarily sits annually and is more 
concerned with policy issues shall consider such technical matters. Such a situation 
would be very impractical, uncertain and costly for the merging parties. It would also 
undermine the independence of the competition authority, a fundamental requirement 
for the successful operation of any competition authority. There is need to amend or 
completely delete this provision from the Treaty as it is a great source of uncertainty 
and interpretation disputes. It does not appear that the Council intended to get 
involved in such a technical exercise. In any case, there would be no lacuna created as 
regards the non- merger provisions of the Regulations if this provision is deleted 
completely as this has been addressed under Article 16(4) of the Regulations which 
draws its legitimacy from Article 55(1) of the Treaty. As regards mergers, Chapter six 
of this dissertation has already revealed that efficiency claims are expressly and 
adequately covered under Article 26(1)(a). 
 
14. Article 55(3) of the Treaty equally gives sad reading when it provides that the Council 
shall make Regulations to regulate competition within the Member States. The 
Regulations are not intended to regulate competition within the Member States but in 
the Common Market. Competition within the Member States is regulated by national 
competition legislation where this exists. In any case, the minimum requirement for 
the Regulations to apply is that there should be two or more Member States involved. 
Therefore, the application of the Regulations to regulate competition within the 
Member States would have the effect of usurping the jurisdiction of national 
competition legislation. It does not seem this was the intention of Council when it 
passed the Regulations but there is need to amend this provision to avoid potential 
disputes.  
 
15. Article 55(3) of the Treaty gave birth to the Regulations and bestowed upon them 
legal authority to regulate competition in the Common Market. To this end, the 
Regulations were promulgated, and assumed force of law on 17 December 2004221 
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although there was a period of inactivity of about nine years before their 
implementation finally commenced on 14th January 2013.222 
 
16. The general purpose of the Regulations is contained under Article 2 which reads: 
 
“The purpose of these Regulations is to promote and encourage competition by 
preventing restrictive business practices and other restrictions that deter the 
efficient operation of markets, thereby enhancing the welfare of the consumers in 
the Common Market, and to protect consumers against offensive conduct by 
market actors” 
 
9.6 Scope of Application 
 
17. The above purpose is too general and broad. Read literally and in isolation it may 
imply that the Regulations are meant to apply to all competition concerns arising in 
the Common Market. This would not only be absurd and impractical but also 
impossible. In view of this, the Regulations have under Article 3(2) provided 
guidance on conduct to which they apply when it states that: 
 
 “These Regulations apply to conduct covered by Parts 3, 4 and 5 which have an 
appreciable effect on trade between Member States and which restrict 
competition in the Common Market". 
 
18. Article 3(2) of the Regulations therefore informs us that ‘effect on trade between 
Member States and restriction of competition in the Common Market’ is the minimum 
requirement to invoke the jurisdiction of the Regulations. Further, it is not any effect 
on trade that would invoke the jurisdiction of the Regulations, the effect on trade 
should be appreciable. It is also important to note that Article 3(2) of the Regulations 
has used the word ‘and’ as opposed to ‘or’. These words are conjunctive and not 
disjunctive, implying that for conduct to be captured by the Regulations, it should 
 
222 COMESA Competition Commission Notice Number 1/2013: Notice on the Commencement of operations of 
the COMESA Competition Commission. Under “settings,” http://www.comesa.int/competition/wp-





both restrict competition in the Common Market and have an appreciable effect on 
trade between Member States.  From the foregoing, the following cumulative 
elements should be satisfied before the jurisdiction of the Regulations can be invoked: 
 
(a) The conduct should restrict competition within the Common Market; 
(b) The conduct should have an effect on trade between two or more Member States; 
and  
(c) The effect should be appreciable 
 
19. If any of the above elements is not satisfied, then the jurisdiction of the Regulations 
cannot be established. It is difficult to imagine how an appreciable effect on trade 
between Member States and a restriction on competition was established in some of 
the first cases to come before the Commission. For example, in the two cases 
involving the merger between Old Mutual (Africa) Holdings Proprietary Limited 
(OMAH) and Oceanic Insurance Company Limited (Oceanic) and OMAH and 
Provident Life Assurance Company Limited (Provident)223 which were filed to the 
Commission simultaneously, it is beyond dispute that the elements of appreciable 
effect on trade between Member States and a restriction of competition in the 
Common Market were not met. OMAH had operations in the Common Market but 
was acquiring firms that had no operations in the Common Market whatsoever. 
Provident, was wholly operational in Ghana while Oceanic, was wholly operational in 
Nigeria. Reasonable and objective assessment of these transactions would reveal that 
the effects were not likely be felt in the Common Market. The acquiring firm only had 
presence in about two Member States, namely Malawi and Swaziland.224 Clearly the 
transactions lacked local nexus. This notwithstanding, the Commission went ahead to 
claim jurisdiction on these two merger cases and charged OMAH a million dollars225 
in merger filing fees. Clearly, the Commission erred both in law and in fact and a 
review of those decisions is likely to find that the Commission exceeded its legal 
mandate to review those mergers. 
 
 
223 The merger notifications were filed with the Commission on 19 September 2013 and unconditional approval 
granted by the Committee Responsible for Initial Determination on 17 December 2013 
224 Eswatini now 
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20. An interesting observation from the wording of Article 3(2) is that it presupposes a 
situation where the Regulations would only apply when conduct has already taken 
place and its effects established. This does not appear to have been the intention of 
Council. For example, the Commission has a pre-merger notification system. This 
means that mergers should be notified to the Commission before they are 
implemented. The current wording of Article 3(2) defeats this position under Part IV 
of the Regulations, particularly Article 24. Article 3(2) would have captured the spirit 
and intention of the promulgators if it had used the word ‘likely’. Therefore, the 
wording should have been as follows:  
 
“These Regulations apply to conduct covered by Parts 3, 4 and 5 which have or are 
likely to have an appreciable effect on trade between Member States and which 
restrict or are likely to restrict competition in the Common Market". 
 
9.7      Conclusion 
 
21. In conclusion, this chapter has revealed that the regulation of competition in the 
Common Market was in the minds of those who promulgated the Treaty. Article 55 of 
the Treaty is instructive on this. This paved the way and facilitated the promulgation 
of the Regulations when it became evident that there was need to regulate competition 
matters that affected two or more Member States because of the lack of extra-
territorial application of national competition laws among other challenges. However, 
the Regulations do not apply to all competition concerns occurring in the Common 
Market but only those that have an appreciable effect on trade between two or more 
Member States and those that restrict competition within the Common Market. 
Therefore, the existence of two or more Member States affected by firm conduct is a 
necessary but not sufficient requirement. The effect has to be appreciable. 
 
22. The dissertation shall later determine whether the Regulations have addressed the 
challenges of regulating cross-border mergers in the Common Market but before that, 
Chapter Ten (10) shall discuss the applicability of the Treaty and the Regulations in 




regulating cross-border mergers may stem from the applicability of the Treaty and 





































10.0            The Application of the Treaty and Regulations in Member States 
 
1. It should be recalled that Member States of COMESA are bound by the Treaty. It 
should also be noted that Treaties are among the sources of international law. 
International law may be defined as “that body of law which is composed for its 
greater part of the principles and rules of conduct which states feel themselves bound 
to observe, and therefore, do commonly observe in their relations with each other, and 
which includes also: 
 
a) the rules of law relating to the functioning of international institutions, their 
relations with each other, and their relations with States and individuals; and 
 
b) certain rules of law relating to individuals and non-State entities so far as the 
rights or duties of such individuals and non-state entities are the concern of the 
international community”.226   
 
2. The foregoing reveal that the Treaty establishing the Common Market is part of 
international law as are the Regulations and other instruments promulgated pursuant 
to it. The next issue to determine is the binding nature of the Treaty and its subsidiary 
instruments.  
 
10.1 The Binding Nature of the Treaty and its Subsidiary Instruments 
 
3. To begin this discourse, it is important to once again look at Article 55 of the Treaty 
which creates the Regulations.227 A careful reading of Article 55(1) reveals that the 
Regulations have not been forced on the Member States, but the Member States have 
agreed with their contents and the subsequent effects therefrom. The general rule of 
the thumb is that if the Treaty is binding, the legal instruments like the Regulations 
 
226 See Hyde International Law (2nd edn, 1947) 
227 The proceeding sections are liberally borrowed from the author’s article titled “The Binding Nature of the 
Regulations in the Common Market and the Individual Member States” presented at the Global Competition 




promulgated pursuant to the Treaty are also binding. It is therefore startling to listen 
to debates that the Regulations are not binding in some or all the Member States.228 It 
does not make both legal and common sense to agree to something then later reject its 
application without changing or amending the instrument that formed the basis of the 
agreement in the first place. 
 
4. Having shown that the Treaty was promulgated with the full consent of the Member 
States, it is important to draw attention to some very important Articles both in the 
Treaty and the Regulations that explicitly and implicitly gives them their binding 
nature in the Member States. Article 5(1) of the Treaty gives a good prelude to this 
argument. It states that: 
 
“the Member States shall make every effort to plan and direct their 
development policies with a view to creating conditions favourable for the 
achievement of the aims of the Common Market and the implementation 
of the provisions of the Treaty and shall abstain from any measures likely 
to jeopardize the achievement of the aims of the Common Market or the 
implementation of the provisions of the Treaty”.  
 
5. This mouthful provision gives a mandatory legal obligation to the Member States to 
respect the provisions of the Treaty in order not to frustrate the objectives of the 
Treaty. This is explicit in the language of Article 5(1) of the Treaty when it uses the 
word ‘shall’ and not ‘may’. Among the provisions of the Treaty whose 
implementation should not be jeopardized is Article 55 which creates the Regulations. 
It follows therefore that Member States are proscribed from engaging in measures that 
would jeopardize the operation of the Regulations and failure to recognize the 
Regulations may be one such measure. 
 
6. The foregoing is buttressed by Article 5(2)(b) of the Treaty which provides that: 
 
 




“each Member State shall take steps to secure the enactment of and the 
continuation of such legislation to give effect to the Treaty and in particular 
…….. confer upon the Regulations of Council the force of law and the necessary 
legal effect within its territory”. 
 
7. The above provision makes interesting reading. It does also impose a mandatory 
obligation on the Member States through the use of the word ‘shall’. This means that 
a Member State cannot act in a manner that is contrary to this provision otherwise it 
risks violating the Treaty. When such provisions are put in a Treaty a Member State 
that ratifies the Treaty without reservations is bound in toto by the provisions of the 
Treaty. Any attempt not to recognize certain provisions of the Treaty would be an 
infraction of both the Treaty in question and generally international law where the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda is sacrosanct. As already noted, Treaties are an 
outcome of consensus among the contracting parties. Treaties are therefore binding on 
the parties and must be executed in good faith. 
 
8. In order to buttress the binding nature of the Regulations further, Article 10(2) of the 
Treaty is instructive when it states that “a Regulation shall be binding on all the 
Member States in its entirety”. Note the language here. ‘Shall’ and not ‘may’ has 
been used. This provision unequivocally defeats any argument that the Regulations 
are not binding in the Member States. Further, not only are parts of the Regulations 
binding on the Member States, but they are binding in their entirety. Therefore, it may 
not make sound intellectual and legal argument to posit that the Competition 
Regulations are only applicable in certain parts and instances. This argument is not 
supported by Article 10(2) of the Treaty.  
 
9. It has so far been observed that the Treaty, which gives birth to the Regulations have 
clothed the Regulations with a binding effect on Member States. What about the 
Regulations themselves; do they have any provisions clothing them with this status? 
A closer look at the Regulations reveals that they have very interesting provisions, 
some of them reminiscent to those found in the Treaty. Interesting enough some, of 




Treaty. Article 5 of the Regulations is one such provision. Article 5 of the Regulations 
provides that: 
 
“pursuant to Article 5(2)(b) of the Treaty, Member States shall take all 
appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment 
of the obligations arising out of these Regulations or resulting from action 
taken by the Commission under these Regulations. They shall facilitate 
the achievement of the objects of the Common Market. Member States 
shall abstain from taking any measure which could jeopardize the 
attainment of the objectives of these Regulations”.  
 
10. The echoing of the language of Article 5 of the Treaty in Article 5 of the Regulations 
is by no way accidental. It reflects the intention of the architects of this law that the 
Member States are to be bound by the Regulations they created for themselves 
through Council. Rule 5(2) of the COMESA Competition Rules also implicitly 
buttresses the binding nature of the Regulations when it states that decisions rendered 
by the Commission shall pursuant to Article 5 of the Regulations, be binding on 
undertakings, governments of Member States and State Courts. 
 
10.1.1 Case Law Principles Conferring the Treaty and Regulations with their Binding Effect 
on the Member States 
 
11. It has so far been demonstrated that the Regulations are binding on Member States 
because of the legal provisions cited above. Nevertheless, it would be important to 
review the Court’s interpretations and decisions on this important matter? 
Jurisprudence is replete with rulings on the subject. Two interesting cases are 
instructive on the subject. One of the cases is close to home and the judgment was 
made by the CCJ. In the Polytol Paints & Adhesives Manufacturers Co. Ltd v. the 
Republic of Mauritius.229 In this case, the Respondent imposed a customs tariff that 
was in breach of the Treaty. In its judgment the CCJ explicated that: 
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 “If the Respondent’s Customs Tariff Regulations were consistent with the rules of 
the Treaty, the Applicant would have paid no customs duty on the Kapci products 
imported from Egypt during the relevant period. The Applicant was therefore 
prejudiced because of the Regulations of the Respondent that was in breach of the 
Treaty. The CCJ held that the argument of the Respondent that the Treaty is not 
directly enforceable in some jurisdictions, including Mauritius, and therefore the 
individuals cannot have rights emanating from the Treaty is misconceived. The 
CCJ added that it is indeed true that there are differences in legal systems 
regarding their position towards the domestication of international law. In some 
Member States, Treaties become directly applicable; in others they require another 
domestic legal instrument for their incorporation. Notwithstanding the differences 
in domestic legal systems the Treaty objectives can be achieved when all Member 
States fulfil their obligations under the Treaty. Any Member State that acts contrary 
to the Treaty cannot, therefore, plead the nature of its legal system as defence when 
citizens or residents of that State are prejudiced by its acts. This is clearly stipulated 
in Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 which provides 
that ‘[a] party may not invoke the provision of its internal law as justification for its 
failure to perform a Treaty’.  
 
12. There are arguments that since the Treaty is not domesticated in some Member 
States, it is not applicable in those Member States and therefore the Regulations 
promulgated pursuant to the Treaty are also not applicable in those Member States. 
The above judgment by the CCJ settles all such disputes and renders immaterial any 
justifications to put the internal house in order before the Treaty and the Regulations 
become applicable.  
 
13. The decision of the CCJ above made reference to Article 27 of the Vienna 
Convention which establishes a mandatory obligation consistent with Articles 5 and 
10 of the Treaty and Article 5 of the Regulations that a State cannot justify the non-
performance of its obligations under a Treaty upon its municipal law. According to 
Ximena Fuentes Torrijo,230 the travaux preparatoire of Article 27 support the view 
that this is a responsibility rule that has the sole effect of excluding national law as a 
 




ground to excuse international responsibility. Indeed, all this is supported by the 3rd 
recital to the Vienna Convention which affirms that the principles of free consent, 
good faith, and pacta sunt servanda are universally recognized.231 Article 26 of the 
Vienna Convention cements this position when it reads that all Treaties are binding on 
the parties thereto and must be performed by them in good faith.232  
 
14. The European case of Costa v. ENEL (1964)233 is another interesting case on the 
subject. The facts of the case were that an individual was claiming before his local 
court that the law nationalising production and distribution of electricity was 
incompatible with the EC Treaty. The European Court of Justice in its judgment 
emphasised the unlimited duration of the Community, the autonomy of Community 
power, both internally and externally, and especially the limitation of competence or 
transfer of powers from the States to the EC. The Court was determined to show that 
the “words and spirit of the treaty” necessarily implied that it is impossible for the 
States to set up a subsequent unilateral measure against a legal order which they have 
accepted on a reciprocal basis. The Court was thus able to reach a conclusion in Costa 
in words which have had considerable influence in national decisions.234 The Court 
stated that: 
 
“the law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law could not, 
because of its special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal 
provisions, however framed, without being deprived of its character as Community 
law and without the legal basis of the Community itself being called into question”. 
 
15. According to Elena Papageorgiou, “the spirit of the Treaty required that they all act 
with equal diligence to give full effect to Community laws which they had accepted 
on the basis of State ‘reciprocity’ – meaning presumably that since each state was 
equally bound by laws passed for the Community as a whole, they had all agreed that 
no one of them would unilaterally derogate from Treaty obligations. And since the 
‘aims’ of the Treaty were those of integration and co-operation, their achievement 
 
231 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969. 
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would be undermined by one Member State refusing to give effect to a Community 
law which, should bind all”.235  
 
16. In summarising this section, it is evident that Statute and case law has shown that 
Treaties are binding on all the Member States who are parties to them. It should be 
noted though that Treaties are binding to the extent of the reservations made by the 
parties thereto. Where there are no reservations, Treaties are binding in their entirety. 
This research has not come across any Member State that made reservations as 
regards the application of Article 55 of the Treaty. 
 
17.  From a legal point of view, it does not matter whether a country follows a monist or 
dualist system. However, this may be a fundamental consideration when it comes to 
the practical implementation of Treaty obligations as will be seen later in the 
dissertation. The foregoing provides sound legal and theoretical principles, but it is 
important to look at what pertains in reality. To explore this discourse further, the 
dissertation shall discuss two legal systems namely; monism and dualism as these 





18. Under this legal system, municipal law and international law are considered distinct. 
International law is not self-executing in a domestic legal order and must expressly be 
incorporated through a process called domestication in order to be enforceable at 
municipal level. This is usually done through a separate legal instrument such as an 
Act of Parliament or a Statutory Instrument. In view of this, it is not improbable for an 
obligation to be legally binding in international law and have effect in the 
international legal system but is arguably unenforceable in the municipal legal system 
as was the case in the Polytol case. 
 
19. It should be noted that most COMESA Member States have dualistic legal systems 
and thus require the domestication of the Treaty and the Regulations in order for them 
 





to be enforced in their jurisdictions. This presents a legal nightmare to persons subject 
to the application of the two legal systems. This is because while they may be in order 
to respect an international instrument and disregard the municipal instrument, they 
may be sanctioned at national level for not observing the municipal legal system. This 
is true for example where a merger meets the COMESA thresholds. In such a case, 
the merging parties arguably only have the obligation to notify the merger to the 
Commission even when notification requirements are met in the Member States 
where they operate. Table 1 below shows the legal systems of selected COMESA 
Member States and the status of domestication at the time of writing. 
 
Table 1: Legal Systems of Selected COMESA Member States on Domestication of 
International Law 
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20. A review of table 1 shows that none of the COMESA Member States with a dualistic 
legal order has domesticated the Treaty and the Regulations except Uganda and 
Eswatini respectively.239 Uganda recently enacted a legal instrument to domesticate 
the Treaty. In 2016, Uganda passed the COMESA Treaty Implementation Act. The 
COMESA Treaty Implementation Act (2017) gives the force of law to the Treaty in 
Uganda.240 As regards Eswatini, in domesticating the Regulations, it relied on Section 
238 of the Constitution Act of Swaziland (the Constitution of Swaziland).241 The 
Constitution of Swaziland appear to provide two ways in which an international 
agreement can become binding on the government, i.e. ratification and non-
ratification for those international instruments that are self-executing. The Eswatini 
authorities interpreted the Treaty as being self-executing from the reading of Articles 
5, 10 and 55 of thereof. The Regulations were therefore, in 2017 domesticated on this 
premise. 
 
21. The case of Mauritius is interesting though. The officials at the Mauritius Competition 
Authority claim that domestication is required for the Regulations to be enforceable in 
Mauritius. Mr. Vipin Naugah submitted that Mauritius takes a dualist approach to 
international treaties and instruments. Therefore to have effect in Mauritius, they have 
to be domesticated through enactment. He averred that this is given effect by Article 2 
of the Constitution of Mauritius which provides that:  
  
“This Constitution is the supreme law of Mauritius and if any other law is 
inconsistent with this Constitution, that other law shall, to the extent of the 
inconsistency, be void”. 
  
 
239 It should be recalled that it is the Executive Branch of Government that is charged with the responsibility of 
entering into international agreements and further submit them to the legislature for domestication. In most 
cases the Executive after ratification have gone to sleep. This shows an awful lack of seriousness and among the 
reasons why general economic and legal development is not impressive in the Common Market. 
240 https://www.independent.co.ug/comesa-commends-uganda-roads/ (accessed on 6 March 2019) 
241 Email exchange of 10 June 2019 between Ms. Thembelihle Dube; the Legal Counsel of the Competition 




22. Mr. Naugar submitted that in as far as he was aware, the Treaty and Regulations were 
not domesticated in Mauritius.242 However, it is difficult to conquer with Mr. 
Naugar’s view that the Constitution in Mauritius requires international instruments to 
be domesticated. It is unequivocal that the Constitution is Supreme pursuant to Article 
2 thereof and that all international instruments that are inconsistent with it are null and 
void. It follows therefore that these instruments will be unenforceable in Mauritius 
only to the extent that they are ultra vires the Constitution. This is a different matter 
from domestication and this research has not come across an Article in the Mauritian 
Constitution that requires domestication. However, this position coming from the 
Mauritians leaves a lot of uncertainty and it would be prudent to domesticate the 
Regulations to settle the matter. It has to be recalled that the Mauritian authorities had 
similar arguments in the Polytol case cited above.  
 
23. It is paramount to note that in dualistic jurisdictions, the Constitution is observed as 
the Supreme law of the land and anything contrary to the Constitution is null and void 
ab initio to the extent of the inconsistency. It should be pointed out however, that 
some domestic courts have given recognition to international instruments in their 
judgments like the Zambian High Court in the cases of Nawakwi v. Attorney 
General243 and Longwe v. Intercontinental Hotel.244  Nevertheless, even in these 
cases, the Courts did not pronounce that international instruments were binding. As a 
matter of fact, they stated that the international instruments were of persuasive value. 
For example, in the case of The Attorney General v. Roy Clark, the Supreme Court 
of Zambia held that:245 
 
“In applying and construing our Statutes, we can take into consideration 
international instruments to which Zambia is a signatory. However, these 
international instruments are of persuasive value unless they are domesticated in 
our laws”.  
 
 
242 Email exchange of 10 June 2019 between Mr. Vipin Naugar of the Competition Commission of Mauritius 
and the Author. 
243 1990/HP/1724 (HC). See M. Hansungule “Domestication of International Human Rights Law in Zambia” in 
M. Kilander (ed) International Law and Domestic Human Rights Litigation in Africa (2010) 83 -108, 76.  
244 1992/HP/765 (HC). 




24. While this is comforting in that Courts in some jurisdictions will give due regard to 
international instruments it does not erase the uncertainty it raises on the merging 
parties who may want to claim their rights under the Regulations and National 
Competition Authorities who may wish to exercise their powers under their municipal 
laws. In the absence of absolute domestication, it is not certain how the Courts may 
elect to interpret international legal instruments. Other cases support this view. For 
example, in the case of Zambia Sugar Plc v. Fellow Nanzaluka, Appeal No. 
82/2001, the court observed thus: 
  
“International instruments on any law, although ratified and assented to by a State, 
cannot be applied unless domesticated”. 
  
25. Therefore, it is notable that before an international instrument can be recognised as 
binding law in Zambia it must be transformed into municipal law through the process 
of domestication. Suffice to observe that the Zambian CCPA does appear to give 
recognition to the COMESA legal instruments albeit devoid of absolute clarity. 
Section 65 of the CCPA provides that: 
 
(1) “Subject to the provisions of subsection (2), a foreign competition authority 
may, where it has reasonable grounds to believe that anti-competitive 
practices in Zambia are damaging competition in the country of the 
authority, request the Commission to investigate and make an appropriate 
determination. 
 
(2) Subsection (1) applies –  
 
(a) to requests from other members of the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa or of the Southern African Development Community by 
virtue of the obligations assumed by Zambia towards these organisations; 
and  
 
(b) where the Minister has certified by order, in the Gazette, that Zambia has 




on a basis of reciprocity, each party to the agreement shall exercise the 
principles of comity on the basis described in subsection (1) in investigating 
and determining cases falling within its jurisdiction”.       
 
26. A cursory reading of these provisions in the Zambian CCPA gives some sense of hope 
that CCPC would respect its obligations through Treaties and other legal instruments 
to which Zambia has assented. After all, this is the appropriate thing to do by virtue of 
the principle of pacta sunt servanda.  One would surmise that this could be the 
provision the CCPC has found solace in submitting to the jurisdiction of the 
Commission. The foregoing notwithstanding, a careful and detailed review of the 
CCPA brings back the same uncertainty. Section 65(2)(b) of the CCPA informs us 
that such investigations or recognition are based on reciprocity and comity. The 
disadvantages of ‘comity’ have already been identified in the introduction section of 
the dissertation. Comity is not stricto sensu a legal obligation but a good faith 
requirement to conduct affairs in a manner agreed by the higher contracting parties. It 
therefore does not provide absolute certainty that the CCPC and Zambia generally 
would respect their obligations in the Treaty under all circumstances. Secondly, 
Section 65 of the CCPA has referred to the principle of ‘reciprocity’. This brings 
another troubling reading to a provision that prima facie appeared to have given the 
CCPC legal authority to respect the provisions of the Treaty with absolute certainty. 
Reciprocity in simple terms means that one Member States would only perform its 
obligations under an agreement if the other Member States are doing the same. This 
requirement under international law was explicated in the Costa v. Enel case cited 
above. The implementation of section 65(2)(b) of the CCPA is therefore questionable 
as not all Member States would comply with the Regulations nor the Treaty under all 
circumstances as demonstrated in the Polytol case. Further, observance of 
international legal instruments by the Courts of one Jurisdiction does not guarantee 
the same in another.  
 
27. A review of section 65 of the CCPA also discloses that what is actually contemplated 
is not an investigation using the law of another country or indeed a regional law in the 
case of COMESA but an investigation with the CCPA having jurisdiction. This brings 




Zambia. There are indications that Zambia may incorporate the Regulations in the 
proposed amendments to the CCPA which would provide relief to the enforcement of 
the Regulations in Zambia.246 
 
28. Placing further emphasis on domestication, it has been observed that most dualistic 
Constitutions require international legal instruments to be domesticated for them to be 
legally enforceable. Suffice to mention that this situation is not a secret or merely 
academic in order to earn a PhD. This situation is very real as could be seen from the 
remarks and positions of High Court Judges of the COMESA Member States 
organised by the Commission in August 2016 in Mangochi, Malawi. The Judges were 
unanimous in their view that the Regulations and the Treaty could only be recognised 
in dualistic legal systems if they were domesticated. For example, the Judge-in-
Charge of the High Court of Malawi (Commercial Division), John Kapsala stated that 
the Courts in Malawi would only consider the Treaty as forming part of Malawi law if 
the Treaty is domesticated in Malawi through an Act of Parliament. Short of 
domestication through an Act of Parliament, Malawian courts cannot rely on a Treaty 
in dealing with violations of the provisions of the Treaty. If this is coming from high 
authorities like High Court Judges, then the situation is not as simple as it may appear 
and poses a great risk to the success of the implementation of the Treaty, Regulations 
and ultimately the single market imperative. 
 
29. The procedure for domestication in Malawi is addressed under section 211 of the 
Constitution which guides that international agreements entered into after the 
commencement of this Constitution shall form part of the law of the Republic if so 
provided by an Act of Parliament. The meaning of this is that a Treaty cannot be 
enforced in Malawi if it is not domesticated as per the provisions of section 211 of the 
Constitution. This is supported by Court Judgments like in the celebrated case of 
Chihana v R (MSCA Criminal Appeal No. 9 of 1992) [1993] MWSC 1 (29 March 
1993). In that case, the Supreme Court of Malawi posited that a Treaty would only be 
considered as been part of the Malawian legal system if it was domesticated through 
an Act of Parliament. As already observed, this is not only unique to Malawi but other 
Member States who have a dualistic legal system.   
 
246 Conversation with Mr. Chilufya Sampa, the Chief Executive Officer of CCPC during the meeting regarding 





30. How then should the dichotomy that the Regulations are binding by virtue of the 
Treaty, Vienna Convention and Case law be reconciled? The starting point is to 
understand that ‘domestication’ though closely related is different from the principle 
of ‘binding’. Further, the Treaty binds the State and non-observance of it may result in 
sanctions meted on the State at international level. Therefore, legally and rightly so, 
the domestic institutions including persons may decline to recognise the Treaty or 
Regulations due to lack of domestication in a dualistic State even if they are binding 
at international level. The consequences of such would be at State level. Such 
consequences are provided for under Article 171 of the Treaty where the Member 
States have reiterated the importance of observing the obligations of the Treaty by 
agreeing that for the attainment of the objectives of the Common Market, full 
commitment of each Member State to the fulfilment of the obligations contained in 
this Treaty shall be required. To this end, the Member States have agreed that specific 
sanctions may be imposed by the Authority to secure fulfilment by the Member States 
of their obligations under this Treaty. The lack of domestication therefore remains a 




31. Under this legal system, international legal instruments are self-executing. What this 
means is that immediately a State ratifies an international legal instrument, it 
automatically becomes binding and enforceable in the jurisdiction of that State. In a 
monist system, international legal instruments are given higher regard than municipal 
law which is viewed as subservient to the former. It therefore means that where there 
is a conflict between municipal law and international law, the latter would supersede. 
There are a few countries with seemingly monist legal systems in the Common 
Market among them Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti and Kenya. These 
Member States appear to have a semblance of a monist legal system because carefully 
reviewed, they do not squarely fit into the theoretical fundamentals of a pure monist 
system and this raises similar risks as in the dualist system discussed above. The next 





32.  Section 2(6) of the Kenyan Constitution provides that any Treaty or convention 
ratified by Kenya shall form part of the law of Kenya under the Constitution. Section 
2(6) of the Kenyan Constitution appear to be very clear that Kenya follows a monist 
system. However, different legal scholars have argued that this is in fact not the case 
as Kenya still follows the tenets of a dualist system. They cite Article 94(5) for these 
purposes which provides that no person or body, other than Parliament, has the power 
to make provisions having the force of law in Kenya except under authority conferred 
by the Constitution or by legislation.247 The argument is that since Treaties are 
entered into by the Executive, they cannot automatically become enforceable as 
authority has to be conferred by the Constitution or by legislation. With all due 
respect this argument sounds unreasoned. The Constitution has under Article 2(6) 
implicitly granted authority to the Executive which enters into Treaties by making 
them automatically enforceable in Kenya. However, what this tells us is that as long 
as there is no Court interpretation, the risk that Kenya stills follows a dualistic 
approach remains.  
 
33. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) appear to have a clear monistic system 
with less room for debate. According to Section 215 of the DRC 2006 Constitution, 
international Treaties to which the DRC is a State Party supersede domestic law. 
However, there is a caveat to this. Section 215 adds that this is without prejudice to 
its application by the other party. It is not immediately clear what this means but it is 
not far-fetched to conclude that this status is only accorded on condition that other 
State parties also give due respect to their Treaty obligations. This poses a risk in that 
Member States with dualist legal systems may not fully observe their obligations if 
the Treaty and the Regulations have not been domesticated. It remains to be seen how 
the Courts shall interpret this provision should they be faced with a case requiring 
such a pronouncement. Nevertheless, currently, what is clear is that the DRC follows 
a monist legal system as confirmed by the decision of the Military Tribunal of Ituri in 
Military Prosecutor v. Massaba (Blaise Bongi) Criminal Trial Judgment and 
 
247 See Asher, E.O. 2013. “Incorporating Transnational Norms in the Constitution of Kenya: The Place of 
International Law in the Legal System of Kenya”. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science. Vol. 
3, No. 11; June 2013. Under settings http://www.ijhssnet.com/journals/Vol_3_No_11_June_2013/29.pdf 





accompanying civil action for damages, RP No. 018/2006, RMP No. 242/PEN/06, 
ILDC 387 (CD 2006), 24th March 2006, Military Tribunal. In that case, questions 
of primacy as regards international law and municipal law were raised. The 
international legal instrument in question was the 1998 Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court. The DRC applied the provisions of this Statute based 
on the monist legal system.  
 
10.2.     Conclusion  
 
34. In conclusion, it has been observed that domestication is indispensable for the 
effective implementation of the Regulations. There are some Member States with a 
monist legal approach, but it appears that even then, practical challenges of 
enforcement may arise, as the principles of reciprocity may jeopardize the 
effectiveness of such a system. The challenge posed by the lack of domestication 
affects both the merging parties and the National Competition Authorities as it results 
in significant legal uncertainty, a very inappropriate situation in law. This situation 
may jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of the Common Market and indeed 
the Regulations.  
 
35. The application of the Treaty and the Regulations forms the foundation of the 
resolution of the challenges encountered in cross-border merger regulation. Where 
this remains, it is difficult to see how the Regulations may effectively address other 
challenges of cross-border merger regulation. For example, the dominance of 
national policies especially public interest and sovereignty may lead to some Member 
States to dubiously disregard the recognition of the Regulations based on non-
domestication. At the advent of enforcement of the Regulations, Kenya raised these 
matters as reasons for not yielding to the jurisdiction of the Regulations. The next 
chapter shall review some other challenges encountered in cross-border merger 










11.0Challenges for the Merging Parties and whether the Regulations have resolved 
these Challenges 
 
11.1 Costs of Multi-jurisdictional Merger Review Processes 
 
1. Research undertaken on cross-border mergers reveals that its regulation poses 
challenges to both the merging parties and the national competition authorities. This 
dissertation has also investigated some of these challenges and verified their 
existence. The dissertation has thereafter expounded on whether the promulgation of 
the Regulations has addressed these challenges.  
 
2. The challenges arguably raise the cost of concluding mergers. Chapter Eleven has 
focussed on the challenges encountered by the merging parties. The dissertation has 
focused on identified challenges it deemed significant and serious enough to require 
immediate attention.248 Below are the challenges the research has identified as serious 
and those it will discuss in greater detail in the subsequent sections of Chapter Eleven: 
 
(i) Information Requirements for Different Jurisdictions 
(ii) Voluntary vs. Mandatory Merger Notification Regimes 
(iii) Suspensory vs. Non-suspensory Merger Control Regimes 
(iv) Inconsistent Approaches and Decisions by National Competition Authorities 
Involved 
(v) High Merger Notification Fees 
(vi) Waiting Periods after Notification 
(vii) Triggering Events for Notification 
(viii) Local Nexus 
(ix) Non-Domestication of the Treaty and the Regulations 
(x) Insufficient Precedent on Merger Determinations 
 
248 It should be noted that there are other challenges established by various researches undertaken on the subject. 
However, for purposes of this research and in the context of the Common Market, the challenges identified in 




(xi) Policy Imperatives beyond the Conventional Consideration of Mergers under the 
Test of Substantial Lessening of Competition 
 
3. Each of the above identified challenges has been discussed in detail below. The 
dissertation has also considered whether or not the Regulations have addressed these 
challenges.  
 
11.1.1  Information Requirements for Different Jurisdictions 
 
4. Parties to a merger face challenges when their transaction is subject to a multiplicity 
of review processes. Merging parties whose transaction is subject to review by two or 
more jurisdictions have to familiarise themselves with different notification 
requirements where their merger satisfies the merger notification requirements. This 
may be a very onerous, time consuming and costly exercise. For example, the Bayer 
Aktiengesellchaft/Mosanto merger notified to the Commission on 16 February 2017 
took over four months to be notified from the time the decision to merge was made.249 
The parties’ legal representatives, Messrs Nkonzo Hlatshwayo and Lesely Morphet of 
Hogan Lovells lamented that the information requirements and the burden of putting 
together a mechanism for notifications in various jurisdiction was massive. This is 
clearly an infraction of Article 24(1) of the Regulations which requires mergers to be 
notified within 30 days of  the parties’ decision to merge.250  
 
5. It is quite clear that different competition regimes have different standards and 
quantity of information required for filing a merger. Others require more information. 
Still the information required by other jurisdictions is vague. The questions posed to 
the merging parties in the merger notification forms or any other such instruments are 
not uniform. In fact, the Whish/Diane report251 has identified harmonising information 
 
249 The parties’ legal representatives, Messrs Nkonzo Hlatshwayo and Lesely Morphet of Hogan Lovells 
lamented that the information requirements and the burden of putting together a mechanism for notifications in 
various jurisdiction was massive. 
250 The parties had however engaged the Commission in October 2016 on the matter and explained that it was 
impossible to submit the merger within the stipulated time due to the huge and different information 
requirements for different jurisdictions. The Commission chose to interpret Article 24(1) expansively and 
purposively and construed the initial engagement with the parties as the commencement of the notification 
process pending complete notification. 




requirements in the notification forms as a possible and greater step towards 
convergence.  
 
6. However, the utilisation of a common filing form with common filing requirements 
may not be easy as observed by the same report. The report observed that 
harmonising such a document would require the harmonisation of substantive 
requirements where the notification forms are premised. Most notification forms are 
promulgated as subsidiary legislation to an enabling law. Sometimes amending a 
subsidiary law without amending the enabling law may result in the subsidiary 
legislation been ultra vires and therefore null and void. It follows therefore that 
although such attempts are more realistic than attempts to harmonise substantive laws, 
it is still a long way before such a goal is achieved within a multilateral framework. 
Further, it appears difficult to reconcile common information requirements for the 
different jurisdictions involved when they are likely to have different policy 
considerations like public interest which may mean different things in different 
jurisdictions. Interestingly, this research revealed that the merger notification forms in 
the Member States are largely uniform in terms of the information required. 
Therefore, even in the absence of a ‘one-stop-shop’, it is unlikely that such 
information requirement in the different jurisdictions would cause confusion in terms 
of the type of information required.  
 
7. Worth noting is that some jurisdictions in the Common Market have a two-phase 
approach to merger assessment. This means that there is a Phase One under which 
mergers that are manifestly unlikely to raise competition concerns are considered and 
Phase Two under which mergers that are likely to raise competition concerns are 
considered. In most jurisdictions, this is not enshrined in legislation but in some 
guideline or office practice note to clear or dispose of those mergers that are unlikely 
to raise significant competition concerns under any conceivable standard of 
assessment. However, it is unfortunate that for most if not all competition authorities 
in the Common Market, the information requirements and the corresponding 
notification forms are the same for both phases. Competition authorities should not 
burden the parties by asking for information that may be irrelevant to the assessment 




Have the Regulations Resolved this Challenge? 
 
8. Undoubtedly the Promulgation of the Regulations has resolved this challenge with 
regard to merger notification in eighteen (18) Member States252 with the exception of 
Kenya which still disputes the jurisdiction of the Regulations and the ‘one-stop-shop 
principle’.253 The merger parties do not need to comply with the information 
requirements of various Member States which regulate mergers because once a 
merger has met the regional dimension requirement, notification is done only with the 
Commission pursuant to the ‘one-stop-shop’ principle the primordial of supra-
national merger control. In any case, this research revealed that this challenge is not 
insurmountable as information requirements are almost uniform in all the Member 
States. 
 
9. Nevertheless, reform needs to be done at COMESA level to streamline the 
information requirement especially under the Phase One stage of assessment. The 
Regulations do not provide for a two-stage merger assessment process, but the 
Guidelines under Section 6 provide for a two-stage merger assessment process 
(Phases One and Two) Mergers that are on a higher balance of probability unlikely to 
raise significant competition concerns are assessed under Phase One within 45 days. 
However, the instrument for filing these mergers and submitting the information to 
the Commission is the same COMESA Merger Notification Form 12 (Form 12). 
There is need for the Commission to address this by following the practice in the EU 
where there are two forms for the two processes. The Form CO and Short Form used 
by the DG Comp of the EC may be adopted by the Commission. In the Short Form, 
there is less information requested for and is based suited for a Phase One assessment. 
The Form CO is best suited for Phase Two mergers, i.e. those that have a greater 
likelihood of raising significant competition concerns. Correspondingly, such merger 
 
252 Tunisia and Somalia have been left out here because at the time of writing the dissertation, it was not clear 
whether these countries submitted to the jurisdiction of the Regulations as there was nothing on record to clarify 
this position. 
253 It should be noted that at the time of writing, the Competition Authority of Kenya and the Commission had 
reached an advanced stage in resolving the notification requirement in Kenya for mergers that have a regional 
dimension. Kenya had at the time put for comments on its website the draft guidelines which among other things 
resolves the problem of double notification. See https://www.cak.go.ke/index.php/statute-




assessments require a substantial amount of information to be comprehensively 
reviewed. 
 
10. Further, the Commission Form 12, requests unnecessary information even for mergers 
that are likely to be assessed under phase two. The information is unnecessary in the 
sense that it is never used for purposes of reviewing the merger. For example, Part VII 
of the Form 12 under the heading “Statement of Merger Information” is deeply 
worrying in some sections, particularly section 1. This part is ostensibly onerous on 
the merging parties when it obliges them to use the 5 – digit Standard Industrial 
Classification Codes (SIC) to identify the product(s) and/or services. Clearly this 
information is irrelevant especially in DEEs and in the Common Market in particular 
to the extent that it relates to merger assessment. It is observed that its absence does 
not alter the trajectory of the investigation or the assessment of a merger 
transaction.254  
 
11. An inspection of the merger reports at the Commission’s registry reveals that since 
inception and of the over 240 merger cases the Commission has reviewed thus far, the 
SIC has never been used for purposes of merger assessment. This confirms the 
conclusion that this information requirement is onerous on the parties and 
superfluous.  
   
11.1.2  Voluntary vs. Mandatory Regimes 
 
12. In jurisdictions where merger notification is voluntary, the parties may conduct their 
own assessment and elect not to notify the merger where their determination reveals 
that the merger is unlikely to cause significant injury to the market. In 
contradistinction, in mandatory merger notification regimes, all merger transactions 
that meet the pre-set criteria are subject to notification and the determination of 
whether they result in significant competitive harm is the preserve of a competition 
authority. Among the problems identified by the instant research were the ambiguous 
laws which may make it difficult to establish with sufficient certainty whether the 
regime is mandatory or voluntary. This is worsened by difficulties in establishing with 
 
254 Suffice to not that with the robust advancement of the digital economy and markets, this may become a 




sufficient certainty that the transaction is unlikely to lead to significant competitive 
harm and therefore does not require notification in a voluntary regime. Mauritius and 
Malawi were identified and chosen to explain the identified challenges with regard to 
voluntary and mandatory merger notification requirements.  
 
13. Mauritius has a voluntary merger review regime whereas most Member States of 
COMESA require mandatory notification of mergers once the notification 
requirements are met.  The Mauritian competition legislation for example provides 
under section 48 that a merger is subject to review by the competition authority 
where: 
 
• all the parties to the merger supply or acquire goods or services of any description, 
and following the merger, the merged entity will supply or acquire 30% or more 
of all those goods or services in the market; 
• prior to the merger, one of the parties to the merger alone supplies or acquires 
30% or more of goods or services of any description on the market;255 and  
• the competition authority has reasonable grounds to believe that the creation of the 
merger situation has resulted in, or is likely to result in, a substantial lessening of 
competition within any market for goods or services. 
 
14. At first glance, the text may suggest that merger notification is mandatory where it 
meets the conditions laid down in the competition legislation. However, section 47(4) 
of the Mauritian Competition Act suggests that the merger notification regime in 
Mauritius is voluntary when it provides that: 
 
“where two or more enterprises intend to be in a merger situation, any 
one of the enterprises may apply to the Commission for guidance as to 
whether the proposed merger situation is likely to result in a substantial 
lessening of competition within any market for goods or services” 
 
 
255 This provision is worrying in that it presupposes a situation where the competition authority may claim 
jurisdiction on a merger where one of the parties to the transaction has insignificant market shares and thereby 




15.  This provision of the Mauritian competition law does not impose a mandatory 
notification obligation on the parties but simply advises them to seek guidance. This 
position has been confirmed by officials from the Mauritian competition authority that 
the Mauritian merger regime is voluntary.256        
 
16. Mauritius is not the only Member State with a voluntary merger review regime. 
Malawi also has a voluntary merger review regime as clarified by the High Court of 
Malawi, in the ex parte matter: In Re the State and the Competition and Fair 
Trading Commission, Miscellaneous Case No. 1 of 2013 (Application for Judicial 
Review). Before this judgment, the Competition and Fair Trading Commission 
(CFTC) of Malawi took the approach that merger notification was mandatory in 
Malawi. However, confusion still remains even in the wake of the Court judgment. 
Mr. Richard Chiputula, the Head of the Mergers and Acquisitions Department at 
CFTC at the time of writing succinctly observed that the view that the regime is 
voluntary comes from the fact that the wording of the relevant provisions is silent on 
whether it is mandatory or voluntary. Section 35(1) of the Competition and Fair 
Trading Act (CFTA) creates an offence for anyone who consummates a merger 
without authorisation from the CFTC if that merger would likely have negative effect 
on competition. Further, pursuant to section 35(2), mergers consummated without this 
authorisation lack legal effect. It is tempting to think that if it is an offence to engage 
in a merger that leads to a substantial lessening of competition and indeed if such 
mergers have no legal effect, then logic and common sense would dictate that the 
mergers should be notified to the CFTC to make a determination on whether they 
would have such a consequence.  
 
17. According to Mr. Chiputula, their interpretation of section 35 is that the determination 
of whether a merger would have negative effect on competition or not rests with the 
CFTC and it cannot make a determination without information. Hence the parties are 
required to provide relevant information to the CFTC for assessment. Therefore, 
parties are under obligation to notify any transaction particularly that the law does not 
 
256 Among these are former officials of the Authority namely; Ms. Sandya Booluck and Mr. Rajeev Hasnah. Mr. 
Deshmook Kowlesur, the Chief Executive Officer of the Competition Commission of Mauritius confirmed this 
position at the Media Workshop held by the Competition Commission of Mauritius in Port Louise, Mauritius on 




provide for thresholds. Mr. Chiputula submitted that some legal practitioners have 
interpreted section 36 of the CFTA as providing for voluntary notification. However, 
according to Mr. Chiputula, the CFTC’s interpretation of section 36 is that it refers to 
persons who may submit a notification to the CFTC as opposed to the notifiability of 
transactions. This view by Mr. Chiputula appears to be correct. Section 36 of the 
CFTA provides that “any person may apply to the CFTC for an order authorising 
that person to effect a merger or takeover”. It does appear that any person with an 
interest to a merger may make application to the authority but not that the merger 
notification itself is subject to the word ‘may’.  Nevertheless, this debate is academic 
as merger notification in Malawi is currently voluntary as per the Court Ruling.  
 
18. To reconcile the two divergent interpretations the CFTC has taken a position that 
parties can choose to notify or not but the CFTC as a regulator can require parties to 
notify any transaction where it suspects the transaction may infringe section 
35.257 CFTC strongly believes that the High Court of Malawi erred in its ruling on this 
subject. According to Mr. Chiputula, the court ruling nullifies the CFTC’s mandate 
over mergers.   
 
19. It does not however appear true that the High Court ruling nullified the CFTC’s 
mandate on mergers. It is difficult to comprehend such an outcome from the 
honourable court judgment. The Court appears to have held that parties are not 
obliged to notify mergers, but it is up to the Commission to review these mergers if 
they threaten to harm the competitive structures of markets. Such parties may be 
summoned to submit information for these purposes. 
 
20. What then is the challenge of Voluntary vs. Mandatory merger notification 
requirements for the merging parties? The existence of both regimes presents concern 
for merging parties. Firstly, sometimes it is not conspicuously the situation that 
criteria for notification in a voluntary merger notification regime is met as is the case 
with Malawi for example. In this case, the merging parties may have to take a great 
deal of risk due to the uncertainty surrounding the merger regimes in such 
jurisdictions. Should the parties go ahead and implement such a merger which is then 
 




determined to be a notifiable merger, legal, financial and practical trouble may ensue. 
Firstly, the wording of some legislation like the Malawi competition legislation are far 
from clear. For these purposes, it is worthwhile to look at section 35 of the CFTA 
again which provides that: 
 
(1) “Any person who, in the absence of authority from the Commission (CFTC), 
whether as a principal or agent and whether by another enterprise, or his 
agent, participates in effecting –  
 
(a) a merger between two or more independent enterprises; 
(b) a takeover of one or more such enterprises by another enterprise, or, by a 
person who controls another such enterprise,  
where such a merger or takeover is likely to result in substantial lessening of 
competition in any market shall be guilty of an offence”. 
 
(2) No merger or takeover made in contravention to subsection (1) shall have any 
legal effect and no rights or obligations imposed on the participating parties 
by any agreement in respect of the merger or takeover shall be legally 
enforceable.    
 
21. As observed in chapter six, what amounts to a substantial lessening of competition 
cannot be determined with mathematical precision. No matter how competition 
authorities may stress the importance of objective consideration of mergers, there is 
still some degree of value judgments and subjective considerations in merger 
assessment. It is this factor that may lead to a competition authority and the merging 
parties to arrive at different conclusions regarding the notifiability of a merger in a 
voluntary merger review regime. In the case of Malawi, such a development may be 
worrying as section 35 of the CFTA gives an indication that a merger which is 
deemed notifiable if implemented without notification would lead to a trespass of the 
law and would attract the consequent sanctions. Further, such a merger would 
immediately be deemed illegal, meaning all contracts it would have engaged in with 
various third parties would be rendered illegal and unenforceable. This is a very 




make legal and practical sense to punish merging parties for lack of notification in a 
voluntary merger notification system. It is for the Competition Authority to call for 
the notification of such a merger where it is convinced that the merger may be 
injurious to the competitive process. 
 
22. The Mauritian competition legislation appears to be clearer on whether the parties 
would be liable for a breach of the law for implementing a merger should the 
Competition Authority of Mauritius determine that the merger is in fact notifiable. 
The legislation focusses on remedying the situation as opposed to imposing sanctions. 
However, remedying the situation post-merger may also have undesirable 
consequences. The legislation has provided that one of the ways through which the 
remedy would be implemented is through divestiture. Divestiture may be a very 
costly undertaking post-merger and a lot of contracts undertaken by the merged entity 
may have to be renegotiated otherwise there is a risk of them being frustrated due to 
the possibility of the formation of new legal entities that may be created after the 
divestiture. Every businessman and lawyer understands the ominous consequences of 
frustrated contracts. 
 
23. The risk of divestiture is very real as it is possible for the competition authority of 
Mauritius and the parties to arrive at a different conclusion. This is because the 
merger notification thresholds in Mauritius are vague and opaque, i.e. they are not 
based on objective criteria, but are based on market shares. The determination of 
market shares as already observed in chapter six may not be done with absolute 
clarity. More objective thresholds like turnover are better as sales are straightforward 
to compute. The Mauritian competition legislation makes a merger transaction subject 
to notification if the merged entity’s minimum market share is 30%. To determine this 
market share, there is need to conduct an assessment and determine the relevant 
market, a process which is not always objective. Therefore, due to value judgments, 
merging parties may define their relevant market widely so that their market shares 
are diluted and avoid notification. On the other hand, there may be temptation from 
the competition authorities to define the market narrowly to capture as many mergers 




verifiable criteria of determining merger notification thresholds and international best 
practice favours turnover values in this regard. 
 
24. A careful review of the analysis of voluntary and mandatory regimes reveal that 
uncertainty is the most worrying factor. It has been observed that some jurisdictions 
like Malawi make it an offence to implement mergers that result in a substantial 
lessening of competition even when arguably as seen above, merger notification is 
voluntary. Determining whether a merger will result in a substantial lessening of 
competition is not always an easy task as seen in chapter six of this dissertation. 
Therefore, what the parties may consider to be a pro-competitive merger, a 
competition authority may consider to be anti-competitive. Similarly, in some 
jurisdictions like Mauritius, the determination of mergers that may be subject to 
notification is based on market share thresholds. However, market shares are a crude 
way of determining thresholds as their determination is not always objective. 
Therefore, the parties may not always be certain that their transaction has met the 
market share threshold for possible notification. Cognate to this is the trouble of 
identifying which jurisdictions are mandatory and those that are voluntary. This can 
sometimes take a lot of time and indeed has cost implications and may delay the final 
implementation of the transaction. 
 
Have the Regulations Resolved this Challenge? 
 
25. To the extent that the Regulations create a ‘One-Stop-Shop’, the challenges posed by 
voluntary and mandatory regimes have been resolved as transactions that have a 
regional dimension have to be notified only with the Commission. This therefore 
creates clarity of what exactly the parties need to do and reduces the burden of having 
to identify jurisdictions where the merger should be notified. The Commission’s 
merger notification regime is mandatory pursuant to Article 24 of the Regulations. 
 
11.1.3 Suspensory vs. Non-Suspensory Regimes 
 
26. Further, there are some COMESA Member States with suspensory merger review 




the Zambian merger regime suspensory in that it is a mischief at law to intentionally 
or negligently implement a merger that is reviewable by the CCPC without the 
approval of the CCPC. Section 42(2) of the Competition Act No. 12 of 2010 of the 
Laws of Kenya is even more express on the subject of suspending the merger pending 
review. It reads thus: 
 
“No person either individually or jointly or in concert with any other person, 
may implement a proposed merger to which this part applies, unless the 
proposed merger is– 
a) approved by the authority; and  
b) implemented in accordance with any conditions attached to the approval” 
 
27. The Malawian competition legislation is equally explicit on the matter when it 
provides under section 35 that: 
 
“any person who, in the absence of authority from the Commission, 
whether as a principal or agent and whether by another enterprise, or his 
agent participates in effecting a merger between two or more enterprises 
or a takeover of one or more such enterprises by another enterprise, or by 
a person who controls another such enterprise, where such a merger or 
takeover is likely to result in substantial lessening of competition in any 
market shall be guilty of an offence. Any merger or takeover made in 
contravention of the foregoing shall have no legal effect and no rights or 
obligations imposed on the participating parties by any agreement in 
respect of the merger or takeover shall be legally enforceable”.  
 
28. It would be overzealous to engage in further explanations on the foregoing as it is 
beyond dispute that the regime is suspensory where the notification requirements are 




258 The situation in Malawi is however confusing. If indeed the regime is voluntary, one wonders then how such 
a system can operate simultaneously with the suspensory system. The Malawian competition legislation needs to 




29. A strict interpretation of the Fair Competition Act 2009 (FCA) of Seychelles reveals 
that it also has a suspensory merger control regime. However, the FCA also has 
imprecise language that may cause legal confusion to those who may conveniently 
elect to do so. The FCA stipulates that where an enterprise wishes to establish a 
merger, it shall apply to the competition authority for permission to carry out or 
implement a merger. However, the FCA does not appear to expressly proscribe the 
implementation of the merger without the permission of the competition authority. 
This is implied in the language of the FCA when it states that where the authority 
determines after investigation that enterprises have effected a merger without the 
authority’s permission, the authority may by notice in writing direct the enterprises 
concerned so that the merger may be determined within such time specified in the 
direction.  
 
30. A cursory reading of this provision in the FCA appears to suggest that it is for the 
authority to investigate those mergers and ask the parties through an order to rectify 
the situation. However, the risk of confusion is not significant as the law is express 
when it provides that ‘a notifiable merger is one which involves an enterprise that by 
itself controls or, together with any other enterprise party to the proposed merger is 
likely to control 40% or more of the market or such other amounts as they minister 
may prescribe. Notifiable mergers are prohibited unless permitted by the competition 
authority’. In any case, the law has to be amended to avoid confusion and introduce 
an element of clarity. The Competition Authority of the Seychelles may also clarify 
this in the Guidelines. 
 
31. The problem raised by the existence of suspensory and non-suspensory regimes is that 
it takes a lot of time and work for the merging parties to gather this information and 
comply with the different procedural requirements by the various authorities. This 
compounds the problem of costs in both administrative and pecuniary respects. A lot 
of money is paid by the parties to the attorneys and other professionals to gather all 
this information and ensure that it is accurate. Anything short of this would lead to 






 Have the Regulations Resolved this Challenge? 
 
32. To the extent that the Regulations create a ‘one-stop-shop’ with respect to cross-
border mergers, it may appear that they have resolved this challenge. Nevertheless, a 
careful review of the Regulations discloses that a fundamental challenge has been 
conceived as regards this matter. 
 
33. The COMESA merger control regime itself is a non-suspensory regime as observed 
from the wording of Article 24, contrary to the Commission officials’ interpretation. 
Article 24 appears (emphasis) to proscribe the implementation of a merger before 
notification to the Commission but is silent on the implementation of the merger 
before the Commission’s approval. The language of the legislation is not as express as 
the language in the Kenyan, Eswatini or Zambian competition statutes which 
expressly proscribe the implementation of mergers before the approval. In the 
Regulations, the relevant Articles for these purposes are Articles 24(1) and (2) of the 
Regulations which provides that: 
 
1. “A party to a notifiable merger shall notify the Commission in writing of the 
proposed merger as soon as it is practicable but in no event later than 30 days 
of the parties’ decision to merge. 
 
2. Any notifiable merger carried out in contravention of this part shall have no 
legal effect and no rights or obligations imposed on the participating parties 
by any agreement in respect of the merger shall be legally enforceable in the 
Common Market. 
 
34. An analysis of these provisions reveals that the Regulations do not outlaw the 
implementation of a merger before approval. What appears to be the case especially 
from Article 24(1) is that a merger has to be notified before it is implemented. Even 
this is a logical and practical conclusion but not a legal conclusion. Indeed, the 
requirement to notify a merger 30 days after a decision to merge259 has been arrived at 
by the parties makes it almost always the case that a merger cannot be implemented 
 




before notification. This is because practice has shown that implementing most 
mergers involves an array of processes and procedures that usually cannot be 
concluded in 30 days. From this angle, one would be correct therefore to argue that 
the Regulations in practice proscribe the implementation of a merger before 
Notification. However, legally and in theory, this position is not true. If the parties 
implement and are able to notify a merger before the expiration of the 30-day period 
within which notification of the merger should be done after the decision to merge has 
been reached, there is no breach of law. Therefore, legally, the COMESA merger 
control regime is actually non-suspensory contrary to what the Commission’s officials 
preach at various fora.260 This legal analysis is actually consistent with the Guidelines 
which the Commission officials have chosen to ignore either deliberately or because 
they have not read the Guidelines in full. Section 5.32 of the Guidelines provides that: 
 
“The Regulations do not prohibit the parties from implementing a notifiable 
merger before making a notification or before the Commission issues a 
decision declaring that it does not object to the merger. However, parties 
should be cautious when implementing a notifiable merger before receiving 
such a decision. If upon review the Commission determines that such a merger 
is unlawful under Article 26(7) of the Regulations, the parties may be required 
to dissolve the merger or take steps as may be determined by the Commission 
under the Regulations to make the merger lawful”. 
 
35. Section 5.32 of the Guidelines is express and very consistent with the analysis in this 
dissertation. Article 24 has not made any reference to implementation of a merger 
when it outlines the sanctions for failure to obey the merger law. Nevertheless, there 
is still a lot of uncertainty as regards the question of whether the COMESA merger 
regime is suspensory or non-suspensory. The position of the Commission officials 
who indicate that it is suspensory exacerbates the problem. The Guidelines under 
section 5.32 are clear but the lack of attention by both the Commission staff and the 
stakeholders does not help the situation.  
 
 
260 Mr. George Lipimile has been cited at several fora stating that it is not lawful to implement a merger before 
the Commission’s decision. This was reiterated at the Media Workshop organized by the Competition 




36. Further the Guidelines are not binding. Therefore, when the Commission is 
confronted with a contrary view, it may elect to ignore the Guidelines. The 
Regulations need to be amended to make it clear that they are either suspensory or 
non-suspensory. The Regulations need to provide for an express suspensory merger 
control regime for two reasons. The first reason is that a suspensory regime provides 
certainty as the parties may not have to worry whether or not they will have to unwind 
their merger or comply to certain conditions like divestiture after they have already 
merged which may be a very costly and onerous exercise. Guidance and inference can 
be sought from the EUMR which provides for the suspension of the merger before the 
EC issues a decision.261 In fact the EUMR instructs against implementation of 
mergers before notification.262 The rationale behind this in the EU may have been to 
avoid some of the concerns raised above.  
 
37. Secondly, the Regulations under Article 24(8) provide for a referral of some mergers 
on certain grounds.263 After the referral, the part of the merger referred is supposed to 
be reviewed under the domestic law of the Member State which has asked for a 
referral. Article 24(8) of the Regulations provides that: 
 
“A Member State having attained knowledge of a merger notification 
submitted to the Commission may request the Commission to refer the 
merger for consideration under the Member State’s national competition 
law if the Member State is satisfied that the merger, if carried out, is 
likely to disproportionately reduce competition to a material extent in the 
Member State or any part of the Member State”.  
 
38. The confusion Article 24(8) creates is the position of the parties whose merger was 
notified to the Commission but later referred to a Member State like Kenya, eSwatini 
or Zambia whose national competition laws provide for a suspensory merger review 
regime. Stricto sensu, it may mean that the parties would have trespassed the national 
 
261 See Article 7 of the EUMR 
262 See Article 4 of the EUMR 
263 It has to be recalled that Article 24(8) of the Regulations provides that after the referral, the transaction shall 
be reviewed under the Member State’s national law potentially making the merger illegal and the merging 
parties violating national law if it has a suspensory merger control regime. May be this has been addressed under 
Article 24(9) as one of the reasons why the Commission may refuse to grant referral to a Member State i.e. if 




competition laws of these countries and may have to face the sanctions/penalties 
under those respective laws. This is troubling and a great source of concern to the 
parties as they are likely to be caught in violation of laws not of their volition but due 
to procedural arrangements. The Guidelines have attempted to address this issue 
under section 5.28 when the provide that: 
 
“The Regulations do not prevent the merging parties from implementing 
mergers before notification or the completion of an assessment…….. The 
Commission considers that the parties to an implemented merger notified in 
accordance with the Regulations and these Guidelines should not, upon 
referral to a Member State authority, be penalised for having implemented the 
merger or not previously notifying such authority. The Commission will 
therefore only refer a merger to a Member State authority that requires 
notification and assessment of a merger prior to implementation if such 
authority undertakes in its referral request not to impose penalties on the 
parties or prejudice its review of the merger due to the implementation of the 
merger…”. 
 
39. Therefore, the Guidelines make it unequivocally clear that referral can only be made 
if a national competition authority undertakes not to penalise the parties, its 
suspensory merger regime as dictated by statute notwithstanding. It is important to 
recall that the Guidelines are clearly ultra-vires the Regulations in this regard as the 
Regulations do not attempt to amend the national competition law to suit this 
situation, they simply provide that consideration of a merger after referral shall be in 
accordance with the Member State’s national competition law.  
 
40. So far, no litigation has arisen as result of this lacuna. Referrals have been made to 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. Zambia’s merger notification regime is suspensory. However, 
no issues arose. One reason is that the parties in some of these mergers did not 
implement the mergers as they were waiting for the Commission’s decision to avoid 
the uncertainty. It should be recalled that parties who elect to implement a merger 
before the decision of the Commission do so at their own peril should the 




The other reason may be that both Zambia and Zimbabwe unlike Kenya have yielded 
to the jurisdiction of the Commission since its inception. The situation may not be the 
same in Kenya which as a matter of fact still calls for merger notifications despite the 
‘one-stop-shop’ principle which the Regulations attempts to create. Even in Zambia 
and Zimbabwe for example, it is possible that some stakeholders may raise issues 
observed above if a merger is referred to their country to be considered under their 
national competition laws. Clearly, the Regulations have not resolved the challenge 
under this heading and amending them to make the COMESA merger regime 
suspensory will completely eliminate this challenge. 
 
11.1.4  Inconsistent Approaches and Decisions 
 
41. Because cross-border mergers are subject to the review of two or more jurisdictions, it 
is not unusual though infrequent that inconsistent outcomes may be arrived at due to 
the different policy considerations and market peculiarities in different jurisdictions. 
This is not a challenge in DEEs alone but developed countries as well. The most 
spectacular and divergent outcome was in the GE/Honeywell merger where the 
United States of America Anti-trust agencies had cleared the merger but the EC 
decided to block it. It appears that the European anti-trust agency based its arguments 
for rejecting the merger on frivolous grounds which were very remote or far from 
being close to the merger specific requirements. The fear of the EC was that the 
merger would lead to mixed bundling which would enable the merged entity to price 
its bundled products cheaply than it would sell individual products and that no 
competitor on the market would counter this. It is beyond the scope of the dissertation 
to reveal in greater detail the divergent approaches of the EU and US anti-trust 
agencies but it appears the findings of the EC where not based on sound evidence but 
speculation. Even a cursory reading of that case does not show that the EC had based 
their concerns on sound economic analysis and evidence.264 
 
42. The US$15 billion Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger is another high-profile 
example of such conflict.  Despite the transaction receiving approval from the Federal 
Trade Commission in the USA, the EC opposed Boeing’s exclusive supply 
 




arrangements with three US airlines because it believed the merged entity would 
control too much of the global market for commercial aircraft.265  Boeing was 
required to scrap its exclusive arrangements and provide competitors with certain 
aviation technology in order to secure approval for the transaction in the EU.266 
Conversely, when Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz proposed to merge to form Novartis, the 
Federal Trade Commission exerted much harsher remedies than did the European 
Commission in various cross-border markets.267 
 
43. Divergent outcomes have been noted even closer to home in the Common Market, for 
example in the 2012 merger involving Tsusho Corporation and Pinault Printemps 
Redoute (Group), the Zambian Competition Authority268 rejected the merger, the 
Malawians approved it with conditions and the Kenyans approved it unconditionally. 
A similar scenario was observed in the Walmart/Massmart Merger.269 Nevertheless, 
care has to be taken to put the argument in context. There is nothing wrong with 
arriving at divergent outcomes as long as they are premised on consistent and sound 
competition principles. This is because they relate to characteristics of distinct 
markets. It should be recalled that Merger determination is highly fact dependent.  
What is worrying is when the divergent outcomes are as a result of inconsistent 
approaches and different vested interests contrary to competition law principles. Such 
possibilities also raise the uncertainty suffered by the parties to the merger. 
 
44. Suffice to mention that divergent outcomes where they raise concern are a function of 
substantive policy consideration and not as much due to procedural issues. As 
observed by William Rowley, “the actual working out of substantive principles 
depends a great deal on precisely who is deciding on the merger application. Potential 
market effects in many merger cases are so elusive or double-edged that different 
decision makers have a good deal of room to come to different conclusions. This can 
 
265 Case No. IV/M 877 – Boeing/McDonnell Douglas. 
266 See Boeing/McDonnell Douglas (December 8, 1997) O.J. L336; and the commentaries in D. Bencivenga, 
“International Antitrust: Nations Respond to Greater Need for Cooperation” (23 October 1997) New York Law 
Journal 5; and M.J. Reynolds, “Opinion” (August/September 1997) Global Competition Review 4. 
267 See In the Matter of Ciba-Geigy Limited, Ciba-Geigy Corporation, Chiron Corporation, Sandoz Ltd., Sandoz 
Corporation, Novartis AG, Docket No. C-3725, Decision and Consent Order (http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/news.htm); 
Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz (November 5, 1996) O.J. C140; and the commentary in A.N. Campbell and J.P. Roode, 
“The ‘Highest Common Denominator Effect’” (August/September 1997) Global Competition Review 29. 
268 CCPC Staff Paper No. 584, November 2012. 




mean a single minded anti-trust agency applying a ‘public interest’ test may well be 
tougher on mergers than a politically motivated Cabinet Minister who is called upon 
to apply a substantial lessening of competition’ standard”.270 These views are sound in 
that where substantive considerations due to different policy considerations of 
different jurisdictions differ, it is likely that divergent determination of mergers will 
arise. 
 
45. In the Common Market and currently in most jurisdictions the world-over, this 
concern is not as serious as it was two decades ago. A perusal of the merger laws of 
different jurisdictions with a focus in the Common Market discloses that there is 
significant convergence in the analytical tools and tests used in the assessment of 
mergers. For example, a review of the Kenyan, Malawian, eSwatini and Zambian 
competition legislation shows that there is a greater extent of convergence in this area. 
Most of the competition authorities in the Common Market consider the elements of 
assessments discussed in chapter Six (6) of this dissertation. This convergence in the 
elements of analysis reduce to a considerable extent the possibility of inconsistent 
decisions. As Pitofsky has noted in the U.S/E.U. context, “both jurisdictions have 
come to share economic premises about the benefits and competitive threats of 
mergers. Once premises are shared, common approaches may not be inevitable but 
they are far more likely.”271  
 
Have the Regulations Resolved the Challenge of Inconsistent Approaches and 
Decisions? 
 
46. This challenge appears to have been resolved by the Regulations in that an 
inconsistent decision cannot be made as it is only the Commission that reviews and 
makes determinations on mergers with a regional dimension. The Commission 
reviews these mergers in consultation with the Member States as mandated by Article 
26(6) of the Regulations. Article 26(6) enjoins the Commission to take all reasonable 
steps to notify the relevant Member States before embarking on a merger inquiry. The 
notice includes the nature of the proposed inquiry and calls upon any interested 
 
270 J William Rowley QC, The Internationalisation of Merger Review: The Need for Global Solutions. 
271 Robert Pitofsky, “E.U. and U.S. Approaches to International Mergers – Views from the U.S. Federal Trade 




persons who wish to submit written representations to the Commission with regard to 
the subject matter of the proposed inquiry. A check on the Commission’s website272 
revealed that the Commission has done extremely well in this area and the Member 
States interviewed revealed that the Commission does consult them in every merger 
that may have an effect in their respective jurisdictions. With this in mind, an 
inconsistent decision is unlikely to arise as only the Commission in consultation with 
the Member States makes a determination on the merger. 
 
47. It is important however, to note that not all Member States have submitted to the 
jurisdiction of the Commission as a ‘one-stop-shop’. All the other Member States 
except Kenya have submitted to the Commission’s jurisdiction. Kenya still calls for 
the notification of mergers that meet the regional dimension requirement. This 
situation is likely to raise the possibility of inconsistent outcomes. For example, it is 
not impossible that the Commission may clear a merger at regional level which 
includes Kenya, but the merger may be rejected in Kenya due to policy considerations 
like public interest which may not be paramount under the Regulations. This may lead 
to inconsistent outcomes in the same merger.  
 
48. This concern was very real especially in the early days of the Commission’s existence 
when Kenya publicly, blatantly and sometimes arrogantly rejected the Commission’s 
jurisdiction on cross-border mergers.273 However, the turf war between the 
Commission and the Competition Authority of Kenya (CAK) has subsided as seen 
from the MOU signed between the two Authorities on 19th April, 2016 in Nairobi, 
Kenya. Further, there has been comprehensive cooperation and coordination in the 
assessment of cross-border merger cases in apparent recognition that this is for the 
good of the Common Market.274 This has helped a great deal in avoiding inconsistent 
outcomes as was seen in the merger involving Total Outre Mer S.A and Gapco Africa 
Petroleum Corporation approved by the Commission on 22 November, 2016. If this 
merger was notified before the turf between the Commission and CAK subsided, it 
 
272 See Notices of Mergers posted on https://www.comesacompetition.org 
273See for example http://www.nation.co.ke/business/news/Authority-criticises-Comesa-over-rollout-of-
competition-rules/-/1006/1722692/-/127w7qb/-/index.html (accessed on 21 March 2017 at 21:08 hours) 
274 This position was confirmed by Mr. Francis Wang’ombe Kariuki, the Director General of CAK on 23rd 





was possible that different outcomes would have occurred. The Commission could 
have approved the merger unconditionally while CAK would have approved it with 
conditions.275 This is because Kenya raised public interest concerns inter alia, 
employment, that were not paramount to the Commission’s determination of the 
merger. However, because the two authorities coordinated and cooperated extensively 
on the case, they ended up giving the exact decision on the matter, a situation that is 
comforting to the business community. The ideal situation is to see Kenya ceding 
jurisdiction to the Commission on mergers that meet the regional dimension 
requirement. 
 
11.1.5  High Notification Fees 
 
49. Generally filing fees should be used to cover the costs of investigating a merger. 
However, it does appear that most jurisdictions in the Common Market and beyond 
use merger notification fees to fund general operations of competition authorities. The 
Commission has for example employed since 2016 six economists and one lawyer 
whose salaries are paid from merger filing fees. What is interesting is that all of these 
staff members except two are not even employed in the Mergers and Acquisitions 
Division but the Enforcement and Exemptions, Consumer and Legal Divisions which 
deal with restrictive business practices, consumer matters and general legal matters at 
the Commission. This is not right as competition authorities are motivated to charge 
high filing fees which tend to act as a tax on the merging parties.  
 
50. Competition authorities’ focus should not be on merger filing fees but the need to 
ensure that mergers do not have the effect of substantially lessening competition. 
However, in most jurisdictions, anecdotal evidence suggests that the prime interest of 
competition authorities for charging merger fees is to mainly fund other operations of 
the authorities not related to merger control. The problem with this is that competition 
authorities may be tempted to capture mergers that have no nexus just to receive filing 
fees. Much research has been done on the negative consequences of unreasonably 
 
275 It should be noted that the transaction was approved by both authorities on condition among others that no 




high filing fees, for example the PricewaterhouseCoopers survey276 on the costs 
involved in multi-jurisdictional merger review. The survey indicated that the burden 
imposed upon firms represents a 0.11% regressive tax on mergers.277 Merger 
application should not attract such unnecessary costs as they raise the cost of doing 
business.  
 
51. The fees charged by the Commission are seemingly high capped at US$200,000 but 
they are not an exception to the notorious high filing fees as it has been observed in 
some jurisdictions in the Common Market such as Malawi and Zambia. The merger 
notification fee in Malawi is calculated at 0.1% of the combined turnover or value of 
assets whichever is higher of the merging parties in Malawi. While the relative fee 
appears to be reasonable, the absolute fee may be astonishingly high as Malawi does 
not have a cap on the filing fees that should be paid. Zambia also has shocking high 
merger notification fees albeit it has a cap. The filing fee in Zambia is calculated at 
0.1% of the parties’ combined turnover or assets in Zambia, whichever is higher, 
subject to a cap equivalent to approximately 5,000,000.1 ZMW278 (which equates to 
approximately US$ 415,839).279  Below is a table showing filing fees in the selected 
COMESA Member States. 
 
Table 2: Merger Notification Fees in Selected COMESA Member States280 
Country Formula Maximum Filing Fee 
Payable 
COMESA 0.1% of the combined 
turnover or asset value of the 
US$200,000 
 
276 See the Pricewaterhouse Coopers survey (commissioned by the International and American Bar 
Associations), A tax on mergers? Surveying the time and costs to business of multi-jurisdictional merger 
reviews, June 2003. PWC survey available at http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/gcfpaper.htm (accessed 
on 14 February 2016)  
277 A word of caution has to be entered here. This regressive tax as a result of costs imposed on the merging 
parties in multi-jurisdictional merger review represent several cost elements and not only merger filing fees. 
However, it is still a crude indication of the costs imposed by merger filing fees in multi-jurisdictional merger 
review. 
278Filing fees payable to the Zambian Competition Authority are provided for in the Competition and Consumer 
Protection (General) Regulations, 2011, Second Schedule (Regulation 21), Prescribed Fees. 
279https://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=5%2C000%2C000.10&From=ZMW&To=USD 
(accessed on 10 March 2019). 
280 All the exchange rate conversions in tables 2 and 3 were obtained on 10 March 2019 from XE Currency 





merging parties, whichever 
is higher in the Common 
Market 
Egypt No fees charged  No fees charged 
Kenya Turnover Ranges KES2000,000=US$20, 
077.38 
Mauritius No fees charged No fees charged 
Swaziland 0.1% of the combined 
turnover or assets of the 
merging parties whichever is 
higher 
E600,000 = US$41,557.91 
Zambia 0.1% of the combined 
turnover or assets whichever 
is higher of the merging 
parties in Zambia 
16 666 667 fee units = 
ZMW5000,000.1 = 
US$415,839 
Zimbabwe 0.5% of the combined 
turnover or combined value 
of assets in Zimbabwe of the 
merging parties, whichever 
is higher. 
US$50,000 
Source: Author’s research 
 
52. Suffice to point out that the high filing fees are not just a feature of the Common 
Market but other jurisdictions the world over. Startlingly even the arguably most 
developed anti-trust regime in the world, the USA has exceptionally high filing fees in 
some cases to a maximum of US$280 000. Below is a table showing the jurisdictions 
which impose filing fees and their values.  
 
Table 3: Comparison with Other Jurisdictions 
Country Criteria Minimum Fee Maximum Fee 
COMESA 0.1% of the 
combined turnover or 
asset values 




whichever is higher 
in the Common 
Market 
South Africa Turnover Ranges ZAR100 000 = 
US$6,926.40 
ZAR350 000 = 
US$24,242.40 
Botswana 0.01% of combined 
turnover or value of 
assets whichever is 
higher in Botswana 
N.A N.A 
Tanzania Turnover Ranges TZS25 000 000 = 
US$10,664.932 







Flat Fees Flat Fee of 5 000 
Swiss Francs for 
Phase 1 =             
US$4,960.54 
Between 100 and 400 
Swiss Francs per 
hour = US$99.21 – 
US$396.84 per hour. 
United Kingdom Turnover Ranges GBP40 000 =    
US$52,064 
GBP160 000 = 
US$208 257.04 
Italy before January 
2013 
1.2% of the Value of 
the Transaction 
EUR3,000 =       
US$3,370.97 
EUR60,000 =   
US$67,416.18 
Italy Current “Competition Tax” 
0.008% of the 
Annual Turnover of 
any Company 
Operating in Italy 




Germany The Amount of the 
Fee is Determined by 
the FCO at its own 
discretion after the 
procedure on the 
basis of the economic 
significance of the 
transaction as well as 
For Phase 1: 
EUR5000 – EUR15 
000 = US$5,618.01 – 
US$16 854.04 








costs incurred for the 
investigation 
United States of 
America 
Size of Transaction 
Ranges 
US$45,000 US$280,000 
Source: Author’s own research 
 
53. The other problem is with regard to the calculation of filing fees based on assets. This 
is because assets may not always give a true indication of the parties’ activities in the 
market. The Guidelines have recognised this fact albeit implicitly when they provide 
that only those assets with a market presence and to which a turnover can be clearly 
attributed should be taken into consideration.281 It should be recalled that assets and 
turnover are used as proxies for these purposes to indicate the level of economic 
activity of the parties in the market. Some firms may have huge assets which may 
inflate the filing fees but the actual level of economic activity of the firm in a 
particular market is negligible. 
 
54. In some countries like Zambia, recent Competition and Consumer Protection Tribunal 
(the Tribunal) judgements have indicated that in calculating filing fees, recourse 
should be made to only those assets that are used for the business line in issue. For 
example, in 2014, the Tribunal282 in a transaction involving the First National Bank 
Zambia Limited and Afgri Leasing Services Limited ruled that in determining filing 
fees, the basis should not be all the assets of the acquiring undertaking but only those 
assets that are related to the relevant market under consideration. While this is 
welcome especially to the merging parties in that it somehow reduces the burden of 
high filing fees, it sets dangerous uncertainty in that there may be a requirement to 
carry out an assessment of the market to determine the relevant market before the 
filing fee is determined. It is to be recalled that relevant market definition is 
sometimes subject to disputes between the parties and competition authorities.  
 
 
281 See section 2.20 of the Guidelines. It should be noted that the discussion of assets in this section is with 
reference to the definition of control and not filing fee. However, it can be inferred that the same principle can 
be applied to filing fees as only assets which has a market presence and to which turnover can be clearly 
attributed are the only assets that could lead to economic activity in the market place. 





55. It is observed that with cross-border mergers, the burden of high filing fees is even 
exacerbated in that the merging parties would have to pay filing fees in all the 
jurisdictions where the notification requirements are met and where merger 
notification fees are a requirement. 
 
 Have the Regulations Resolved this Challenge? 
 
56. In the Common Market, the Regulations appear to have reduced this cost although not 
to satisfactory levels. This is because it does appear that the filing fees are still 
disproportionately283 high. It is necessary to first show how the Regulations have 
reduced this burden and then demonstrate that improvement is possible. 
 
57. When the Commission commenced operations in January 2013, the merger 
notification fees were calculated as 0.5% of the combined turnover or value of assets 
of the merging parties whichever was higher in the Common Market with a ceiling at 
US$500 000. This raised controversy and the stakeholders complained that the filing 
fees were too high. Some observers commented that the Commission was stealing 
from the merging parties through unjustifiably high filing fees. Some observed that 
the notorious high filing fees undermined the credibility of the nascent Commission 
and threatened its very existence and durability as it increased the risk that 
stakeholders would not submit to its jurisdiction. This astounding high level of filing 
fees also threatened the very raison d’etre of COMESA, i.e. to enhance regional 
investment, regional trade and ultimately attain full market integration. The high 
filing fees coupled with the zero notification thresholds and lack of guidance on the 
method of calculation of turnover and assets to take into account when computing the 
filing fees raised concern about the onerous cost implications on the business 
community.  
 
58. Something had to be done urgently. However, since filing fees are provided for in the 
COMESA Competition Rules which are law, it was difficult to amend them within the 
first year of the Commission’s existence. Lawyers would agree that laws, let alone 
supra-national laws are not amended with astronomical speed,. 
 






59. In March 2015, Rule 55 of the COMESA Competition Rules 2004 (which deals with 
matters of notification fees) was amended to reduce the merger filing fee to 0.1% of 
the combined turnover or value of assets in the Common Market of the merging 
parties whichever is higher with a ceiling of US$200,000. This was a tremendous and 
welcome reduction as it represented a reduction in filing fees of over 65%. It should 
also be noted that before the enactment of the Regulations, mergers that affected more 
than one Member State had to be notified and filing fees paid as long as the 
notification criteria was satisfied in those Member States. This is no longer the case as 
transactions that meet the regional dimension requirement are only notified and filing 
fees paid to the Commission only.284 In view of this, it may be argued that the 
enactment of the Regulations reduced the cost of multi-jurisdictional merger review 
through merger fees in the Common Market by a significant proportion especially that 
cross-border mergers in the Common Market are only notified to the Commission.  
 
60. A merger of multinationals having operations in a number of Member States would 
have had to pay significant amounts in filing fees but with the existence of the 
Regulations, the filing fee would in any case be a maximum of US$200 000. For 
example, in the 2011 transaction involving the acquisition of all the issued and 
outstanding common shares of Equinox Minerals Limited by Barrick Gold 
Corporation,285 the parties paid more than US$700 000286 to the CCPC in merger 
filing fees in addition to the filing fees they could have paid in other jurisdictions 
where the transaction was notifiable. If this transaction was to take place today, the 
parties would have paid US$200,000 to the Commission since the transaction would 
have had a regional dimension as the parties were present in some other Member 
States like the Democratic Republic of Congo. Similarly, barely a few months after 
the Equinox/Barrick merger, Glencore acquired Mopani Copper Mines in Zambia and 
paid over US$600 000287 in merger filing fees to the CCPC. Had this transaction 
taken place after the Commission had commenced operations, the parties would have 
 
284 As already observed in this dissertation, this does not include Kenya. 
285 See Competition and Consumer Protection Commission Staff Paper Number 417 of May 2011. 
286 At that time, the Zambian Merger Regime had not introduced a cap on the merger notification fees. 
287 It is this transaction that precipitated the discussions leading to the introduction of a cap through a Statutory 
Instrument. The author was the case officer in this matter and was instrumental in the capping of the fees with 
the then Minister of Commerce, Trade and Industry, Honourable Felix Mutati and Liya Tembo, the then Head of 




paid US$200 000 to the Commission since the transaction would have had a regional 
dimension as the parties were present in other Member States.    
 
61. A careful review of some of the cases reviewed by the Commission shows that in the 
absence of the Regulations, the parties would have paid more in notification fees as 
they would have had to file their mergers in a number of Member States. The table 
below shows the filing fees paid to the Commission in a selected number of mergers 
and the minimum they would have paid if the transactions were notified in the various 
Member States with notification requirements. This research revealed that more than 
66% of the selected mergers that have been notified to the Commission have paid less 
in merger notification fees than what they would have paid if the transactions were 
notified at national level. It is therefore beyond dispute that the regional merger 
control system has resulted in reduction in the cost of merging in the Common 
Market. 
 
Table 4: Comparison of Filing Fees of Selected Mergers at Regional and National 
Levels. 
Merger Name Notification Date288 Fees at Regional 
Level (US$) 
Minimum Fee at 




by Puma Energy 
Mauritius Investments 
Limited 
5 June 2014 500 000 672 517 
Acquisition of the 
Entire Issued Share 
Capital of Shell 
Marketing Egypt and 
Shell Compressed 
2 July 2013 500 000 583 911 
 
288 Note that before 27 March 2015, the filing fees at the Commission was a maximum of US$500 000. It has 
since that date been reduced to US$200 000.  
289 Minimum in the sense not all Member States where the transactions were notifiable were identified by the 




Natural Gas Egypt 
Company by Total 
Outre Mer S.A 
Acquisition of Gulf 
Africa Petroleum 
Corporation by Total 
Outre Mer S.A 
5 July 2016 200 000 560 077 
Acquisition of DFCU 
Limited and Zambia 
National Commercial 
Bank Plc by Arise 
B.V 
27 February 2017 200 000 619 388 
Merger between 
Holcim Limited and 
Lafarge S.A 
8 July 2014 500 000 192 291 
Zambeef/CDC/RCL 
Merger 
 200 000 240 157 
Merger between 
Carlsberg and Castel 
14 December 2016 200 000 50 745 
Merger between Total 
Egypt LLC/Chevron 
Egypt SAE 







15 April 2015 200 000 110 275 
Merger between Dow 
Chemical Company 
and El du Pont de 
Nemour Company 
13 June 2013 200 000  46 766 





62. The table reveals that the Regulations have reduced the cost incurred through filing 
fees by the merging parties when filing their transactions with different national 
competition authorities. However, a survey of the market reveals that many 
stakeholders still think filing fees imposed by the Commission are on a high side. 
More than 95% of the respondents interviewed stated that the filing fees imposed by 
the Commission were too high.290 Most stakeholders were attorneys and the business 
community. National Competition Authorities and other Government agencies had 
varying views with some saying the fees were high and others saying they were low, 
and still others being indifferent. Although this method gives a crude indication that 
the filing fees are high, care must be taken before generalising the conclusion. For 
example, the attorneys and business community would naturally state that the fees are 
high because their clients are responsible for paying and they would want the figure to 
be as low as possible. The National Competition Authorities and other Government 
agencies on the other hand would want the fee to be high as they have an incentive 
through the revenue sharing of the merger notification fees collected by the 
Commission.   
 
63. Therefore, to corroborate these findings, research was undertaken on the principles 
governing the determination of merger filing fees. It should however be noted that the 
determination of merger filing fees is not an exact science as a number of value 
judgments are taken into account. The April 2005 report of the International 
Competition Network on Merger Notification Filing Fees has stated that “the primary 
reason that jurisdictions have introduced filing fees is full or partial recovery of the 
cost of merger review and/or the competition agency’s total budget”. According to 
the Report, in the latter case, merger filing fees contribute to covering the cost of the 
agency’s activities other than merger review. This appears to be the case with the 




290 This is supported by information in Table 4 which reveals that in some instances, parties still pay higher 
filing fees at regional level than they would have paid at national level. 
291 This is corroborated by the evidence that the adverts for these jobs was on condition that renewal after three 
years was subject to the availability of funds, implying that since the flow of merger funds is not guaranteed, the 




64. Merger notification fees should reflect to an extent the cost incurred by competition 
authorities to review those mergers and anything outside this is bad practice and 
imposes an unnecessary cost on the merging parties. In fact, there is growing debate 
with some vocal critics positing that merging parties should not be subjected to 
paying merger notification fees292 as this is the responsibility of governments to 
ensure that markets function properly and optimally for the benefit of the general 
populace. Competition Authorities that receive funding from the Central Government 
for merger assessment and other operations of the Competition Authority may not 
have convincing policy rationale for charging merger filing fees. Proponents however 
argue that the merging parties should bear this cost as it is their transactions that 
potentially threaten the optimal operation of markets.  
 
65. So, what should be the ideal merger notification fees under the COMESA Merger 
Control Regime? The starting point is to appreciate that the setting of merger filing 
fees is not an exact science determined with mathematical precision. A lot of factors 
including policy considerations should be taken into account when considering this 
inquiry. The dissertation shall consider some of these factors, and then focus on the 
internationally accepted best practice. 
 
66. As noted already, merger filing fees are charged for various reasons among 
Competition Authorities. Some of these may inter alia, include the need to recover 
the administrative costs incurred in the assessment and review of a merger, the need 
to fund the operations of the entire Competition Authority as it appears at least in part 
for the Commission and the need to fund other Government programs, institutions or 
other COMESA institutions293 and programs in the case of the Commission. There 
does not appear to be available any policy document from the Commission or from 
the COMESA Secretariat highlighting the policy considerations behind the merger 
notification fees. Therefore, one can only surmise what these policy considerations 
may be by reviewing a number of activities and practices of the Commission since its 
establishment in January 2013. 
 
292 Note that the terms ‘merger notification fees’ have been used interchangeably with the terms ‘merger filing 
fees’ throughout this dissertation. 
293 The Council of Ministers sitting in 2016 instructed the Commission to purchase an accounting package for 
the Federation of National Association of Women in Business, another COMESA Institution using merger 





67. The Commission does share the merger fees with the Member States affected294 by a 
merger pursuant to Rules 8(1) and 8(2) of the Rules on COMESA Revenue Sharing of 
Merger Filing Fees. The Commission retains 50% of the merger fees and the 
remaining 50% is shared by the Member States on a pro-rata basis, i.e. based on the 
amount of turnover derived by the parties in the respective affected Member States. 
This may imply that it is intended to fund National Competition Authorities’ activities 
in assessing these mergers, an input they feed to the Commission for the ultimate 
determination of the merger. The reason for this assumption is that turnover figures 
are used as a proxy to give crude indications of the level of activity and the likely 
influence on competition an undertaking may have in the market place. Therefore, 
giving a larger share of the filing fees to a country where the merging parties derive 
their largest combined turnover may be based on the premise that these countries may 
have to do more work in the determination of the likely harm of the merger on the 
market and may need more resources.  
 
68. However, the supposition above may not always be supported by empirical evidence. 
It may not always be true and may in some instances be flawed to conclude that 
countries with the largest share of combined turnover are more susceptible to the 
competition injury likely to be inflicted by a merger. A country with a smaller share 
of the combined turnover of the merging parties may suffer competition harm in 
contradistinction to a country with a larger share of the combined turnover of the 
merging parties. Competition harm is usually related to the structure of the market 
discussed in Chapter Six of the dissertation. It may be the case that the parties derive a 
smaller amount of turnover in a certain Member State because it has a small economy 
with very few players compared to a Member State with a bigger economy and a 
greater number of players. In such a situation, a merger may raise competition 
concerns in a Member State with a relatively smaller share of the combined turnover 
in the Common Market.  
 
69. Further, it may also be the case that one of the parties to a merger has a smaller 
turnover while another has a disproportionately huge turnover in a particular Member 
 
294 According to the Guidelines and the Commission’s practices, Member States affected by a merger are those 




State making the combined turnover proportion larger than in countries where both 
the merging parties derive similar amounts of turnover. In the former case, the impact 
on competition may not be significant because of the presumption that the party with 
a significantly smaller turnover may not have considerable market share and hence 
there would be little or no change to the market structure. However, such a Member 
State would receive a larger share of the merger filing fees. 
 
70. Nevertheless, if the revenue sharing mechanism is intended to share the merger fees 
with competition authorities who contribute to the assessment of the merger because it 
affects their jurisdiction and that the share is intended to cover the cost of this 
assessment, then another concern would arise. This is in a case where the Commission 
decides to refer the case to a Member State pursuant to Article 24(8) of the 
Regulations. It would be difficult to understand in those instances why even after 
referral of the case, the Commission retains the exact amount of the merger filing 
fees. One would reasonably opine that the Commission should cede that portion of the 
merger notification fees since it does not incur any costs to review that part of the 
merger.  
 
71. An engagement with George Lipimile and other officials who were involved in the 
promulgation of the Regulations and Rules revealed that the revenue sharing formula 
was constructed to act as an incentive for Member States to yield to the jurisdiction of 
the Commission. It was clear that the National Competition Authorities would incur 
costs when assessing transactions in collaboration with the Commission, therefore 
without any form of revenue from the Commission, such a system would collapse. 
This system further provided an incentive to submit to the regional competition law 
because Member States would have some further source of funding.295 Ultimately, the 
system contributes to the overall success of the regional merger control regime.  
 
72. Further, as already observed in Chapter Seven, it is largely accepted that effective 
merger control of cross-border mergers requires that the countries involved have 
 
295 Note that because of the regional merger control regime, the revenue that some Member States would have 
been receiving through the notification of mergers at national level has arguably reduced. Countries like Zambia 
and Malawi that charge unreasonably high merger filing fees have lost a great deal of revenue as a result. 
Therefore, the revenue sharing of the merger filing fee may act as an adhesive to hold together the regional 




effective merger control regimes and this is one way of making the national 
competition authorities in the Member States effective. The portion of the merger fees 
disbursed to the Member States is intended among other things to enhance the 
capacity and effectiveness of the national competition authorities to assess cross-
border mergers. This is expressly provided for under Rule 4(4) of the Rules on 
COMESA Revenue Sharing of Merger Filing Fees (Amendment), 2017 (No. 1) which 
states that: 
 
“The Member States shall ensure that the fifty percent share of the 
merger filing revenue distributed to the designated Member States is 
utilised for the development and strengthening of their national 
competition laws and capacity building in their national competition 
authorities”. 
 
73. Most national competition authorities are still incompetent to handle mergers with a 
regional dimension. Only a few like Kenya, Zambia and Zimbabwe appear to have 
this competence.296 This however is a double-edged sword. While high filing fees 
help to build a successful merger control regime, they are not in line with 
international best practice. Further, the system itself is not currently functioning 
properly. While the merger fees shared with the national competition authorities are 
intended to strengthen the capacity of the national competition authorities, it is a 
notorious fact that in some Member States, this money goes to the Central 
Government which then decides generally how to deal with it depending on pressing 
needs in their budgets. Examples include the Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, 
Madagascar and Zambia.  
 
74. One thing that is important to note when setting merger notification fees is that they 
may raise the preponderance of non-compliance by the undertakings subject to merger 
review, incidences of corruption orchestrated by the competition authority officials 
and the merging parties if it is less costly to evade the system than complying with it. 
Further, high filing fees may frustrate merger transactions that are pro-competitive 
and that would enhance efficiencies and contribute to the realisation of the single 
market imperative.  
 
296 This is on the premise that these countries have a long history of competition law enforcement, have handled 




11.1.5.1 Principles for Setting Merger Notification Fees. 
 
75. International best practices for setting merger filing fees as enunciated by the ICN, the 
OECD and other similar reputable bodies in the field of competition law include the 
following:297 
 
• The fee should cover the government’s costs of providing the service in a 
sustainable manner 
• The fee should not exceed the full costs of providing the services otherwise 
the fee becomes a tax on the firms or persons that request the service 
• The fees schedule should be set in a way that welfare-enhancing actions are 
not discouraged while harmful actions are deterred 
 
76. As already observed, the fee should be computed or determined in such a manner that 
it covers the cost of reviewing the merger. In some jurisdictions like the United States 
of America, the merger filing fees are determined based on the size of the transaction. 
This may not be a good basis for determining the merger filing fees. This is because 
the fee paid may not be proportionate to the complexity of the case. It is not always 
the case that larger transactions by value lead to serious competition concerns 
requiring detailed and rigorous review. Sometimes smaller transactions by value may 
raise significant competition concerns compared to larger transactions and cause the 
competition authority to spend much more resources through rigorous review. What is 
important therefore is the nature and structure of the market298 in which the 
transaction occurs. If the transaction occurs in a market that is highly concentrated 
and characterised with high barriers to entry and lack of countervailing power, it may 






297 Global Forum on Competition, 2011. Available at 
http://search.oecd.org/competition/globalforum/GlobalForum-February2011.pdf?cv=1v (accessed on 10 
November 2019). 




11.1.5.2 International Best Practices on Determination of Merger Notification Fee 
 
77. What then is the international best practice on the determination of the merger filing 
fees? There are different forms of computation and methods for determination of 
merger filing fees. For purposes of emphasis, below are some of the methods used by 
different jurisdictions: 
 
• Reimbursed fees if the merger is cleared (e.g., New Zealand, Germany) 
• Differentiated fees by type (complexity) of merger case (e.g,. New Zealand, 
Netherlands, South Africa) 
• Fees that depend on the value of the transaction (e.g., USA) 
• Minimum and Maximum absolute value with a fee based on percentage of the 
turnover or asset value (e.g. COMESA) 
 
78. In terms of the absolute values, the COMESA merger filing fees compare very well 
with the fees charged in other jurisdictions including some Member States. Some 
countries’ absolute maximum fees as observed in table 3 can be very high. Some of 
the absolute figures that are higher than the COMESA merger filing fees include:299 
 
• Malawi, which has no maximum filing fees. The filing fees can go as high 
depending on the value of assets or turnover of the merging parties in Malawi 
• Zambia whose maximum filing fee is approximately US$415,839 depending 
on the exchange rate 
• United Kingdom whose maximum filing fee is GBP160,000 which is 
approximately equal to US$208,257.04 
• Italy whose maximum filing fee is EUR400,000 which is approximately equal 
to US$448,263.31 
• United States of America, whose maximum filing fee is US$280,000 
 
79. From the perspective of the absolute fee, the COMESA merger filing fee may not 
appear to be that high. Nevertheless, this may be misleading as the fees should be 
 
299 The exchange rates used in this part were obtained from http://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/convert/? 




determined relative to some parameter like the cost of reviewing the merger or the 
size of the economy.  
 
11.1.5.3 Merger Notification Fees Based on Size of the Economy 
 
80. This inquiry begins by taking the sizes of the economies into account and see how the 
COMESA merger fees compare. The comparisons shall not include the Member 
States since they are part of the Common Market and it shall be liberally assumed that 
any national notification fee higher than the COMESA merger fee is 
disproportionately high from the basis of the size of the economy as a Member State 
cannot have an economy larger than the Common Market. It is acknowledged here 
that this is a simplistic view as a lot of factors have been held constant. Further, the 
size of a particular economy is not a good determinant of merger notification fees as it 
is remotely related to merger review. Nevertheless, it still gives us a useful albeit 
crude indication about the reasonableness of the COMESA merger filing fee.   
 
81. Based on research and calculations, it can be inferred that the COMESA merger filing 
fees are high relative to the COMESA economy.300 Figure 2 below illustrates this 
inference. Further, it has to be recalled that the Commission under the Guidelines 
have introduced a two-phased merger review process. However, the filing fees have 
remained the same despite this development. This is irregular as the phase one by 
nature and in practice implies that the transaction is unlikely to raise significant 
concerns of competition injury to the relevant market and therefore does not require 
rigorous and comprehensive review. Likewise, the amount of resources spent on 
reviewing such a merger may not be comparable to the phase two review. 
International best practice informs us that for those jurisdictions that have a two-
phased merger review approach, different merger filing fees are charged for each 
phase reflecting the differences in the costs incurred to review the merger under each 
phase. The Netherlands is an example where the first phase review is restricted to 28 
 




days and the associated fee is EUR 17 450 whereas the second phase attracts a filing 
fee of EUR34 900.301  
 
Figure 2: Merger Filing Fess as a Function of GDP 
 
Source: World Bank Group’s Competition Policy Thematic Group, Investment Climate Department. 
 
82. Caution must be taken though, when making comparisons on this basis as the 
COMESA merger control regime is supra-national. A supra-national merger control 
regime may have factors such as geopolitics, heterogeneous market structures, 
culture, extended geographical coverages among other factors influencing the cost of 
merger review. However, since the comparison is on a ceteris paribus basis, the 
results of this inference still gives a useful indicator. The other fully functional supra-
national merger review regime, the European Commission has not been referred to 
because it does not charge merger filing fees. The Eurasian Economic Commission is 
also a supra-national competition authority but has no mandate on mergers.  It does 








semblance of objectivity is the calculation of merger filing fees based on the costs 
incurred in the review of a particular merger, i.e. cost-based merger filing fee. 
 
11.1.5.4 Cost Based Merger Notification Fees 
 
1. It is beyond dispute that every merger assessment does lead to expending resources. It 
is therefore logical that competition authorities do recover these costs that are incurred 
to review merger transactions through charging merger filing fees. However, care 
should be taken in computing these fees as in some cases, the figures used may inflate 
the filing fees. For example, including the cost of salaries of officials involved in the 
assessment of mergers may be misleading as these officials would receive the same 
salaries whether or not the authority has reviewed the merger. However, since the 
establishment of such a system is far from perfect, these factors shall be considered 
for purposes of comparing different scenarios. Further and as already observed in the 
dissertation, the fact that simple mergers require few resources to conclude than the 
complex mergers, entails that there should be two separate filing fees for simple and 
complex mergers to reflect this reality. An interview with the Commission’s 
officials302 revealed that since the system was introduced in October 2014, it handles 
on average 6 phase one merger cases per annum.303    
 
2.  The analysis begins by recalling that according to Rules 8(1) and 8(2) of the Rules on 
COMESA Revenue Sharing of Merger Filing Fees, the Commission retains 50% of 
the fees in every merger application while the remaining 50% is shared among the 
Member States on a pro-rata basis considering the turnover realised by the merging 
parties in the respective Member States. We may therefore liberally assume that the 
50% of the portion of the merger filing fees retained by the Commission reflects the 
cost incurred by the Commission in the assessment of the merger and the other 50% 
shared by the Member States represents the cost of assessing the merger in the 
respective jurisdictions. We shall therefore consider the cost elements that are 
 
302 Interview on 17 June 2018 with Mr. Ali Kamanga, Senior Economist; Mergers and Acquisitions at the 
Commission. 
303 These statistics may be misleading. The author’s research revealed that currently, the Commission considers 
mostly all the transaction under Phase II unless the parties make a specific request during notification. The 
reason is that the Commission is very under-staffed with only 3 officials in the mergers division such that if they 
considered most transactions under Phase I, they would be overwhelmed. As a matter of fact, most of the merger 




involved in the assessment of mergers at regional level and liberally assume that the 
same cost elements are involved in the assessment of mergers at national level.304  
Table 5 below shows estimates of administrative costs incurred by the Commission on 
a monthly basis in investigating a merger. 
 
Table 5: Monthly Costs Incurred by the Commission 
Element Unit305 US$ 
Director  Monthly Salary 7 500 
Manager; Legal  Monthly Salary 6 500 
Manager; Mergers Monthly Salary 6 500 
Economist Monthly Salary 5 500 
Legal Officer Monthly Salary 5 500 
Registrar Monthly Salary 5 500 
Accountant Monthly Salary 3 500 
Administration Costs Monthly Expenditure 31000/12 = 2583 
Advocacy and Awareness Monthly Expenditure 240000/12 = 20000 
Investigation of Merger 
Notifications 
Monthly Expenditure 10 000/12 = 833 
Expenditure on Committee 
Responsible for Initial 
Determination Meetings 
Monthly Expenditure 45000/12 = 3750 
TOTAL  67666 
Source: COMESA Competition Commission  
 
3. It should be noted that the administrative costs are not only used to cover mergers 
activities at the Commission. Other activities such as Consumer and Restrictive 
Business Practice Activities are covered under the same administrative costs. 
Therefore, in order to have an indication of how much administrative costs cover 
 
304 It should be noted that this is an exaggerated way of determining the merger notification fees. For example, 
the staff would still receive their salaries whether or not the Commission has received a merger notification. 
Further it is information in public domain that staff at the Commission generally receive better salaries than their 
counterparts at national competition authorities. Therefore, it is not entirely true to state that the same costs are 
incurred at national level. Nevertheless, this method has been used because it still does give us some useful 
indication in the absence of any criteria of merger notification fee determination with Rocket Science precision. 




mergers, each activity is given a weighting depending on the levels of enforcement 
activity.306 Table 6 below illustrates this: 
 
Table 6: Allocation of the Commissions Resources by Function307 
Activity Proportion 
Mergers and Acquisitions 50% 
Restrictive Business Practices 40% 
Consumer Protection 10% 
 
4. In order to have an exact amount of the costs incurred on the assessment of mergers, 
we shall estimate how much time in days each human resource depicted in table 5 
above spends on a merger case. Table 7 below depicts this: 
 










Cost in US$ on 







Cost in US$ on 
the Basis of 
Figures in 
Table 5 
Director 0 2 7500*2/30 = 
500 








0 4 6500*4/30 = 
867 
34 6500*34/30 = 
7,367 
Economist 4 45308 5500*45/30 = 120309 5500*120/30 = 
 
306 This assumption is based on reviewing case trends at the Commission.  
307 This information is according to the author’s own estimates on the basis of the volume and prioritization of 
work at the Commission at the time the research was undertaken. 
308 The maximum period allowable for a phase 1 merger review under the Guidelines is 45 calendar days. We 
liberally assume that since the economists are responsible for the assessment of mergers, they would be involved 
at every stage until the merger is disposed of. It should be noted that this is a broad assumption as not all phase 1 
mergers exhaust the 45 calendar days. 
309 The maximum period allowable for a phase 2 merger review under the Regulations is 120 calendar days. We 
liberally assume that since the economists are responsible for the assessment of mergers, they would be involved 
at every stage until the merger is disposed of. It should be noted that this is a broad assumption as not all phase 2 





Legal Officer 4 0 0 14 5500*14/30 = 
2567 
Registrar 1 3 5500*3/30 = 
550 
3 5500*3/30 = 
550 
Accountant 0 2 3500*2/30 = 
233 
2 3500*2/30 = 
233 
Total   10400  38484 
Source: COMESA Competition Commission and Author’s own estimates 
 
5. It should be noted that the efforts of the Commission’s human resources are not 
expended on mergers only. In order to have an idea of how much is expended on a 
merger, recourse should be made to the proportion of resources expended on each 
Commission activity as depicted in table 6 above. The table shows that 50% of the 
Commission’s expenses are expended on mergers. Therefore, in order to find out how 
much is spent on both phase 1 and phase 2 merger reviews, the corresponding costs 
for phase 1 and phase 2 in table 7 above are divided by 2 as follows: 
 
Phase 1: 10400/2 = 5200 
 
Phase 2: 38484/2 = 19242  
 
6. Care has to be taken not to conclude that the human resource effort is the only cost 
incurred in the review of mergers. Table 5 shows that there are other costs that are 
incurred. Indirect costs like merger advocacy to strengthen merger assessment in the 
Common Market are also incurred. The total amount incurred on each merger should 
therefore include the following elements: 
a) Costs for hosting the Committee Responsible for Initial Determination Meeting 
b) Advocacy Costs 
c) Administration Costs like communication, printing etc, 
d) Costs incurred in the actual investigation of a merger310 
 
310 We liberally assume that these costs include the costs of air tickets in visiting Member States affected by a 
merger. It should be noted that this scenario while not impossible is far-fetched. This is because the Commission 





7. Since most of these costs have been determined on an annual basis, it is important to 
determine how many mergers the Commission reviews on an annual basis.311 An 
interview with the Commission’s officials revealed that the average number of phase 
1 mergers reviewed by the Commission in a year is 6 while the average number of 
phase 2 mergers reviewed by the Commission in a year is 28.312 In order to get the 
approximate amount of the merger notification fee, we should determine how much is 
incurred on an individual merger case. 
 
8. A look at the Commission’s annual work plan revealed that a total of 4 CID meetings 
are held annually. Table 5 also shows that the total amount incurred on 4 CID 
meetings per annum is US$45000. However, only 50% of the cost is attributed to 
mergers. Therefore, US$22500 per annum is attributed to mergers. This therefore 
means that 4 CID meetings are equivalent to 28 merger cases, which are 
correspondingly equivalent to US$22500. The mathematical representation of this 
arrangement is depicted below: 
 
4 CID meetings = 12 Months = 28 Cases = US$22500 
 
I Case is therefore equal to: 22,500/28 = 803.57. 
 
9. The calculation above reveals that the CID cost incurred per merger is equal to 
US$803.57. 
 
10. The CID cost for phase 1 mergers is naught. This is because phase 1 mergers are 
determined by the Director pursuant to section 6.9 of the Guidelines. There is no need 
for the CID to make a determination on phase 1 mergers. 
 
the Commission has developed an elaborate system with affected Member States facilitated by Article 26 of the 
Regulations. Under this arrangement, the affected Member States carry out investigations in their jurisdictions 
and feed into the Commission’s assessment. Teleconferences are used as a medium for such discussions and are 
covered through the administration costs depicted in table 5.  
311 Note that the reference period is from 31 October 2014 being the date on which the two-Phase Merger 
Review System became implementable.  
312 Though the two phased assessment approach was introduced in October 2014, for purposes of computation in 
this dissertation, all mergers reviewed in 2014 have been taken into account. This inflated figure has been 
compensated by assuming the number of mergers considered in November 2019 shall remain the same until the 





11. As regards advocacy, table 5 shows that US$240000 is incurred for merger advocacy 
per annum. Therefore, the contribution in terms of money each merger should 
contribute to the advocacy costs is determined as follows: 
 
US$240000 = 12 Months = 28 Merger Cases. 
 
12. Therefore, the advocacy costs per merger is equal to 240000/28 = US$8571.43.313 
 
13. As regards the administration costs, table 5 shows that the Commission incurs about 
US$31000 in administration costs. However, according to table 6, only 50% of these 
administration costs are spent on merger assessments. Therefore, the costs of 
administration related to an individual merger case is determined as follows: 
 
31000/2 = 12 Months = 15500 = 36 Merger Cases. 
 
14. Therefore, the administration costs per merger is equal to 15500/36 = US$430.56314 
 
15. As regards the costs incurred in investigating the merger, table 5 informs us that the 
Commission incurs US$10,000 per annum. The mathematical representation of this is 
shown below: 
 
US$10000 = 12 Months = 28 Merger Cases. 
 
16. Therefore, the investigation costs per merger is equal to 10000/28 = US$357.14. 
 
17. We assume with a high degree of probability that there are little or no costs involved 
in the investigation of phase 1 mergers as the Commission staff do not have to go out 
to Member States to conduct merger investigations.315 
 
313 Since phase 2 mergers are assumed to be more complex than phase 1 mergers, an assumption is made that 
more advocacy is towards phase 2 mergers and therefore the cost incurred in advocacy should be recovered 
from the review of phase 2 mergers. 
314 This includes 6 Phase 1 and 28 Phase 2 Mergers. It should however, be stressed that this approach is 
simplistic as phase 1 mergers are supposed to attract less administration costs compared to phase 2 mergers 





18. Table 8 shows the estimated costs of conducting merger reviews under both phase 1 
and phase 2 procedures. 
 
Table 8: Costs Incurred by the Commission in the Review of Mergers. 
Cost Element Cost in US$ (Phase 1) Cost in US$ (Phase 2) 
Human Resource 5200 19462 
CID Meetings 0 803.57 
Merger Advocacy 0 8571.43 
Administration Cost 430.56 430.56 
Merger Investigation 0 357.14316 
Total 5630.56 29624.7 
 
19. It is recalled that the Rules on the sharing of revenue mandates the Commission to 
share 50% of its merger fees with the Member States affected by a particular merger. 
We can therefore assume that the Member States collectively incur a similar amount 
of costs in the assessment of the mergers in question. 
 
20. Therefore, the total amount incurred in reviewing a merger is 56630.56*2 = 
US$11,261.12 for phase 1 and 29624.7*2 = US$59,249.4 for phase 2. 
 
21. In the absence of any method carrying with it a high degree of mathematical 
precision, the above show some semblance of the ideal maximum merger notification 
fees that should be charged by the Commission. It should be noted that these figures 
are way below the current merger notification fees in COMESA. It should be noted 
that the Commission does not even charge a different fee for phase 1 mergers when it 
is evident that the introduction of a two-phase merger review indicate that phase 1 
merger reviews do not require rigorous assessment and therefore incur less costs 
compared to phase 2 merger assessment. It should also be noted that these figures are 
 
315 Merger investigation as used in this context refers to a situation where the Commission staff go to affected 
Member State to conduct investigations on a particular merger. 
316 This figure does not sound reasonable but is inferred from the Commission’s budget. And in any case as 
observed in the dissertation, the Commission has never ever gone to a Member State to investigate a merger. 
This is because of an organized system of collaboration developed between the Commission and the National 




inflated due to a number of assumptions made. For example, the human resource costs 
would still be incurred even in the absence of merger notification. 
 
22. However, the computation has also omitted certain elements indispensable in the 
assessment of a merger in an ideal situation.317 Therefore, in a Phase 2 merger review, 
we can add a realistic cost of investigating a merger by visiting the affected Member 
States. Research revealed that the average number of affected Member States in a 
single merger is about 8.318 The cost of an air ticket to these Member States may be an 
average of US$1000. We assume that all the 8 Member States would be visited in a 
phase 2 merger review and that two Commission officers would visit each Member 
State for 5 days. The total number of days would therefore be 40. The amounts 
incurred in such an exercise are depicted in table 9 below: 
 
Table 9: Adjusted Merger Notification Fees for Phase 2 Merger Review319 
Cost Element Cost in US$ 
Air Ticket for Two Members of Staff to 8 
Member States 
2(8*1000) = 16000 
DSA for Members of Staff 2(250320*40) = 20000 
Contingency in any Member State 8*400321 = 3200 
CID Meeting 803.57 
Merger Advocacy 8571.43 
Administration Costs 430.56 
Total 49005.56 
 
23. Therefore, using the above method which appears to be more accurate and reasonable, 
the maximum merger fee charged by the Commission in a phase 2 merger review 
should be US$49,005.56.  
 
317 The terms ‘ideal situation’ has been used because there is no evidence the Commission has ever conducted an 
investigation of a merger by visiting any of the affected Member States.    
318 Author interview with Mr. Ali Kamanga; Senior Economist in the Mergers Division at the Commission on 
17 June 2019 
319 Human Resource costs have been removed from determining the cost incurred in investigating a Phase Two 
merger as such cost are incurred whether the Commission has reviewed any merger or not. 
320 The COMESA Staff Rule and Regulations staff the Daily Subsistence Allowance at US$250 per day to any 
country in Africa. 
321 The practice at the Commission is to carry a contingency of US$400 whenever there is a mission in a 





24. As regards phase 1 merger review, we should only deduct the human resource cost in 
table 8 as such costs would have to be incurred whether or not there is a merger 
notification. The other elements included for phase 2 merger cases in table 9 above 
shall not be included for phase 1 as Commission staff do not have to travel to affected 
Member States to investigate mergers. Therefore, the realistic maximum merger 
notification fee for a phase 1 merger review should be 5630.56 -5200 = US$430.56.322  
 
25. Recalling the assumption that Member States incur a similar cost on the basis of the 
merger fee sharing formula which mandates the Commission to share 50% of its 
merger fees with the Member States affected by a particular merger, the mergers 
filing fees for both phases have to be multiplied by two respectively. 
 
26. Therefore, the total amount incurred in reviewing a merger is 430.56*2 = US$861.12 
for phase 1 and 49005.56*2 = US$98,011.12 for phase 2.323 
 
27. As regards the challenge brought by the different methods of valuating assets in the 
different Member States, the COMESA merger control regime has effectively 
resolved this challenge. This is because once a transaction has a regional dimension, 
only the COMESA method of determining and valuating assets as enunciated under 
Rule 4 of the COMESA Competition Rules on the Determination of Merger 
Notification Thresholds and Method of Calculation as well as the Guidelines is 
used.324 
 
28. However, what the regional merger control regime has not resolved is the challenge 
posed by the determination of merger filing fees on the basis of asset value. Basing 
the determination of filing fees on asset value has the risk of misleading conclusion 
that a merger involving parties with huge asset values is likely to raise significant 
competition concerns. This therefore implies that rigorous scrutiny warranting more 
 
322 This confirms that little costs are incurred on Phase 1 cases. The main cost is the administration cost. 
323 It should be recalled that the filing fee computation here is an indication. However, the deviation from this 
indication should not be unreasonably high. 
324 Suffice to mention that the methods discussed in these documents refer to merger notification thresholds and 
not to merger notification fees. However, practice at the Commission reveals that the same methods are 




resources for such an exercise is required. The solution is to do away with 
determining merger notification fees on the basis of asset values and focus such 
determination on the basis of turnover values which provide a greater degree of 
certainty and objectivity. 
 
29. In conclusion, the analysis in this section reveals that the establishment of a supra-
national merger control system has contributed to a reduction of merger notification 
fees in the Common Market due to the one-stop-shop principle. However, it is also 
observable that the filing fees are still high as they do not reflect the true cost of 
investigating a merger. Therefore, there is need to reduce the merger filing fees if the 
Commission is to contribute to attracting investments in the Common Market. There 
is also need to set different filing fees for the different phases of mergers introduced 
under section 6 of the Guidelines. This is because the different phases depict 
differences in complexity and therefore cannot incur the exact costs in assessment. 
 
11.1.6 Long Waiting Periods 
 
30. This subject is closely related to suspensory and non-suspensory matters discussed 
above. The context here however, is what effect if any would waiting periods (i.e. 
periods between notification and decision in a suspensory regime) have on the 
transaction and merging parties. 
 
31. Waiting periods in some jurisdictions may be unreasonably long that it leads to cost 
implications in terms of falling shares on the stock markets which are uncertain of the 
transaction until determination, financial cost in terms of retaining attorneys until a 
merger is disposed of and costs resulting from lost merger synergies pending review if 
it is unnecessarily long. One astonishing example of a country outside the Common 
Market with very long waiting periods is Brazil which suspends the transaction for a 
maximum of 240 days with a possible extension of 90 days.325 Another is India where 
a merger transaction is suspended for 210 days326 within which the Competition 
 
325 OECD; Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee. Suspensory Effects of 
Merger Notifications and Gun Jumping. 20 February 2019. 
326 Note that Jonathan Galloway views the 210 day period of suspending a merger in India pending review to be 
unnecessarily long. See Jonathan Galloway, “Convergence in International Merger Control”, Volume 5 Issue 2 




Commission of India should clear the merger otherwise it is considered approved by 
operation of the law or effluxion of time.327 Within the Common Market, countries 
like Zambia,328 Kenya329 and Malawi330 have waiting periods of 90, 60 and 45 
respectively. Countries like Eswatini and Zimbabwe have evidently unusual 
provisions with respect to waiting periods. The Competition Act No. 8 of 2007 under 
section 35(3) provides that the Swaziland Competition Authority shall within a 
reasonable time after the receipt of an application or date on which the applicants 
provide the information sought by the Competition Authority if the date is latter make 
an order concerning an application for authorisation of a merger or takeover. The 
foregoing implies that the period for merger review in Eswatini is indefinite and the 
determination is at the discretion of the Competition Authority. This situation creates 
a huge degree of uncertainty in the market, which is not appropriate for business. 
Similarly for Zimbabwe, section 34A of the Zimbabwe Competition Act read together 
 
327 Section 31(11) of the Indian Competition Law 2002, as amended. It should be observed here that the 210-day 
review period by far exceeds the ICN best practice note. See also https://iclg.com/practice-areas/merger-control-
laws-and-regulations/india (accessed on 10 November 2018) 
328 In Zambia, the maximum period may reach 120 days as the CCPC may where it has reasons to do so extend 
the time for review for 30 days. What amounted to days was a subject of dispute between the CCPC and the 
parties in Zambia. The CCPC contended that the days were working days while the parties contended that the 
days were calendar days. The CCPC’s interpretation meant that in effect, the CCPC had more than 6 months to 
review a merger transaction. This period was extremely too long. Although in practice the CCPC rarely 
exhausted all the time, this possibility was alarming to business. This dispute was later resolved by referring to 
Zambia’s General Provisions Interpretation Act Cap 2 of the Laws of Zambia, which guided that such days are 
calendar days. 
329 The time periods in Kenya can reach 180 days as the law provides for an extension of 60 days where the 
authority has reason to believe that this is required. Section 44 of the Act provides that the Authority shall 
consider and make a determination in relation to a proposed merger of which it has received notification within 
60 days after the date on which the Authority receives that notification or if the Authority requests further 
information, within 60 days after the date of receipt by the Authority of such information, or if a hearing 
conference is convened, within 30 days after the date of the conclusion of the conference. Where the Authority 
is of the opinion that the period referred to above should be extended due to the complexity of the issues 
involved, it may before the expiry of that period by Notice in writing to the undertakings involved extend the 
relevant period for a further period, not exceeding 60 days, specified in the Notice. A careful observation of the 
foregoing raises worrying concerns. It is noted that the Authority can elect to extend the time period allowable 
for review on the basis of an opinion. This is not right. The opinion should be a sound and reasoned opinion on 
the basis of objective factors of law and fact. Further, a careful calculation of the days in consideration reveals 
that the maximum time period may reach a total of 180 days which by reasonable standards is long for merger 
review. 
330 The time periods under the Malawi legislation appear to be very reasonable and probably an indication and 
inspiration of what should inform international best practice. Section 39(1) of the Malawi Competition and Fair 
Trading Act, 1998, provides that the Commission shall, within 45 days of receipt of an application or the date on 
which the applicants provide the information sought by the Commission if that date is later, make an order 
concerning an application for authorisation of a merger or takeover. Further, there is no room for extending the 
time period for reviewing mergers. An interview with Richard Chiputula, the Director of Mergers and 
Acquisitions at the validation workshop of the COMESA Competition Restrictive Business Practice and Abuse 
of a Dominant Position Guidelines on 20 May, 2017 in Victoria Falls Town of Zimbabwe supported this view. 
Mr. Chiputula stated that the days contemplated under the Act are calendar days and that the Act does not 




with Statutory Instrument 270 of 2002 particularly Section 5 on “Determination of 
Notification” shows that the law does not provide for statutory maximum time periods 
for reviewing a merger.331 This creates a deeply worrying concern that should be 
addressed. It is important to note here that the dissertation is only concerned with the 
maximum periods allowed under each statute. This is to ensure consistency and 
uniformity of comparison, as some merger control regimes do not have a two phased 
merger review. 
 
32. Surprisingly, even the EUMR have relatively long review periods. Article 10 of the 
EUMR, provides time limits for each phase, i.e. 25 working days for the first phase 
which can in some cases be extended to 35 working days, and an additional 90 
working days for the second phase which can be extended in a number of situations. 
These review periods are alarming coming from an advanced jurisdiction like the EU. 
When the Commission commenced operations, it was severely criticised for its review 
periods of a maximum of 120 days coupled with its earlier interpretation that these 
were working days.332 It is strange to know that most critics on this came from the 
EU, i.e. EU based lawyers among others. Note that in the EU, the days are not 
calendar days but working days, which can extend to 6 months of reviewing a merger 
in some circumstances. This is not only strange but also inconsistent with 
international best practice. 
 
33. Suffice to mention here that the determination of the time period allowable for merger 
review is also not an exact science based on mathematical precision. It depends on a 
number of factors like nature and complexity of transactions, the nature and 
development of markets among others. Therefore, the view that the above waiting 
periods are long is drawn from experience and responses of the interviewees. From 
experience at the Commission and from most competition authorities engaged, it does 
appear that the time period for merger review should not exceed 60 days and there 
should be a safeguard for reasonable extension should circumstances demand such a 
 
331 With regard to the Zimbabwe, the only comfort is that the regime is non-suspensory as the parties may 
implement the merger before the authority clears it. However, in most cases, the parties choose to wait for the 
authority’s clearance before implementing the merger to avoid consequences of dissolving the merger or 
complying with undertalings should the merger be declared anti-competitive. It therefore, follows that longer 
waiting periods may have similar effects in non-suspensory regimes just like they do in suspensory regimes. 
332 Since October 2014, the Commission interprets the days under Article 25 to be calendar days. See the 




situation. Experience has shown that most mergers are not injurious to the process of 
competition and should be cleared within a relatively short period of time. Merger 
approvals are in most cases a condition precedent to the conclusion of a merger either 
by operation of law or through contract. Unnecessary delay in the review of a merger 
by a competition authority may lead to time sensitive factors like financing 
arrangements to be jeopardized and ultimate collapse of the merger. 
 
34. Having multiple authorities reviewing a transaction does not make matters any better. 
Different authorities may issue decisions at different times depending on the time the 
transaction was notified to the respective authorities. It does appear that with the 
challenges of multiple notifications observed and analysed above, it is not possible to 
completely synchronise the timing of notifications to different competition authorities. 
 
35. Another observed challenge as regards the different waiting periods in different 
jurisdictions is that competition authorities that have not issued a decision on a merger 
transaction are to a great extent under pressure and undue influence to conclude and 
arrive at a similar decision in the same merger case. This may result in lack of 
objectivity and due consideration on the examination of the merger. Such an outcome 
is irreconcilable with the fundamental objectives of merger review and may result in 
arriving at erroneous decisions with harmful consequences on the competition 
landscape of a given relevant market. Further, an erroneous decision may result in the 
rejection of a pro-competitive merger and injure the interests of the merging parties. 
Related to this matter, similar views were held by the Financial Times editorial which 
stated that if every country looks at every deal, then not only will the increased 
bureaucracy mean cost and delay, but the country with the toughest anti-trust 
interpretation of a particular transaction will make a de facto decision for everybody 
else.333 
 
36. Suffice to mention here that this particular challenge is not only on the merging 
parties but on competition authorities and in most cases initiated by the merging 
parties who refer to other competition authorities that have made a decision and refer 
to the actual decision itself. The merging parties put significant pressure on the 
 




competition authorities to arrive at the same conclusion forgetting that merger 
examination and determination is fact dependent and it is not usually the case that 
different competition authorities will arrive at the same decisions. This is because the 
markets under their review in the same merger may present characteristics of a 
distinct market and other peculiarities.  
 
Have the Regulations resolved the Challenge of Long Waiting Periods? 
 
37. Within the context of the COMESA merger control framework, the Regulations 
appear to have resolved the challenge of unreasonably long suspension periods of 
transactions after notification. Firstly, the fact that the merging parties do not have to 
notify multiple competition authorities means that there aren’t several staggered 
waiting review periods as the only review period is that under the Regulations. 
Secondly, the time periods under the Regulations as interpreted in the Guidelines 
compare very well with international best practice and in some cases are much better 
than some waiting periods under the national competition authorities and other 
jurisdictions like Brazil and India cited above. In practice, the Commission completes 
the assessment of mergers way below the maximum 120 days334 permissible under 
Article 25 of the Regulations as can be observed from its website. The guidance in 
section 6.1 of the Guidelines that the Commission can seek extension from the Board 
but just for a maximum of 30 days gives comfort to the merging parties that such 
extension would not be unreasonable. The obligation to seek permission from the 
Board335 provides further comfort that the extension would not be arbitrary and for 
reasons of getting around the Commission’s incompetence of completing the 
assessment of the merger within the allowable time. 
 
 
334 The 120 days period for review compare well with international best practice (See ICN Recommended 
Practices for Merger Notification and Review Procedures). Further the introduction of an expedited process in 
the Guidelines through a phased review system allows transactions that do not raise competitive concerns to be 
cleared fairly quickly. 
335 The Board of Commissioners in terms of the institutional set up of the Commission is independent from the 
Commission and is the Supreme Policy Body of the Commission pursuant to Article 13 of the Regulations. It 
also plays an adjudicative role in cases where there are disputes between the Commission and the merging 
parties. Due to this independence, there is comfort on the merging parties that the Board shall be impartial in 
making decisions as regards the request by the Commission to extend the time for review under Article 25. Such 




38. Lastly, the fact that notification is made only to the supra-national competition 
authority for mergers with a regional dimension means there is no undue influence to 
conclude the transaction and arrive at a similar decision once one national competition 
authority has concluded the assessment of a transaction and issued a decision. It 
should be noted that this risk is still real as regards the relationship between 
competition authorities outside the Common Market and the Commission though this 
is not the focus of attention of the research. 
 
11.1.7  Triggering Event for Notification 
 
39. The triggering event for notification refers to the occurrence of an event that should 
initiate the obligation to notify a merger to a competition authority. Different 
jurisdictions may have different trigger events while others may not. Further, some 
jurisdictions like COMESA, Zimbabwe, Brazil and Argentina impose deadlines 
within which a merger should be notified after the trigger event has materialised while 
others may not. The obligation to notify a merger within a specified time after the 
triggering event has occurred may raise concern in multi-jurisdictional merger review.  
 
40. Triggering events are usually included in merger legislation to prevent premature 
notification which may be costly on the parties in terms of merger notification fees 
and other administrative requirements should the transaction fail to materialise. 
Premature notifications may also waste the Commission’s time and efforts which may 
be used on other priority cases. Therefore, triggering events operate as a safeguard 
and ensure that resources are used effectively and efficiently for both the merging 
parties and the competition authorities. What may be a problem in most cases is that 
what amounts to a triggering event is not defined expressly leading to significant 
uncertainty. For example, in Brazil, notification is required within 15 business days 
from the date that the transaction was “realized.”  William Rowley and Omar Wakil 
observed that initially, most attorneys took the view that the realization date was the 
transaction closing date.  However, the antitrust authorities later established that the 
term should be interpreted to mean the execution of the first binding document 
between the parties – but what that is can be uncertain.  As a consequence, Brazilian 




cases preliminary arrangements between the parties could trigger the notification 
requirement.  Fines for failing to file or filing late range from approximately 
US$27,000 to US$2.7 million; although the average fine for late filing does not 
usually exceed US$400,000, which is still high by any standard. The authorities have 
historically been aggressive in enforcing violations of these uncertain laws.336 
 
41. A well-defined triggering event brings certainty and predictability to both the merging 
parties and the Competition Authority. The ICN provide guidance on what amounts to 
a triggering event for merger notification through the ICN Recommended Practices 
for Merger Notification and Review Procedures. In this document, it is stated that 
parties should be permitted to notify a proposed merger upon the certification of good 
faith intention (bona fide intent) to consummate a proposed transaction. Even with 
this clarification, what amounts to good faith intention to consummate a merger may 
be different in different jurisdictions complicating the burden of multi-jurisdictional 
review. The problem is exacerbated further when jurisdictions impose a deadline 
within which notification should be made after the triggering event.  
 
42. There is general recognition that deadlines should be flexible enough to allow the 
parties time to organise the merger transaction and lodge a notification. What begs the 
question is the relevance of the deadline for jurisdictions that suspend the merger 
pending approval. For such jurisdictions, it is not in the interest of the merging parties 
to consummate a merger before approval as there are penalties for such. Therefore, it 
would almost always be the case that parties to a merger in a suspensory regime 
would notify a merger within reasonable time so that they obtain the approval they 
need to facilitate the implementation of the merger and other time sensitive exigencies 
such as funding agreements. The triggering event should be there to protect the 
parties’ interests in only notifying those transactions they are sure with a sufficient 
degree of probability that they would be concluded. The tight deadline for making the 
notification after the triggering event is onerous on the parties. 
 
 
336 International Mergers: The Problem of Proliferation. By J. William Rowley QC and Omar K Wakil. A paper 
presented at the 33rd Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy. Under “settings” 





43. As regards jurisdictions that are non-suspensory, the argument for imposing a 
deadline after the triggering event has been that the competition authority would need 
reasonable time within which to review the merger and deal expediently with any 
post-merger issues that may arise.   
 
Have the Regulations resolved the Challenge Posed by the Requirement of a 
Triggering Event after Notification? 
 
44. The Regulations equally have a triggering event for merger notification and 
additionally imposes deadlines for notification after the triggering event. Article 24(1) 
of the Regulations provides that a party to a notifiable merger shall notify the 
Commission in writing of the proposed merger as soon as it is practicable but in no 
event later than 30 days of the parties’ decision to merge. Further, Article 24(2) of the 
Regulations makes any merger implemented in contravention of Article 24(1) of the 
Regulations a nullity. Article 25(5) imposes a fine on the merging parties by imposing 
a maximum of 10% of either or both of the merging parties’ annual turnover in the 
Common Market as reflected in the accounts of any party concerned for the preceding 
financial year.  
 
45. It does appear that this system raises some concerns already identified in this section. 
It should be recalled that when the Commission commenced operations, it had an 
expansive interpretation of what amounted to ‘decision to merge’. The Commission 
interpreted the terms to mean a point in time when there is a meeting of minds or 
consensus ad idem to consummate a merger. This was an absurd interpretation as a 
meeting of minds and/or intention to merge may not always culminate in a merger. 
This still leaves a lot of ambiguity. Obviously proving intent is a mental or 
psychological matter that may not be free from trouble and may be subject to bias and 
subjective considerations. The Commission has since addressed this concern by 
interpreting what ‘decision to merge’ means in the Guidelines. The Commission 
considers that a decision to merge must either be (i) a joint decision taken by the 
merging parties and so comprise the conclusion of a definitive, legally binding 




precedent), or (ii) the announcement of a public bid in the case of publicly traded 
securities. This interpretation appears sound and introduces certainty. 
 
46. Notably, the Regulations also impose a deadline within which to notify a merger after 
the triggering event. The deadline is 30 days which is just as tight as in Zimbabwe, 
Brazil and Argentina. It appears that this gives little room for the parties to compose 
themselves in terms fulfilling all the requirements necessary for a merger notification. 
What is comforting to observe is that the Commission has taken a pragmatic approach 
on this matter and has never punished any firm for failure to notify the merger after 
the deadline. This is different from the position of the Brazillian and Argentinian 
Authorities who have followed a strict interpretation of the law and imposed hefty 
fines on merging parties in the past. The mischief that the imposition of the deadline 
attempts to address is far from clear. This shows that the provision is superfluous and 
needs to be amended for legal certainty.  
 
47. The main comfort the Regulations have brought in this area however is that while in 
the past, the parties would have to comply with different trigger events and deadlines 
if a merger involved more than one Member State, currently they just have to comply 
with the trigger event and deadline under the Regulations. This reduces the risk of 
failure to meet the legal requirement and subject to sanctions. Further, the soft and 
pragmatic approach by the Commission brings comfort to the parties although the 
noble thing to do would be to strike out this provision which evidently cures no 
mischief and burdens the merging parties. Consistent with this analysis Thula Kaira337 
observed that: 
 
“Parties may announce a merger but it is when they are ready to notify that they 
should notify. An announcement to marry does not bring with it deadline when to 






337 Thula Kaira was the second Head of the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission of Zambia. He 
later became the first Head of the Botswana Competition Authority. He is currently a consultant responsible for 




11.1.8  Local Nexus 
 
48. It is a requirement under international best practice that a merger to be reviewed 
should have local nexus to the reviewing jurisdiction. In simple terms, this means that 
the merger transaction should raise the likelihood of affecting competition in the 
reviewing jurisdiction. Mergers should only be notified in jurisdictions where there is 
proximate and material nexus. Those jurisdictions where a merger does not have 
material and proximate nexus, should not call for the mandatory notification of such 
mergers as it unnecessarily increases the burden on the merging parties. The nexus is 
basically determined by the merger notification thresholds. However, it is surprisingly 
observable that most jurisdictions in the Common Market commenced their merger 
control regimes with zero notification thresholds. Some of them still implement zero 
merger notification threshold regimes. Among these countries are Malawi, Swaziland 
and Kenya.338  
 
49. It should be noted that just like the setting of merger filing fees, the setting of merger 
notification thresholds is also not conducted within the confines of mathematical 
precision. A lot of considerations are taken into account some of which may be 
subjective. The ICN gives guidance on this as follows:339 
 
a) Identify goals of reform 
b) Consider the type of thresholds 
c) Consider exempting transactions that do not raise competitive concerns 
d) Engage in benchmarking based on historical information 
e) Consider identifying a desirable number of transactions to review annually 
 
338 Until just recently, the Kenyan Competition Legislation was not explicit on merger notification thresholds. 
Implicitly, Kenya implemented a zero merger notification regime. The Competition Amendment Act of 2016 
which was assented to on 23 December 2016 and took effect on 13 January 2017 now allows the competition 
authority in consultation with stakeholders to set thresholds for any proposed merger to be excluded from the 
merger control provisions of the competition legislation. The proposed thresholds had not yet been enacted at 
the time of writing the dissertation but has reached an advanced level of Parliamentary approval. This position 
was provided by Mr. Boniface Makongo during their visit to their counterparts at the Commission on 13 – 15 
March 2019 to discuss the MOU Implementation Plan for the Competition Authority of Kenya and the 
Commission. However, the Competition Commission of Kenya Administrative Guidelines allows for the 
exclusion of proposed mergers from the provisions of the Competition Act. The Administrative Guidelines are 
not binding but they give guidance as regards transactions Competition Authority of Kenya is likely to exclude 
from the provisions of the Competition Act  
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f) Consider the size of the economy 
g) Compare thresholds used in other jurisdictions 
h) Thresholds may be higher where agencies have residual jurisdiction to review 
non-notifiable transactions 
i) Consultations with stakeholders can help build support for threshold reforms 
j) Adjusting thresholds should be a continuous process. 
 
50. Competition Authorities should however not be condemned for setting thresholds on 
the low side in their nascent stages of development as usually there is little data for 
benchmarking in the authority’s jurisdiction. Nonetheless, an absent notification 
threshold is absurd under any conceivable situation. It is difficult to imagine a 
situation where a merger involving firms with insignificant operations in a certain 
jurisdiction would raise competition concerns. Very few Member States have 
thresholds in the Common Market, the notable ones been Mauritius, Seychelles, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe.  
 
51.  Kenya has issued Guidelines on thresholds but these are not binding. Table 10 below 
shows the current merger notification thresholds in selected Member States. 
 
Table 10: Merger Notification Thresholds in Selected Member States 
Country Type Individual 
Worldwide 
Combined Local Individual 
Local 
Kenya Turnover  US$11,496,949 US$1,149,695 






Zimbabwe Higher of 
Turnover/Assets 
 US$1,200,000  
Source: Author’s research 
 
340 Section 8(1) of the Competition and Consumer Protection (General) Regulations, 2011 stipulate that a merger 
transaction shall require authorization by the Commission where the combined turnover or assets whichever is 
higher in Zambia of the merging parties, is at least fifty million fee units in their latest full financial year, for 
which figures are available. Accordingly 1 fee unit equates to 0.3 Zambian Kwacha (see the Fees and Fines Act 
Cap 45 of the Laws of Zambia).  
341https://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=15%2C000%2C000&From=ZMW&To=USD  





52. A few comments are worth mentioning regarding these thresholds. With regard to 
Zambia, an interesting scenario arises from a careful reading of section 8(1) the 
Competition and Consumer Protection (General) Regulations, 2011 which stipulates 
that a merger transaction shall require authorization by the CCPC where the combined 
turnover or assets whichever is higher in Zambia of the merging parties, is at least 
fifty million fee units in their latest full financial year, for which figures are available. 
This provision does not appear to take into account the requirement of the target firm 
having individual local turnover in Zambia. It is possible for the acquiring firm to 
have for example a turnover of fifty five million fee units in Zambia with a target 
having only a paltry turnover or even naught and yet the transaction qualifying for 
notification. This is because the combined turnover in this case would exceed the 
merger notification thresholds. Evidently, such a transaction would not have local 
nexus and it is unlikely to raise competition concerns. The same comments apply to 
Zimbabwe. However, research revealed that CCPC has changed its practice and has 
for a long time now not been reviewing merger transactions where at least one of the 
parties to the transaction does not have local nexus. This change of practice is 
commendable but the acceptable thing to do is to amend the law.   
 
53. The Kenyan merger thresholds are well designed. They only capture transactions of a 
certain magnitude and in addition, incorporates the requirement for an individual local 
turnover which excludes mergers involving large and significantly small firms from 
notification. Nevertheless, these are only Guidelines and not binding and therefore do 
not give great certainty to the parties. 
 
54. Other jurisdictions like Mauritius have voluntary merger notification systems but the 
Mauritian competition legislation makes a merger transaction subject to notification if 
the merged entity’s minimum market share is 30%. Seychelles is another jurisdiction 
that bases the competition authority’s intervention on a merger on market shares. The 
competition legislation in Seychelles provides that a notifiable merger is one which 
involves an enterprise that by itself controls or, together with any other enterprise with 
which it intends to effect the merger, is likely to control, 40% or more of a market, or 
such other amounts as the Minister may prescribe. The dissertation has already 




shares. Some notification thresholds discussed above raise challenges not only on the 
merging parties but the competition authorities also.  
 
55. It can be observed that a number of countries in the Common Market do not have 
meaningful merger notification thresholds. This raises the cost of doing business in 
the Common Market and ultimately frustrates business development, investment and 
the regional integration imperative. In the absence of meaningful thresholds, it means 
that the parties would have to notify their transactions and in some cases pay merger 
notifications fees regardless of the size of the transaction and the likelihood that it 
would raise any competition concerns. This is irregular and clearly inconsistent with 
international best practice. The situation also presents a challenge to competition 
authorities in that they would have to devote human resources to reviewing mergers 
that have no consequence on competition instead of focusing on transactions of 
importance or other anti-trust cases like cartels and abuse of dominance that may 
cause much damage to markets than mergers. Cognate to this are jurisdictions without 
the criteria of combined local turnover for the merging parties. This results in 
capturing transaction without local nexus and anti-trust importance.  
 
56. Further, basing merger thresholds on market shares is problematic as it is not 
objective and gives both the merging parties and competition authorities the task of 
defining the relevant market before notification. The greater likelihood is that the 
merging parties and the competition authorities are likely to arrive at different 
definitions of the market and therefore different market shares. Recall from Chapter 
Six of the dissertation that the definition of the market is not a very simple task based 
on scientific precision. Therefore, uncertainty looms on both the merging parties and 
the competition authorities where the notification thresholds are based on market 
shares.  
 
Have the Regulations Resolved the Challenge of Reviewing Mergers Lacking Local 
Nexus? 
 
57. The Regulations appear to have resolved this challenge to a very large extent. With 




with different merger notification thresholds for transactions that meet the merger 
notification thresholds stipulated in Rule 4 of the COMESA Competition Rules on the 
Determination of Merger Notification Thresholds and Method of Calculation. The 
aforementioned Rule provide that:  
 
“a merger is notifiable to the Commission where the combined turnover 
or value of assets of the merging parties whichever is higher in the 
Common Market equals or exceeds US$50 million and that the annual 
turnover or value of assets, whichever is higher, in the Common Market 
of each of at least two of the parties to a merger equals or exceeds COM$ 
10 million, unless each of the parties to a merger achieves at least two-
thirds of its aggregate turnover or assets in the Common Market within 
one and the same Member State”. 
 
58. This is important to the merging parties in that the notification thresholds under the 
COMESA regime are clear and certain and that they are not vague and opaque as they 
are based on objective and verifiable criteria.342 Further, the Rules also provide 
guidance on the turnover and asset values343 to take into account when determining 
merger notification thresholds, an element absent in most merger control regimes. The 
element of local nexus has well been addressed by the requirement that each of at 
least two parties to the merger should derive a certain turnover in the Common 
Market. Therefore the possibility of capturing mergers with firms that have no 
operations or whose operations in the Common Market are significantly low is to a 
great extent diminished unless the Commission elects to do so by invoking Article 
23(6) of the Regulations which stipulates that the Commission may require parties to 
a non-notifiable merger to notify the Commission of that merger if it appears to the 
Commission that the merger is likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition or 
is likely to be contrary to public interest. According to Article 23(5) a non-notifiable 
merger means a merger or proposed merger with a value below the prescribed 
threshold. The Commission would only invoke Article 23(6) in exceptional 
 
342 Note that the criteria in the COMESA Competition Rules is consistent with the ICN recommended practices 
cited in this section. 
343 See Rule 5 of the COMESA Competition Rules on the Determination of Merger Notification Thresholds and 




circumstances and from inception to the time of writing this dissertation, the 
Commission has only invoked this provision once in the case involving the takeover 
of Careem Inc by Uber Technologies in June 2019. It is also commendable that 
unlike their EU counterparts, the COMESA merger regime has focussed on local 
(COMESA wide) turnover or asset value as opposed to worldwide turnover thereby 
closing any debate as regards local nexus.  
 
59. Evidently observable in the COMESA Competition Rules on the Determination of 
Merger Notification Thresholds and Method of Calculation is that the local nexus 
requirement is cemented by introducing the two-third rule. It works to ensure that 
where a merger has nexus in one Member State despite deriving a minimum 
combined turnover or value of assets of US$50 million and at least two of each of the 
parties to a merger deriving a minimum of US$10 million turnover or value of assets 
in the Common Market, that merger should be notified to that Member State only. 
Therefore, if two-thirds of each of the merging parties’ turnover or value of assets is 
derived in one and the same Member State, the transaction lacks COMESA nexus and 
should be reviewed by that particular Member State. 
 
60. It should be recalled that when the Commission commenced operations, it also started 
with zero notification thresholds. The argument by the Commission was that there 
was no historical data to benchmark on and the Commission needed to review 
mergers until such a time when it was able to find the right policy balance. This 
argument was sound and consistent with the ICN views that the determination of 
merger notification thresholds may be based on historical information. However, it is 
still absurd that the notification thresholds were at zero. The Commission should have 
used other parameters like the size of the economy and comparing thresholds in other 
jurisdictions. The Commission could have started with the thresholds used in one of 
the Member States and later raised the thresholds as adjusting thresholds should be a 
continuous process.  
 
61. The argument that stands now is whether the COMESA merger notification 
thresholds are optimal. The merger notification thresholds appear to be optimal in that 




this threshold level. There is still room for the thresholds to be adjusted upwards 
should need be in the future. It is therefore concluded that the Regulations have 
resolved this challenge of lack of local nexus in reviewing mergers with a regional 
dimension. 
 
62. However, a word of caution should be entered. The Rules appear to be ultra vires 
Article 23(3)(a) which presupposes a situation where a merger involving a party that 
is absent in the Common Market may be notified as long as one of the parties has 
operations in two or more Member States. Further, the wording of the Rules also does 
not completely eliminate the uncertainty in that it is still possible to have each of at 
least two parties to a merger derive a turnover or hold assets of US$10 million or 
more in the Common Market and yet the target has no operations therein. This may be 
in a situation where there are two acquiring parties. The Rules should have been 
specific that at least one acquiring firm and one target firm should derive a turnover or 
hold assets of not less than US$10 million in the Common Market. 
 
11.1.9 Non-Domestication of the Treaty and the Regulations 
 
63. This challenge is not just unique to the merging parties but also to National 
Competition Authorities. The challenge for the merging parties is that they are 
threatened by some Member States if they do not notify therein notwithstanding that 
they have notified at COMESA level because the Regulations and the Treaty are not 
domesticated in that particular country. This creates a lot of uncertainty for the 
merging parties. For example, this situation was serious when the Commission 
commenced its operations as Kenya threatened undertakings to notify with the CAK 
despite notifying the Commission. As a matter of fact, there is case involving the 
Coca-Cola Beverages Africa (CCBA). In this matter, CCBA notified the Commission 
of the merger in 2015 and the transaction was approved unconditionally. One of the 
Member States where the parties had operations was Ethiopia. Subsequently, in 2019, 
the Ethiopian Authorities ruled that the parties had engaged in an unlawful merger 
because they did not notify the Ethiopian Authorities. The parties contended that they 
were not obliged to notify the Ethiopian Authorities as the transaction was cross-




Authorities disregarded the Regulations on account that they were not domesticated in 
Ethiopia. The parties have appealed the case and it remains to be seen how it will 
conclude. 
 
Have the Regulations Resolved the Challenge of Non-Domestication of the Treaty and 
the Regulations? 
 
64. Clearly the Regulations have not resolved this challenge as has been established in 
Chapter 10 of this dissertation. There is need to rest this ghost by COMESA ensuring 
that all the Member States put their internal houses in order by domesticating the 
Treaty. It should also be noted that respect of the Treaty and the Regulations at 
national level may be beyond legal considerations. It may be argued that for countries 
to respect their obligations under a Treaty or any other regional trade agreement, they 
are not only compelled by their conscience to respect laws but also by political and 
other interests beyond legal responsibility.  
 
65. There should be strong common interests tying the countries together. For example, 
their economies and legal system should be interwoven to the extent that without one 
of them participating, the entire common market is at stake. This is the case in Europe 
and may be the reason why it has been very difficult to reach an amicable divorce 
between the EU and the United Kingdom. It can also be argued that this project has 
succeeded in the EU because of little disparities in the Member States’ economies and 
more so because the European project began as a result of rebuilding after the world-
wars. Therefore there was common interest of reconstruction. In COMESA, this is 
largely absent as can be attested from the very low levels of intra-COMESA Trade, 
fragmented and divergent legal frameworks. This situation is exacerbated by the rise 
of national interests which is rife and poses a threat to the durability of supra-national 
merger control arrangement.  
 
11.1.10  Less Jurisprudence on merger Assessment in the Common Market 
 
66. This poses a huge challenge to the merging parties in that it becomes difficult to 




parameters of assessment discussed in Chapter Six of this dissertation. While 
assessment follows a scientific approach, it is not crystal mathematics which leaves 
little or no room for disputes. The assessment criteria are not based on pure 
objectivity that the merging parties would only know the competition authority’s 
possible approach through guidelines, assessment reports and judicial decisions 
regarding mergers. 
 
67. However, this research has revealed that not all Member States have merger 
assessment guidelines to direct the merging parties as regards the authority’s thinking 
and approach in merger assessment. The situation is even more notable when it comes 
to issuing decisions as in most cases the competition authorities simply approve the 
mergers unconditionally or conditionally and in rare circumstances prohibit mergers 
without giving clear details and reasons for their determination. Such detailed 
decisions could create precedent for the merging parties as they would know the 
precise approaches of the competition authorities. This concern was echoed by Mark 
Griffiths; an attorney at Norton Rose Fulbright who observed that in most cases when 
they were filing a transaction before the Commission, they relied on precedents of the 
EC.344 This is not right as market circumstances and other imperatives may differ 
between Europe and the Common Market. Europe has a long history of merger law 
enforcement, political and market integration is enhanced, the reasons that motivated 
the establishment of the EU are different among other factors. 
 
68. Further, there is less judicial precedent in most Member States as regards merger 
regulation. It is regrettable that even respected jurisdictions like Zambia have had a 
paltry number of cases considered by the Courts. At the time of writing this 
dissertation, Zambia had less than 10 merger cases determined by the courts of law 
after been in existence for over 20 years while the Republic of Mauritius at the time of 
writing the dissertation never had any merger determined by the courts of law. One 
explanation for this may be a lack of culture of litigation in the Common Market 
and/or lack of faith in judicial institutions. However, a detailed research may be 
needed on this as it is beyond the scope of this dissertation.  
 
344 Views of Mark Griffiths at the COMESA Competition Validation Workshop for Guidelines regarding the 
implementation of Articles 16 and 18 of the COMESA Competition Regulations held on 18 – 20 May 2017 in 





Have the Regulations Resolved the Challenge of Less Precedent on Merger 
Assessment in the Common Market? 
 
69. This inquiry begins by observing that the Commission has issued a comprehensive set 
of Guidelines as regards its approach on merger assessment. It should be noted that 
these Guidelines are well drafted and very consistent with international best practice 
in many respects. This is commendable especially that the Commission issued these 
Guidelines barely one year after commencing operations. This demonstrates the 
Commission’s appetite to have a perfect regional merger control regime. However, 
the impressive situation ends here. A check at the Commission’s website for the 
decisions it issues to the parties revealed that the practice is not different from that in 
most Member States. The decisions issued and made public are shallow that they 
contain no detailed reasons for arriving at the determination. Fortunately, no merger 
has thus far been prohibited by the Commission. Prohibitions would require detailed 
reasoning so that the parties know exactly the approach the Commission takes to 
review their transactions.  
 
70. As regards lack of judicial precedent, the situation is not any better at COMESA level. 
There have been no cases that have been taken to the CCJ for determination. The only 
case that has been considered by the CCJ is that of Polytol and it did not relate to 
mergers although it touched on fundamental imperatives of market integration and the 
Supremacy of the Treaty, matters that have consequences on merger control in the 
Common Market as discussed in Chapter 10 of the dissertation.  
 
11.1.11  Policy Imperatives beyond the Conventional Consideration of Mergers under 
the Test of Substantial Lessening of Competition   
 
71. The main reason of assessing mergers is to determine whether they would lead to a 
substantial lessening of competition. The tests used to determine the competition 
effects are almost standard in almost all laws that have merger control provisions in 
the Common Market. These tests have been comprehensively covered in Chapter Six 




Zambia, Malawi and Swaziland in addition to the substantial prevention of 
competition test also consider other policy imperatives either by practice or Statute to 
determine mergers. While such practice departs from pure competition consideration, 
it is not unusual as competition laws do not exist in a vacuum but operate in line with 
other government policies. What is important is that these considerations should be 
predictable, consistent and not arbitrarily invoked to satisfy interests not related to 
merger review. 
 
72. The main policy imperative considered in most jurisdictions including the ones cited 
above is public interest. A detailed discussion on this was provided in Chapter Six. 
The challenge on the merging parties is to determine what amounts to public 
interest345 as it is vague in most jurisdictions. The other challenge is complying with a 
myriad of public interest obligations which may be different from one Member State 
to another.  
 
Have the Regulations Resolved the Challenge Policy Imperatives beyond the 
Conventional Consideration of Mergers under the Test of Substantial Lessening of 
Competition?     
 
73. A careful review of the relevant Articles under the Regulations would support the 
rushed conclusion that this challenge has been resolved. The Regulation appears to 
focus only on competition matters. Public Interest has been mentioned in the 
Regulations but with specific connection to competition tests i.e. Dominance and 
Substantial Lessening of Competition. The specific wording of the law makes it 
impermissible for the Commission to take into account the traditional public interest 
considerations discussed above. Article 26 informs us that if the merger is likely to 
substantially prevent or lessen competition, the Commission must determine whether 
there is overriding technological efficiency or other procompetitive gain and whether 
the merger can be justified on substantial public interest grounds.  Article 26(3) 
provides that a merger shall be contrary to the public interest if the Commission is 
satisfied that the merger:  
 
 




 a)  has lessened substantially or is likely to lessen substantially the degree of 
competition in the Common Market or any part thereof; or 
b)   has resulted, or is likely to result in, or strengthen a position of dominance 
which is or will be contrary to the public interest.  
  
74. Article 26(4) stipulates that in order for the Commission to determine whether a 
merger is or will be contrary to public interest, the Commission shall take into 
account all matters that it considers relevant in the circumstances and shall have 
regard to the desirability of:  
 
a) maintaining and promoting effective competition between persons producing 
or distributing commodities and services in the region;  
 
b)  promoting the interests of consumers, purchasers, and other users in the 
region, in regard to the prices, quality and variety of such commodities and 
services;  
 
c)  promoting through competition, the reduction of costs and the development of 
new commodities, and facilitating the entry of new competitors into existing 
markets. 
 
75. The rule of ejusdem generis is clearly at play as all the public interest elements 
mentioned relate to competition considerations.  The challenge of uncertainty has 
therefore been eliminated as it is clear that the only public interest issues the 
Commission shall take into account are competition related. Further, the fact that the 
Commission is supposed to be a ‘one-stop-shop’ means that only the Commission’s 
assessment would be taken into account for mergers meeting the regional dimension 
requirement. 
 
76. The foregoing notwithstanding, it appears that challenges still remain. They were 
good signs when the Commission commenced operations in that it resisted to be 
drawn into wide public interest considerations invoked by Member States and it chose 




informs us that this is no longer the case as the Commission has also began to approve 
non-pernicious mergers on condition that no jobs are lost. Further, the Commission’s 
officials have recently been quoted as stating that they are a Member State based 
institution and there is no way they can avoid taking such public interest 
considerations if it reflects the desires of Member States. This is deeply troubling as 
some Member States’ desires may simply be political, disguised under public interest. 
This situation is serious as some Member States indicated346 that the dichotomy in 
public interest considerations between the Commission and the Member States is an 
anomaly that should be addressed by amending the Regulations to expressly address 
traditional public interest elements.  
 
77. To buttress the point on the uncertainty the treatment of public interest raises even 
under the Regulations, this research considered the deliberations by the Commission 
and the National Competition Authorities at a workshop held in Eswatini on 23 – 24 
October, 2018 to discuss remedies and public interest matters in regional merger 
review. In that meeting, it was considered that the Commission should consider public 
interest matters. The participants chose an expansive interpretation of the definition of 
the term ‘Competition’ under Article 1 of the Regulation which provides that: 
 
“Competition means the striving or potential striving of two or more 
persons or organisations engaged in production, distribution, supply, 
purchase or consumption of goods and services in a given market against 
one another which results in greater efficiency, high economic growth, 
increasing employment opportunities, lower prices and improved choice 
for consumers”. 
 
78. The participants argued that some of the elements like employment and economic 
growth bordered on public interest and therefore clothed the Commission with the 
jurisdiction to consider public interest in merger review. It should be stated that there 
is nothing wrong with the consideration of public interest as long as there is certainty 
in what amounts to public interest. It was discussed at the Eswatini meeting of 23-24 
October that the Commission shall draft Guidelines explaining the public interest 
 




matters it shall consider. What was comforting at this meeting however, is that it was 
made clear that any public interest claim that would be in the interest of one Member 
State only but of detrimental concern to other Member States shall not be entertained. 
This is comforting in that political interference in the name of public interest may 
easily be screened. Suffice to mention that though the definition of competition in 
Article 1 of the Regulations includes the increase in employment opportunities, it 
does not automatically mean that any merger that results in short term employment 
losses347 should be prohibited. The merger may result in long term opportunities for 
increasing employment through efficiencies created.  
 
11.2     Conclusion 
 
79. This Chapter has discussed some of the challenges faced by the merging parties in 
multi-jurisdictional merger review and whether the creation of a supra-national 
competition authority has resolved these particular challenges in the Common Market. 
It has been determined that while the supra-national merger control regime has eased 
some burden, challenges remain stemming from both legal and practical uncertainty. 
The next chapter shall discuss some of the challenges faced by the NCAs in multi-
jurisdictional merger review and determine if these have been resolved by the supra-





















12.0 Challenges for National Competition Authorities and whether the Regulations 
have resolved these Challenges 
 
1. It is recalled from Chapter One of this dissertation that a number of challenges in the 
regulation of cross-border mergers were identified. Those that relate to NCAs include: 
 
(i) The lack of extra-territorial application of national competition laws 
(ii) Lack of skills and expertise 
(iii)Lack of financial resources 
(iv) Poor coordination and cooperation arrangements among the institutions involved 
 
2. It should be noted that that there may be several challenges but in order to be focussed 
and realistic, the dissertation has elected to focus on the above challenges identified 
by other researches and appearing relevant to the current research. Under this Chapter, 
these challenges have been addressed.  
 
12.1 Lack of Extra-territorial Application of National Competition Laws 
 
3. Extra-territorial jurisdiction refers to a situation where a national law is extended to 
apply to conduct initiated outside its boundaries but having effects within its borders. 
It should be noted that most countries in the Common Market purport to have extra-
territorial jurisdiction on the basis of the effects doctrine, i.e. as long as conduct has 
effect in their territories, their national laws apply. The effectiveness with which this 
is done is highly questionable. Notable is that even advanced jurisdictions in the field 
of anti-trust law are not yet settled on how to address this concern and mostly they get 
around it through rich experience of cooperation and trust in each other’s systems.348 
 
348 In an email conversation of 11 October, 2016, Maria Coppola of the Federal Trade Commission of the United 
States of America admitted that even the United States anti-trust authorities have problems addressing anti-trust 
infringements emanating from outside but having effect inside the United States.  However, it may be argued 
that these jurisdictions have managed to get around this challenge through accumulated experience of 
competition law enforcement and effective cooperation with other competition authorities as can be attested 
from the cooperation between the United States of America competition authorities and the European 
Commission. The author also interviewed Russell W. Damtoft and Caldwell Harrop of the U.S Department of 




Maria Coppola, in an email interview regarding extra-territoriality remarked as 
follows:349 
 
“In theory we can get evidence abroad but in practice it is so difficult we almost 
never do. Usually we will get evidence from a foreign company through a US 
subsidiary or parent, or their US lawyers. We have even less experience with fines 
since we rarely seek monetary penalties”. 
 
4. However, before pre-empting the assessment of this matter in the Common Market, it 
is imperative to look at the national competition laws of selected Member States. We 
begin the inquiry by inspecting the Ethiopian competition legislation to identify 
provisions that clothe it with extra-territorial application. Article 4(1) of the Trade 
Competition and Consumer Protection Proclamation (TCCPP) states that the 
Proclamation shall apply to any commercial activity or transaction in goods or 
services conducted or having effect within the Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia. They key word is ‘effect’. The ‘effects’ doctrine respects no borders as 
conduct may be consummated in one country, but effects would transcend national 
borders. Therefore, the wording of the law presupposes a situation where the TCCPP 
would be apply on an undertaking that is located in another jurisdiction as long as the 
effects of its anti-competitive behaviour are experienced in Ethiopia. Similarly, 
section 3 of the Mauritian competition legislation provides that it applies to every 
economic activity that has effect in Mauritius. A check in the Zambian competition 
Statute gives similar reading. Principally, section 3(1) of the CCPA provides extra-
territorial connotation in application, as follows: 
 
“Except as otherwise provided for in this Act, this Act applies to all economic 
activity within, or having an effect within, Zambia”.  
 
5. This means conduct need not necessarily originate from Zambia to have effect, but it 
can originate from outside the country. Further section 27(1)(d) of the CCPA, gives 
the CCPC authority to review a merger even if it is concluded outside Zambia but has 
 
Development Sixteenth Session of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy held 
in Geneva, Switzerland from 6-7 July 2017 who both buttressed the views of Maria Coppola. 




consequences in Zambia that require further consideration. Such legislative, 
adjudicative and enforcement overtones of extra-territorial application of the above 
respective laws are impressive but are they practical? This inquiry begins by taking 
note of Maria Coppola’s view above. It is observable that this is not only a challenge 
for the DEEs but developed countries alike. The challenge lies in the cooperation and 
the readiness of one country to enforce the laws of another. Several factors account 
for the fact that in most cases this is unsuccessful. Among these factors is the 
principle of sovereignty. It has been posited that one of the essential elements of 
Statehood is the occupation of a territorial area, within which State law operates. Over 
this area, supreme authority is vested in the State. It is considered that the concept of 
sovereignty signifies that within this territorial domain, jurisdiction is exercised by the 
State over persons and property to the exclusion of other States.350 Max Huber, the 
Arbitrator in the Island of Palmas Arbitration commented the following on territorial 
sovereignty:351 
 
“Sovereignty in the relation between States signifies independence. Independence in 
regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any 
other State, the functions of a State”. 
 
6. It can therefore be inferred that the extra-territorial application of one law may appear 
to usurp the jurisdiction of another State by perceptibly ceding sovereignty, a matter 
most countries are sensitive to. Therefore, the claim by the above cited Statutes that 
they have extra-territorial reach may be academic to the extent that the jurisdictions 
where the culpable undertakings are located are not ready to cooperate. To circumvent 
this problem, countries engage in MOUs. For example, under SADC, there is a 
coordination system to share information amongst competition authorities. A Mergers 
working group has been established, and an MoU signed amongst SADC competition 
authorities. This system is however not immune to challenges which are usually: 
 
(i) Information requests are made by staff who are peers and thus easily exchange 
such information however, where the staff do not know each other personally, 
information is difficult to be shared; 
 
350 JG Starke and IA Shearer Starke’s International Law (London, Boston: Butterworths, 1994), 144. 




(ii) Information requests is usually made informally and thus may be a subject of 
personal workload issues before it is responded to; 
(iii) There is generally no supervisory monitoring for such to ensure that the 
information requested is submitted timeously and in a manner that would 
provide useful feedback to the requesting authority; 
(iv) Legal issues in relation to confidentiality may be a challenge - including the 
definition of what exactly is ‘confidential’ information; 
(v) Whom do you go to (appeal) in case an individual officer is not forthcoming 
with information? 
 
7. Indeed, the challenges the application of the extra-territorial principle poses to both 
multi-national corporations and State agencies have long been noted. For example, 
John R. Stevenson352 observed in 1970 that: 
 
"multinational corporation, by definition, is established and has activities in 
more than one State. If a strict territorial approach is adopted, each State may 
regulate only those activities within its borders. Such an approach could have 
serious effects. It might make it impossible for the corporation to do business 
by subjecting it to contradictory or confusing legal regimes, or on the other 
hand, it might allow the corporation to escape liability for conduct whose 
components are legal in each of the States in which they take place but which, 
taken as a whole, is illegal under the laws of some or all of the States 
concerned”.  
 
8. The magnitude of the problem is reflected in the fact that not even the EU which has a 
long history and experience on judicial precedent in competition matters has expressly 
decided a case on the premise of extra-territoriality. For example, it was held in the 
Woodpulp case353 that “the application of the Regulation is justified under public 
international law when it is foreseeable that conduct will have an immediate and 
substantial effect on the Community”. Nevertheless, in this case, the CJEU although 
advised to take into account the effects doctrine, a prerequisite to extra-territorial 
application, ended up ruling on distinct and narrow premises. Commentators like 
 
352 John R. Stevenson in Department of State Bulletin, 12 October 1970, p 429. 




Professor Alison Jones354 have remarked that “although the EU competition 
authorities may claim jurisdiction in cases involving non-EU undertakings, 
enforcement of this jurisdiction is more problematic”. This is consistent with the EC’s 
position in some of its publications. For example, the EC underlined in its 2008 
annual report that “although the competition provisions do not explicitly provide the 
extraterritorial application, as EU is the major player in an increasingly globalized 
world economy, competition policy must also adopt a global outlook”.355 
 
9. The observation by the EC in the 2008 annual report gives an indication that the 
application of the extra-territorial principle is far from easy. As observed by Yue 
Xia,356 “to justify the extra-territorial application of EU competition rules, the 
Commission has always been looking at the effects that those agreements and 
practices have on the EU market. But this criterion was not recognized by the 
European Courts for a very long period. The courts seem unwilling to adopt the 
‘effects doctrine’. Instead, the courts have adopted two other legal theories on the 
extra-territorial application of EU competition rules. The first one is the ‘economic 
entity’ doctrine and the second one is the ‘implementation’ doctrine”.357  
 
10. Dyestuffs case358  is one of the most important cases that applied economic entity 
doctrine. The question was whether the EC had jurisdiction over non-EU parent 
companies because of their EU subsidiaries’ infringements. The EC established that 
several non-EU manufacturers had engaged in price fixing for dyestuffs sold in the 
internal market. However, plaintiffs argued that neither the ECJ nor the EC had 
jurisdiction on the matter. While the court was presented with an opportunity to 
decide the matter on the effects doctrine basis, the supposedly pre-requisite for 
establishing the extra-territorial application of EC Competition Law, it claimed 
jurisdiction by establishing the ‘economic entity’ theory.359 The ECJ found that the 
 
354 Professor Alison Jones is a Professor of Law at King’s College London 
355 The European Commission’s 2008 Report on Competition Policy, para 164. 
356 Yue Xia, Assessing Extraterritorial Application of EU Competition Law: LLM Paper, 2016 – 2017 “Under 
Settings” https://lib.ugent.be/fulltxt/RUG01/002/349/640/RUG01-002349640_2017_0001_AC.pdf (accessed on 
21 April 2019) 
357 Ibid 
358 Case C-48/69, Imperial Chemical Industries Limited v. Commission [1972] E.C.R. 619. 
359 In case C-48/69, Imperial Chemical Industries Limited v. Commission [1972] E.C.R. 619, para 132, the ECJ 
stated that: “The fact that a subsidiary has separate legal personality is not sufficient to exclude the possibility of 




applicant was able to exercise decisive influence over the policy of the subsidiaries as 
regards selling prices in EC and in fact used such power. Therefore, the ECJ 
recognized the Commission’s jurisdiction ratione personae by considering the parent 
companies and subsidiaries as a single economic entity.360  
 
11. The single economic entity doctrine may not always be suitable to establish the 
application of EU law to undertakings located outside the EU without any subsidiary 
therein. To get around this, the ECJ has relied on the ‘Implementation Doctrine’. This 
was observed in the Wood Pulp Case.361 It involved price-fixing collusion of forty-
one non-EU sulfate wood pulp producers with Finnish and U.S trade associations. The 
Plaintiffs submitted that the EC lacked jurisdiction on the case as the single economic 
entity doctrine could not be established. As observed by Yue Xia this huge 
international price-fixing case took the ECJ an unusually long time (almost four 
years) to reach a judgment which reflects the dilemma that on the one hand, the court 
faced a big challenge on justifying the extra-territorial enforcement of EU competition 
rules, but on the other hand, it needed a convincing theory to do this.362 In this case, 
the court circumvented the ‘effects doctrine’ and its ratio decidendi, implied that 
jurisdiction on the matter could be claimed on the premise that the conduct was 
implemented in the Community, i.e. the conduct of the applicants was implemented in 
the internal market.363   
 
 
conduct independently but in all material respects carries out the instructions given to it by the parent company. 
When the subsidiary does not enjoy any real autonomy in the determination of its course of action on the 
market, the prohibitions imposed by Article 85(1) may be considered inapplicable in the relations between the 
subsidiary and the parent company, with which it then forms one economic unit. In view of the unity of the 
group thus formed, the activities of the subsidiaries may, in certain circumstances, be imputed to the parent 
company.” 
360 Yue Xia, Assessing Extraterritorial Application of EU Competition Law: LLM Paper, 2016 – 2017. Under 
“Settings” https://lib.ugent.be/fulltxt/RUG01/002/349/640/RUG01-002349640_2017_0001_AC.pdf (accessed 
on 21 April 2019) 
361 Joined Cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 and 125 to 129/85, A. Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and others v Commission 
(Wood Pulp), [1988] ECR 5193. 
362 Joined cases 6 and 7/73 Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano and Commercial Solvents Corp. v. E.C. 
Commission, [1974] 13 Common Mkt. L.R. 309. 
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12. Suffice to mention that by 1999, the EU Courts finally adopted the ‘Effects Doctrine’ 
to establish extra-territoriality in the Gencor merger.364 Gencor contested the EC’s 
decision on the basis that the merger was not implemented in the EU. In its judgment, 
the CFI introduced the criterion for ‘effects doctrine’. The Court affirmed that the 
concentration would not only alter the competitive structure of the market in South 
Africa but throughout the world.365 This therefore meant that the competitive structure 
of the common market would also be affected by a merger implemented in South 
Africa through the ‘effects doctrine’.  
 
Have the Regulations Resolved the Challenge of Extra-Territorial Application? 
 
13. As observed in this dissertation, the challenge of extra-territorial reach of national 
laws is complex. To the extent that the Regulations theoretically and may be in 
practice so far have created a ‘one-stop-shop’, it may be argued that the challenge has 
been resolved. This is because the Regulations have jurisdiction in all the Member 
States and Article 10 of the Treaty and Article 3 of the Regulations are instructive on 
this matter. A Member State whose market has been affected by a merger of 
undertakings domiciled in another Member State may implore the Commission to 
invoke the Regulations on the premise of the ‘effects’ doctrine. Similarly, an 
undertaking affected by such a merger may also do the same. However, the legal risk 
still remains due to the lack of domestication of the Treaty and the Regulations which 
continue to haunt and threaten their application in the Common Market. If a Member 
State in whose jurisdiction the Regulations would apply is of the view that such a 
development is not in its best interest, it may refuse to recognise the Regulations on 
the basis of non-domestication and the status quo would revert to the challenges 
raised by the lack of extra-territorial application of national competition legislation. 
Member States in this instance may have to rely on their national laws to address the 
conduct of companies domiciled outside but whose effects are felt in their 
jurisdictions.  
 
14. A similar situation may arise where an undertaking senses the possibility of a 
successful prosecution. It may raise arguments of domestication and lack of 
 





jurisdiction of the Regulations to frustrate the whole process. Therefore, 
domestication should be a precursor to any discussions on extra-territorial application. 
Though beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is worth noting that the Regulations 
also purport to have extra-territorial reach as regards conduct taking place outside the 
Common Market but having effects therein. It remains to be seen how this would be 
handled should the Commission be faced with such an instance. It is therefore 
concluded that the Regulations have not resolved this challenge as the legal risk 
remain until such a time the Regulations are domesticated. 
 
12.2 Lack of Skills and Expertise 
 
15. It is recognised the world over that merger review is a methodical process that 
requires competence and enforcement experience in order to arrive at accurate 
determinations. This is even more so with regard to cross-border mergers whose 
considerations should take into account not only the legal, economic, social and 
political fabric of one country but a number of countries. Such analysis requires a 
good number of highly qualified economists and lawyers. However, research 
conducted in selected NCAs revealed that most merger directorates are significantly 
understaffed with very little expertise and experience in the enforcement of the 
merger laws. For example, it would have been expected that with all the years of 
enforcement experience, Zambia would have a good number of staff in the mergers 
Division of the CCPC. However, at the time of writing, the mergers Division of 
CCPC had 5 Members of staff only who were all economists. None of them had a 
PhD, let alone any qualification specialised in competition law. The situation is the 
same for most other NCAs366. Such lack of specialised skill and expertise may lead to 
erroneous determination of cross-border mergers with undesired consequences. 
 
Have the Regulations Resolved the Challenge of lack of Skills and Expertise? 
 
16. The categorical answer to this question is no. The situation appears even better at 
Member State level especially in terms of quantity. The number of staff at the 
Commission is indisputably low compared to what pertains at national level. The 
 




Commission only has three dedicated members of staff to review cross-border 
mergers. Two of these staff are pure economists with impressive qualifications at 
Masters level although none has a specialised degree in competition law. The third 
one has a specialised Masters Degree in competition law. The qualifications may be 
impressive but the numbers are worrying. Such a staff complement does not reflect 
the status of a regional competition authority that reviews cross-border mergers. Such 
a workload would not be supported by three members of staff.  
 
17. It gives great trepidation to imagine what remarks the United States of America anti-
trust authorities would have on this matter looking at the scathing criticism they had 
on their European counterparts when they arrived at a divergent decision in the 
GE/Honeywell case. In their criticism, the DOJ observed that the EC was not 
equipped with a good number of qualified economists. Whereas the DOJ had by 2001 
more than 50 PhD economists to look at mergers, the same was far from true at the 
EC.367 Therefore, in the case of the Commission having only three members of staff to 
look at mergers in a regional economic block is truly laughable. It is recalled from 
Chapter Six that a lot of elements are analysed in the determination of mergers and 
such an exercise require highly trained staff if the determinations are to be respected. 
 
12.3   Lack of Financial Resources 
 
18. Indisputably the regulation of cross-border mergers is resource intensive in terms of 
finances.368 However, the NCAs interviewed revealed that they were seriously 
constrained by small budgets that sometimes the money was not enough to run even 
purely national mergers. They lamented that competition law and policy is not 
considered a priority by central governments and hence competition authorities are on 
the lower end of sharing the financial cake. It is even worrying that for some 
competition authorities that collect fees and fines, this cannot supplement their 
operations as the central government collects this money and then before the 
beginning of the financial year allocates a budget to the competition authority which 
 
367 Remarks of Deborah Platt Majoras, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Anti-trust Division; U.S Department 
of Justice. Before the Anti-trust Law Section, State Bar of Georgia. November 29, 2001. 
368 It is public knowledge that most competition authorities in DEEs including those in COMESA have limited 




in some cases is lower than the fees and fines collected. Zambia and Mauritius are 
good examples. 
 
Have the Regulations Resolved the Challenge of lack Financial Resources? 
  
19. Undoubtedly the Regulations have not resolved this challenge. It is to be recalled 
earlier in the dissertation that a check of the Commission’s budget for merger review 
disclosed that US$10,000 was budgeted in 2016, 2017 and 2018 on an annual basis. 
This demonstrates a lack of seriousness and that the work the Commission does on the 
review of mergers is not comprehensive and lack quality. US$10,000 is not sufficient 
even to conduct mergers of national character only. Strange enough is that a number 
of NCAs even have higher budgets than that of the Commission for merger review. If 
the Commission is to be taken seriously and be respected as a regional competition 
authority, it should improve on this score. The Commission has money from the 
merger fees it collects but the prioritization appears to be wrong. 
 
12.4 Poor Coordination and Cooperation Arrangements among the Competition 
Authorities Involved. 
 
20. It has been established in the various sections discussed that cooperation among 
competition authorities is not always the easiest approach to take. Usually cooperation 
is tied to personalities at competition authorities. The personal relationship with 
officials in the respective authorities breaks the formal approaches and introduces 
informality which makes the turnaround period faster. One may argue that a formal 
MOU may be used to get around this problem. Nevertheless, this also has its own 
challenges as regards confidentiality, the admission of evidence collected through 
cooperation in a court of law or tribunal among other issues.  
 
Have the Regulations Resolved the Challenge of Poor Coordination and Cooperation 
Arrangements among the Competition Authorities Involved? 
 
21. The Regulations are binding law with jurisdiction in all the Member States. Therefore, 




States are not brought together by a non-binding understanding that addresses their 
interests but are brought together by a law which imposes binding obligations on 
them. Further, as regards mergers, the Commission and the NCAs have created a 
robust informal mechanism of cooperation that has worked very efficiently over the 
time the Commission has been in existence. To consolidate this, the Commission has 
signed MOUs with a number of NCAs to enhance the enforcement of the Regulations. 
The caution here is that this aspect is also threatened by the lack of domestication of 
the Regulations. There is a risk that if personalities changed in these NCAs then this 
bond of cooperation may collapse if the new persons elect to question the jurisdiction 
of the Regulations in their territories. Domestication is something that should be 
addressed with a sense of urgency if the continued implementation of the Regulations 




22. In addition to the challenges discussed above, the research identified other challenges 
it deemed worth to discuss. These are the lack of autonomy of national competition 
authorities and multiple membership to RECs.  
 
12.5 Lack of Autonomy of National Competition Authorities 
 
23. One of the fundamental ingredients of a successful competition authority is its 
autonomy in decision making. Where this is lacking, stakeholders have no confidence 
in the operations and decisions of such a competition authority. A careful distinction 
should be made between decisional autonomy and administrative autonomy especially 
for funding and organisational structure purposes. The authority can dispense with 
administrative autonomy and still execute its mandate effectively. After all most 
competition authorities in the Common Market and the world over are funded by 





24. However, it is a notorious fact that most competition authorities in the Common 
Market lack decisional autonomy.369 In many instances, there is a lot of political 
interference from the highest offices to have a decision made in a certain manner that 
satisfies their interests. In some cases, as already observed in this dissertation, this is 
done under the disguise of public interest. Suffice to state that this is not just the case 
for DEEs but also advanced competition authorities. However, what is worrying in 
DEEs is the frequency and blatant manner in which this is done and it appears, unlike 
in developed countries, there are less safeguards in DEEs to mitigate against this risk. 
Further, the disregard of the law with impunity by governments in DEEs paints a 
gloomy picture. 
 
Have the Regulations Resolved the Challenge of Lack of Autonomy of National 
Competition Authorities? 
 
25. It does appear that the Regulations have resolved this challenge. This supposition is 
based from the fact that the Commission is not subjected to only one government but 
21 governments such that it is improbable to find a situation where what is in the 
political interest of one government is also in the political interest of all the other 
governments. The Commission is therefore able to stand firm and oppose the political 
interference of one/few Member States with the assurance that other Member States 
would support its position. Further, an interview with the Commission officials 
revealed that some Member States in certain cases have attempted to influence 
decisions of the Commission or have the Commission exempt a merger from 
notification despite the clear satisfaction of the merger notification thresholds. The 
Commission has made it clear to such Member States that its decisions are governed 
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12.6 Challenges of Multiple Membership to Regional Economic Communities 
 
26. The challenges posed by this is that Member States may end up having conflicting 
obligations to different RECs pursuant to the legal instruments establishing the 
respective RECs. This may end up frustrating the enforcement of the respective laws 
governing the different RECs in the concerned Member States. For example, Kenya is 
a Member of both the EAC and COMESA. It remains to be seen how Kenya will 
submit to the jurisdiction of both Commission and the East African Community 
Competition Authority (EACCA) without violating its obligations under either law. 
For example, will Kenya call for the notification of a merger that does not meet the 
COMESA merger notification thresholds but does meet the EAC and Kenya 
notification thresholds? At this point in time, the legal and business fraternity can only 
speculate what would happen until such a time EACCA becomes fully operational.   
 
Have the Regulations Resolved the Challenges of Multiple Membership to Regional 
Economic Communities? 
 
27. In theory the Regulations appear to have resolved this challenge when they provide 
under Article 5 that: 
 
“Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or 
particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the 
Regulations or resulting from action taken by the Commission under 
these Regulations. They shall facilitate the achievement of the objects of 
the Common Market. Member States shall abstain from taking any 
measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of these 
Regulations”.  
 
28. It does appear that one measure that may jeopardize the attainment of the objectives 
of the Regulations is membership to multiple RECs with conflicting obligations. 
However, in practice the challenge remains. This is because other RECS may have 
similar provisions in their enabling legislation, and it does not appear that a Member 




that countries are quick to sign regional legal instruments without appreciating the 
text and consequence of what they are committing to and they do not take stock of 
what they have already committed to in order determine any possible conflicts. This is 
seen from the astronomical pace at which countries in Africa are signing the Africa 
Continental Free Trade Area even before they fully implement their commitments 
under their respective RECs and at the Tripartite level in the case of EAC, SADC and 
COMESA. 
 
12.7     Conclusion 
 
29. This Chapter has disclosed that the fundamental challenges faced by NCAs in the 
regulation of cross-border mergers have not been resolved through the creation of a 
supra-national merger control regime. Among the main challenges is the lack of extra-
territorial application of national competition laws that cannot be effectively resolved 
by the regional competition law because the latter faces the fundamental risk of non-
recognition due to failure by most Member States to undertake the process of 
domestication. 
 
30. The next Chapter shall make synoptic comparisons between COMESA and other 
selected RECS in Africa and beyond as regards the enforcement of a regional 
competition law. Lessons to be learnt from COMESA shall be highlighted. However, 

















13.0 What does Experience in COMESA Teach us? Comparison with other Regional 
Economic Communities in Developing and Emerging Economies. 
 
1. COMESA is not the only REC composed of DEEs with a regional competition 
authority.371 Other RECs like the Economic and Monetary Community of Central 
Africa (CEMAC), the Economic Commission for West African States (ECOWAS),372 
the East African Community (EAC), the West African Economic and Monetary 
Union (WAEMU), Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) and the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM) have regional competition authorities of varying degrees of 
functionality. As a matter of fact, competition legislation in WAEMU acquired force 
of law on 1 January 2003 almost two years before the COMESA competition 
legislation was enacted. Others like the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) do not have a regional competition authority but they have within their 
statutes provisions to do with cooperation on competition matters.  
 
2. The EEC373 has regional competition mandate but restricted to anti-competitive 
business practices. It has no mandate on mergers. Therefore, since the focus of the 
dissertation is on cross-border mergers, no further reference shall be made to the EEC 
suffice to mention that the Commission can draw lessons and experiences on how 
they have resolved sovereignty issues and had their law recognised in all the five 
Member States. It should be noted nevertheless that even the EEC has not completely 
passed over these issues as can be seen from the sentiments of the Director of the 
Department of Antitrust Regulation of the EEC, Aleksey Sushkevich that:374 
 
 
371 At the time this research concluded, the COMESA Competition Commission was the most recent fully 
operational supra-national competition authority. Further, lessons can be drawn from the COMESA Competition 
Commission in that it has enforced the merger law for a relatively longer period of more than six years. 
372 The Author interviewed Dr. Sacko Seydou, the Program Officer on Competition and Informal Trade at 
ECOWAS on 4 July 2017 at the UNCTAD Intergovernmental Group of Experts in Geneva. Dr. Seydou stated 
that the ECOWAS competition authority is poised to commence operations in 2018. Sadly, the competition 
authority had not commenced operations as at 12 March 2019. 
373 Currently there are five EEC countries: The Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and the Russian Federation. Under “Settings” 
http://www.eurasiancommission.org/en/Pages/about.aspx (accessed on 12 June 2019) 




“We do face the same problem but at the lesser extent: Treaty of Eurasian 
economic union is above national constitutions, but some procedures need to 
be presupposed at national legislation in order to be implemented by the EEC 
in cooperation with national antimonopoly authorities (NAAs). Generally 
speaking, the problem of this kind can be decided mainly by administrative 
practice of NAAs and by some minor modification of national secondary 
legislation”. 
 
3. The dissertation has elucidated the issues below for discussion on what other RECs in 
DEEs can learn from COMESA. 
 
13.1 Allocation of Jurisdiction 
 
4. COMESA was the only regional economic block that had a fully functional regional 
competition authority with a mandate on mergers in DEEs at the time of writing. The 
other regional competition authorities were not yet fully functional due to a number of 
reasons among them, sovereignty matters, lack of political will, lack of financial and 
human resources, inherent lacunae in procedural and substantive law and a poor 
competition culture.  
 
5. The allocation of jurisdiction between National and supra-national competition 
authorities is a critical and fundamental factor for the success of supra-competition 
enforcement. Where national authorities are of the view that the supra-national 
authority is usurping their jurisdiction, they may be reluctant to submit to its 
jurisdiction or even oppose it. Further, such a situation may frustrate the development 
and growth of national competition enforcement. For example, the WAEMU Court of 
Justice effectively usurped the jurisdiction of national competition authorities when it 
ruled that all anti-trust cases in the region375 would be handled by WAEMU. This 
ruling resulted in thwarting of the development and growth of some competition 
authorities in the region. For instance, the competition authority of Senegal ceased to 
operate several years ago in yielding to the jurisdiction of WAEMU which has not as 
of yet created a viable alternative. As a result, Senegal lost its ability to deal with most 
 
375 See Opinion 03/2000/CJ/UEMOA. The opinion implied that even cases of pure national character should be 




of its domestic anti-competitive conduct.376 It is this complete loss of jurisdiction that 
Member States oppose.  
 
6. It should be stated that the opinion of the WAEMU Court of Justice notwithstanding, 
the Treaty of Dakar does not unequivocally grant WAEMU the sole jurisdiction on 
competition cases in the region. There should be a balancing act between the need to 
address competition concerns with regional effects and not stripping Member States 
jurisdiction to review competition cases especially those lacking regional significance. 
Cases affecting only one Member State and all those affecting more than one Member 
State but are insignificant in effect should be addressed at national level. COMESA 
has done well in this area by clearly defining what cases would be of regional 
importance and which ones would be of national character. This is done by 
establishing clear and transparent thresholds that demarcate jurisdiction to avoid 
conflict.  
 
7. The EAC Competition Authority is another regional competition authority that does 
not have a clear policy on allocation of jurisdiction and can learn from the challenges 
the Commission went through when it implemented a zero-threshold merger 
notification regime. A regional competition authority should not be seen to be 
usurping the jurisdiction of Member States if it has to be respected and accepted by 
them. 
 
13.2 Merger Filing Fees 
 
8. At the time of writing the dissertation, the EAC competition authority was still 
discussing the merger notification fees it shall be charging once implementation 
commences. It should not follow COMESA’s footsteps of charging unreasonably high 
filing fees at commencement. It risks being rejected and not taken seriously by the 
business community, a situation that may threaten its very existence. High filing fees 
may negate compliance by firms. The filing fees should to a great extent reflect the 
 
376 See e.g., Daniel P. Weik, Competition Law and Policy in Senegal: ‘A Cautionary Tale for Regional 





cost of reviewing a merger. COMESA has since reduced the merger filing fees but the 
dissertation has established that the filing fees can be reduced further.  
 
13.3 Funding and Staff Complement 
 
9. Adequate funding for a regional competition authority is a very important 
consideration. The Commission’s merger review annual budget of US$10,000 is 
inadequate. By all reasonable standards and under any conceivable situation, the 
Commission cannot review more than 46 mergers in a year as it did in 2013 with this 
budget. The conclusion from this would be that the assessment of these mergers lack 
thoroughness. Other regional competition authorities should not fall into this trap. It 
does appear that the EAC competition authority is already falling into this trap as it is 
grossly under-funded.377  
 
10. Further, a regional competition authority should have adequate staff numbers in order 
to effectively address regional mergers. It is improbable that the three staff members 
at the Commission’s merger division have done an effective job of reviewing regional 
mergers. The EAC Competition Authority can learn from this mistake. As at 28 
August 2019, the EAC Competition Authority had only one staff member to run all 
the affairs of its competition authority. This is unacceptable. The situation is the same 
at ECOWAS. The operationalisation of the ECOWAS Competition Authority has 
stalled due to administrative challenges among them lack of adequate funding and 




11. Lobby and advocacy is another very important activity other regional competition 
authorities should undertake. Before the commencement of the operations of the 
competition authority. COMESA did not do a good job on this. Most stakeholders did 
not know about the existence of the Regulations and the Commission. Even some 
 
377 The author was privileged to conduct an induction workshop for the Board of EACCA on the regulation of 
regional competition laws held on 1 – 2 February 2017, in Arusha, Tanzania. 
378 Email exchange between Dr. Sacko Seydou, the Program Officer on Competition and Informal Trade at 




Member States were not aware of this. This affected the initial acceptance and 
submission to the jurisdiction of the Commission. RECs that are yet to commence the 
regulation of cross-border mergers may consider significant advocacy programs to 
raise awareness before the authority commences operations. Advocacy may also lead 
to lobbying of governments and creation of political will and support. For example, it 
may be argued that the CEMAC competition authority379 has not punished any firm 
for any anti-trust infringement because of lack of political will and awareness to do so 
despite the law been directly applicable in the Member States. Suffice to mention that 
the Commission has repaired this shortcoming by engaging in frequent advocacy 
activities after the commencement of operations, a situation that has resulted in the 
successful operation of the Commission despite the legal bottlenecks. 
 
13.5 Effective National Competition Authorities 
 
12. Another important tenet observed is that in order to have an effective regional 
competition authority, there should be effective national competition authorities. In 
COMESA, a good number of Member States have competition authorities. However, 
only a few appear to be effective, notably, Kenya and Zambia. Effective national 
competition authorities assist regional competition authorities in the assessment of 
mergers and in the design of effective remedies since they are closer to conduct with 
cross-border effect implemented in their jurisdictions. Nevertheless, in comparison to 
some other regional competition authorities, the competition authorities/laws in 
COMESA appear to be better. For example, as regards institutional challenges, Dr. 
Kusha Haraksingh, Chairman at CARICOM Competition Commission lamented that 
“the majority of CARICOM Member States have not enacted competition laws and/or 
established national competition authorities”.380 Where there is no national 
 
379 The CEMAC Competition Regulations are binding in their entirety and are directly applicable in the Member 
States. See Article 21 of the Addendum to the CEMAC Treaty relating to the institutional and legal system of 
the Community. COMESA can learn from CEMAC by inserting a provision in the Treaty and the Regulations 
providing for Direct Applicability. The European Union legal system has similar provisions of direct 
applicability. It may not completely address the challenges of implementation in COMESA as domestication 
would still remain a challenge but it would be a step in the right direction. Notable though is that CEMAC 
appear not to have mandate on mergers. See for example African Competition Law Developments in 2018 and 
Outlook for 2019 by LEXAfrica. Under “Settings” https://www.lexafrica.com/competition-law-outlook-for-
2019/ (Accessed on 12 June 2019).  
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competition law and/or national competition authorities, then the effectiveness of the 
CARICOM Competition Commission in the Member States would be hampered 
under Article 174 of the Treaty381. This provision empowers national competition law 
to have the legal right to compel persons or institutions to provide information or 
appear to give evidence on behalf of the CARICOM Competition Commission.  
 
13.6 Corporate Governance/sound and Legitimate Institutional Framework   
 
13. There is need to ensure and safeguard the autonomy of these institutions to avoid their 
decisions being subjected to undue influence that would compromise their integrity. 
This should be done through water-tight procedural and substantive legal provisions. 
For example, in COMESA there is a clear separation of decision-making beginning 
from the Commission which investigates and makes recommendations to the 
Committee Responsible for Initial Determination (CID) created under Article 13 of 
the Regulations and Rule 24 of the COMESA Competition Rules. The decisions of 
the CID are appealable to the Board of the Commission established under Article 12 
of the Regulations. At several fora, the Commission is on record arguing that the 
decision of the Board is further appealable to the CCJ. However, the Regulations do 
not have any provision for taking matters to the CCJ in an event of any dispute 
regarding the interpretation or application of the Regulations. The Regulations appear 
to suggest that any such disputes end with the Board as an appeal from the Committee 
Responsible for Initial Determination according to Rule 24 of the COMESA 
Competition Rules lies with the Board and no further legal path is drawn for pursing 
the matter further to the CCJ. Rule 24 of the COMESA Competition Rules only 
provides that the respondent party dissatisfied with the initial determination made by 
the Committee may appeal to the full Board of Commissioners. Similarly, Article 
26(12) of the Regulations suggests so. 
 
14. This lacuna is not only worrying but has serious implications as it conflicts with the 
principles of accountability, fairness and transparency. It defeats the rule of natural 
 
CARICOM Competition Commission as a Supra-national Agency’ made at the Latin America Competition 
Forum on 3 – 4 September 2013. 
381 Revised Treaty of Chaguaramus establishing the Caribbean Community including the CARICOM Single 




justice in terms of having the right to a hearing. This has to be addressed in both the 
Treaty and the Regulations and this fact was graciously admitted by one of the CCJ 
Judges, Justice Mary Kasango.382  
 
15. In addition, it does appear that the decisions made by the CID may be defective at 
law. Article 13(4) of the Regulations provides that the Chairperson of the Board shall 
assign three of the Commissioners to be full-time members of the Board. The full-
time Commissioners shall each have suitable qualifications and experience in law and 
economics and will form the CID. From the Commission’s practice the Members of 
the CID are not permanent383. Further, the Regulations require that CID Members 
should be qualified in law and economics. However, an investigation on the 
qualifications of the members who have served on the CID revealed that not all of 
them had the required qualifications.   
 
16. Sufficiency of institutional framework is critical in the regulation of cross-border 
mergers. While the Commission has put in place sufficient measures to ensure this, 
more can be done. For example, the Council approved the COMESA Competition 
Commission Appeals Board Procedure Rules to create an avenue of appealing Board 
decisions. However, these Rules are ultravires as they are made pursuant to Article 39 
which from the reading of the law should only cover Part V of the Regulations which 
addresses consumer protection matters. Further, the Treaty, to which the Regulations 
are subservient does not provide for such matters as already observed in the earlier 
chapters of this dissertation. In addition, Article 26(12) of the Regulations appear to 
purport an avenue for third party action but this is only at Board level of the 
Commission and not beyond . Such a matter, prima facie cannot be taken to the CCJ 
as the applicants and the respondents to the CCJ under Articles 24 -28 of the Treaty 
does not include parties in such matters. There is need to amend the Treaty to 
expressly provide this avenue and prevent any latent legal dispute. Such an 
amendment would also enhance due process in the regional merger control regime.  
 
17. Therefore, new and yet to commence regional competition authorities can learn from 
COMESA and refine their laws to ensure that there is sound institutional framework 
 
382 The author engaged Justice Mary Kasango of the COMESA Court of Justice on the subject on 29 June 2016. 









18. Lastly, RECs should make sure that regional competition laws are recognised in their 
countries by processes that are provided for in domestic laws. In the absence of this, 
the regional law risks being ignored. The Regulations suffer this risk and it remains to 
be seen how Member States, the business community and other stakeholders would 
react once the Commission imposes sanctions which it has never done before possibly 
for fear of the imminent risk of challenge of jurisdiction on account of non-
domestication of the Regulations. For example, Dr. Kusha Haraksingh384 observed 
that the jurisdiction of the CARICOM Competition law needs to be respected in the 
Member States. However, some Member States like Jamaica have not enacted 
provisions in their national laws allowing for the recognition of the CARICOM 
Competition law. CARICOM may want to address this matter before they commence 
the full implementation of their regional law.   
 
13.8       Conclusion 
 
19. It may appear that COMESA was not ready for a regional competition authority as a 
number of things were not put in place by the time enforcement commenced. It may 
actually be argued that COMESA is operating illegally in most Member States as the 
Treaty is not domesticated therein and therefore not part of domestic law 
notwithstanding that under international law the Treaty is binding on the Member 
States. The effect of non-domestication of the Treaty and the Regulation on their 
practical implementation cannot be ignored. Further, the staff complement and 
funding at the Commission is inadequate to enable the Commission to effectively 
detect anti-competitive mergers of regional character and design effective remedies to 
address them. Other regional competition authorities in DEEs may learn from 
COMESA and avoid making similar mistakes. 
 
 










1. The objective of the dissertation was to conduct an assessment of whether supra-
national competition authorities addresses the challenges of cross-border regulation in 
DEEs. This was against the background that the regulation of such mergers poses 
challenges for both NCAs and the merging parties. Among the reasons why the 
Commission and the Regulations were promulgated was to resolve the identified 
challenges. The study delved into these matters and addressed the question of whether 
the creation of a supra-national merger control regime in the Common Market has 
resolved these challenges. The results of the dissertation could be extrapolated to 
other RECs in DEEs.  
 
2. The study revealed that a number of concerns and challenges remain even in the wake 
of the establishment of a supra-national merger control system. The Commission is 
critically resource challenged both financially and from a human resource point of 
view. For it to be respected and indeed reflect the true character of a regional 
competition authority, it should compare well with advanced competition authorities 
like the United States anti-trust authorities and the EC to the extent possible reflecting 
different developmental levels. In its current form, the Commission risks not to be 
taken seriously. It is difficult to imagine how the Commission would establish the 
effects of a merger transaction in the Common Market with such constrained 
resources. The Commission risks approving mergers that may have competition 
concerns or reject pro-competitive mergers and fail to address the reasons why it was 
established. 
 
3. Most of the concerns though serious may be easy to address. Concerns like high filing 
fees and others inherent in the Regulations may easily be addressed by amending the 
Regulations, action which is permissible at law as laws are living things that are not 




challenge that threatens the existence and durability of the entire COMESA merger 
regime. This is the lack of domestication of the Treaty and the Regulations. This 
threat is so serious that there is urgent need to domesticate the Treaty or at least the 
Regulations. The argument that Treaty law is binding on State parties pursuant to the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the principle of pacta sunt servanda 
while sound, remains an academic argument as this is not what pertains in reality. 
Reality is replete with cases where parties have challenged the jurisdiction of 
international law on the basis that it has not been transformed into municipal law 
especially when litigation threatens their interest. Indeed, international courts and 
tribunals would rule that international law is binding but its enforcement would be a 
challenge as domestic institutions would be required to enforce such judgments. The 
CCJ has given a neat judgment on the matter of domestication in the Polytol Paints 
& Adhesives Manufacturers Co. Ltd v. the Republic of Mauritius but it remains 
to be seen if Mauritius shall respect this judgment. To date, there is no publicly 
available information stating that Mauritius has obliged to this ruling. Interviews with 
officials from the legal division of the COMESA Secretariat reveal that a political 
route to resolve the matter was subsequently followed. Political routes are not 
satisfactory as they do not provide binding precedents.   
 
4. Lessons can be drawn from the demise of the SADC tribunal by reviewing the matters 
that led to its dissolution. It is to be recalled from Chapter Ten of the dissertation that 
the failure by Zimbabwe to respect the ruling of the SADC tribunal in the Mike 
Campbell (Pvt) Ltd. and Others v. Republic of Zimbabwe case was a coup de 
grace to its existence. As rightly observed by Laurie Nathan, “the dissolution of the 
SADC tribunal reflects SADC’s hierarchy of values in terms of which the 
organisation’s formal commitment to a regional legal order is subordinate to the 
political imperatives of regime solidarity and respect for sovereignty to regional 
institutions”.385 In this case, the other Member States instead of imposing sanctions on 
Zimbabwe for abrogating the Treaty, sided with Zimbabwe and agreed with its 
argument based on inter alia, domestication. Indeed as Laurie Nathan further 
observes, the demise of the SADC tribunal serves as a cautionary tale, demonstrating 
that the jurisdiction of regional institutions derives not simply from their official 
 
385 The Disbanding of the SADC Tribunal: A Cautionary Tale: by Laurie Nathan. Laurie Nathan is Director of 




mandates but also from the response of Member States when an international 
organisation rules against one of them.386 These risks are on all fours with the inherent 
risk that the Commission and the Regulations are facing in the wake of non-
domestication. 
 
5. It should be noted that domestication is a prerequisite in jurisdictions that observe 
dualism. In such jurisdictions, it is the Executive Branch of Government that has the 
mandate to enter and negotiate international legal instruments. Usually the Attorney 
General is heavily involved in the process in conjunction with the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and other line Ministries. Once the international instrument is ratified, it is the 
duty of the line Ministry to introduce the domestication bill for enactment to the 
legislature. However, it is exceedingly disappointing that the same Ministries who 
ratified the international legal instruments and who are presumed to understand the 
contents very well drag their feet to introduce the domestication bill to the legislature. 
In these legal systems, it is the legislative branch of government that is responsible for 
the transformation of international law into domestic law. Without this process, 
international law cannot be observed at national level. This is consistent with the 
holding of the Court in the case of Attorney General for Canada v. Attorney 
General for Ontario, (1937) A.C. 326 Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 
where Lord Atkin succinctly stated that: 
 
“If the national executive, the government of the day, decide to incur the 
obligations of a treaty which involve the alteration of law they have to run 
the risk of obtaining the assent of Parliament to the necessary statute or 
statutes”.    
 
6. The study therefore concludes that the main challenge to the effective implementation 
of the Regulations is the lack of domestication. From here some challenges faced by 
the NCAs like lack of extra-territorial reach of national law still remain on the 
premise that even the regional law may not be recognised in Member States. 
Therefore, the creation of a supra-national competition authority has not resolved 
the challenges of regulating cross-border mergers in the Common Market leading 
 
386 It should be recalled that President Robert Mugabe dismissed the Tribunal’s judgment as an exercise in 




failure to reject the null hypothesis. This result can be generalised to regional 
competition authorities whose membership is that of DEEs as their characteristics are 




7. A number of recommendations can be made in order to address the concerns 
identified in the research. However, the research focussed on recommendations that 
would be most effective for the efficient implementation of the Regulations. There 
should be amendments to the legal and administrative frameworks.  
 
14.2.1 Amend Article 3(2) of the Regulations to expressly make it clear that Merger 
Notification under the Regulations is Mandatory 
 
8. As observed, uncertainty and ambiguity are serious concerns and costly to the 
merging parties. The wording of Article 3(2) presupposes a situation where a merger 
is consummated and if it results in affecting trade between Member States and 
restricting competition in the Common Market then the jurisdiction of the Regulations 
is invoked. It does not reflect a pre-merger notification process but post-merger 
assessment where there are demonstrable anti-competitive effects resulting from the 
merger. This is in conflict with Article 24 of the Regulations which calls for 
mandatory merger notification. It is therefore recommended that the Commission 
should embark on an exercise to amend Article 3(2) of the Regulations which clothes 
it with jurisdiction. The wording of Article 3(2) should therefore read: 
 
“These Regulations apply to conduct covered by Parts 3, 4 and 5 which 
are likely to have an appreciable effect on trade between Member States 
and which are likely restrict competition in the Common Market”.  
 
14.2.2 Amend Article 23(1) to Refer to ‘Control’ and not ‘Controlling Interest’ 
 
9. It is observed that Article 23(1) of the Regulations uses the term ‘controlling interest’ 




that use the term ‘control’ to define a merger. The Guidelines have addressed this 
seemingly unusual term by defining it with reference to the term ‘control’. However, 
it would be sound to amend the law so that ‘control’ is used therein and not 
‘controlling interest’. The amendment should also ensure that the Regulations 
adequately capture Joint Ventures. Therefore, Article 23(1) may be amended to read 
as: 
 
“For the purpose of this Part, merger means the direct or indirect 
acquisition or establishment of control by one or more persons in the 
whole or part of the business of another person or the creation of a joint 
venture by two or more persons….” 
 
14.2.3 Amend Article 23(3)(a) of the Regulations to Avoid Capturing Mergers Lacking Local 
Nexus 
 
10. Article 23(3)(a) is also a troublesome provision for it may result in the capture of 
mergers lacking local nexus. Indeed, the Commission in 2013 and a greater part of 
2014 captured mergers lacking local nexus on the basis of the defective wording of 
Article 23(3)(a) which contemplates a situation where a merger would be captured 
even if the target firm has no operations in the Common Market as long as the 
acquiring firm has operations in two or more Member States. It sounds inconceivable 
that such mergers would lead to negative effects on trade between Member States and 
a restriction on competition in the Common Market. This absurdity has been remedied 
in the Guidelines and to a greater extent the Rules but such remedies are ultra vires 
Article 23(3)(a). Rules and Guidelines are subservient to the Regulations.  
 
11. Further, as already observed, even the Rules on Merger Notification Thresholds and 
Method of Calculation have not effectively addressed the problem and require 
amendment as proposed earlier in the dissertation. The wording of Rule 4 of the Rules 
on the Determination of Merger Notification Thresholds and Method of Calculation 
presupposes that it is possible to review a merger lacking nexus. For example, a 
merger involving two acquiring parties may be captured by the Regulations even if 




have met the merger notification thresholds. The Rules should have been specific that 
at least one acquiring firm and one target firm should derive a turnover or hold assets 
of US$10 million or more in the Common Market. To effectively address the concern 
of local nexus, Article 23 can be amended to read as follows: 
 
“A proposed merger shall be a ‘notifiable merger’ if:  
 
(a) the combined annual turnover or value of assets in the Common Market 
of all acquiring parties and target parties exceeds the prescribed 
threshold; and  
 
(b) the annual turnover or value of assets in the Common Market of each of 
at least one acquiring party and one target party exceeds the prescribed 
threshold, 
unless each of the parties to a merger achieves or holds more than the 
prescribed percentage of its annual turnover or value of assets in the 
Common Market within one and the same Member State”. 
 
14.2.4 Introduce an Express Provision to make the COMESA Merger Control Regime 
Suspensory to avoid the Uncertainty of whether the Regime is Suspensory or Non-
Suspensory 
 
12. The uncertainty on whether the Regulations provide for suspensory or non-suspensory 
merger review may have serious legal and financial consequences. The Regulations 
should make it express to suspend the implementation of the merger pending 
competition review by the authority. This is important as it does not put the 
Commission in an awkward position of imposing remedies as a fire fighting solution 
should the merger be found to be incompatible with the Regulations post 
implementation. This outcome happened in the merger involving Uber and Grab in 
September 2018 in Singapore. In that transaction, the parties implemented the merger 
without notifying the Singaporean Competition Authority as required by law. The 
parties were subsequently fined for failure to notify the transaction and remedies were 
imposed to address anti-competitive concerns. Officials from the Competition 
Authority of Singapore lamented that had they assessed the transaction before 
implementation, they would have rejected it but since the merger had already been 




Competition Authority of Singapore was left with no option but to impose remedies 
on which they conceded that some of them had not addressed the concerns as 
expected.387 Suspending the transaction before implementation would also help the 
parties to avoid costly processes of undoing the merger should the Commission 
demand so. Most importantly, such a system would eliminate uncertainty on both the 
Commission and the merging parties. Therefore, the Regulations under Article 24 
should introduce provisions reading as follows: 
 
“No person may implement a proposed merger, unless the proposed merger is― 
 
a) approved by the Commission; and 
b) implemented in accordance with any conditions attached to the approval. 
 
No merger carried out in the absence of authorisation from the Commission, 
shall have any legal effect, and no obligation imposed on the participating parties 
by any agreement in respect of the merger shall be legally enforceable”. 
 
14.2.5 Do away with Deadline after Triggering Event 
 
13. The Regulations should maintain the provision on the triggering event for notification. 
This is important as it prevents premature notifications which may be costly for the 
parties as well as the Commission if the proposed merger is aborted. However, the 
deadline within which to notify under Article 24(1) must be done away with for it 
practically serves no purpose especially in suspensory jurisdictions. The Commission 
has never invoked this provision for any parties that have violated it. This shows how 
it does not serve any practical purpose. Article 24(1) should therefore be completely 
removed from the Regulations especially that the dissertation has recommended for a 




387 Interview with officials from the competition authority of Singapore on 30 August 2019. It should be noted 
that reference to Singapore should be put in context. Pre-merger notification is mandatory in Singapore and 





14.2.6 Address the Confusion of Public Interest under Article 26 of the Regulations which 
makes the Consideration of Public Interest Otiose because any Merger that results in 
SPLC and Dominance is Contrary to Public Interest. 
 
14. Article 26 should be amended to eliminate the uncertainty the reference to public 
interest has brought in that provision. The public interest factors mentioned there are 
pro-competitive. It is not the traditional public interest that is known in competition 
assessment. The Regulations under Article 26(2) presents a best practice approach to 
review a merger using SLC but then has a confusing sub-article (3), which imbues 
SLC and Dominant test as part of a public interest process. It states thus:  
 
“A merger shall be contrary to public interest if the Commission is satisfied 
that the merger:  
a) has lessened substantially or is likely to lessen substantially the degree of 
competition in the Common Market or any part thereof; or  
b) has resulted, or is likely to result in, or strengthen a position of 
dominance”.  
 
15. This is a peculiar approach. Public Interest should be a completely separate process 
from SLC and Dominance determination. The Regulations should be amended to have 
a separate section for traditional public interest considerations like employment, 
saving the failing firm, enhancing the competitiveness of local firms at international 
markets etc. Such public interest considerations should be merger specific and 
predictable. It should be made clear that public interest that is in the interest of one 
Member State to the detriment of others shall not be entertained. The Commission 
may also consider coming up with public interest guidelines for clarity and uniformity 
of interpretation. 
 
14.2.7 Consider Revising the Filing Fees Downwards 
 
16. As already observed, merger filing fees should be used to cover the costs of 
investigating a merger. However, it does appear that most jurisdictions in the 




of competition authorities. This is not right as the high filing fees tend to act as a tax 
on the merging parties. Further, competition authorities’ focus should not be merger 
filing fees but the need to ensure that mergers do not have the effect of substantially 
lessening competition. Merger application should not attract such unnecessary costs 
as they raise the cost of doing business. The fees charged by the Commission are 
seemingly high capped at US$200,000. The analysis under Chapter Eleven of the 
dissertation has revealed that the merger filing fees may be revised downwards. In 
order to gain acceptance and respect by the stakeholders, the Commission should 
consider revising the filing fees downwards so that they reflect the cost of reviewing a 
merger. This will also reduce the cost of doing business in the Common Market and 
encourage investments ultimately enhancing the regional imperative agenda. 
 
14.2.8 Consider Revising the Thresholds Upwards to Capture only those Mergers with 
Regional Significance. 
 
17. While the study has revealed that the current merger notification thresholds are close 
to optimal, the Commission may also consider revising the thresholds upwards so that 
it only captures mergers of regional importance and enhance its acceptance by the 
NCAs who may have the trepidation that the Regulations usurp their jurisdiction. 
From the mergers reviewed by the Commission since inception, it is clear that a 
majority of them have not raised competition concerns, a justification to raise the 
thresholds. Further, the Rules may be revised to only consider turnover and not assets 
for determination of thresholds as it gives a better proxy of transactions likely to raise 
competition concerns.  
 
18.  The Commission may also take an active lead in Africa to promulgate merger 
notification thresholds on transactions that are likely to escape the net of a 
competition law because turnover, asset or market share thresholds are an 
inappropriate measure in such circumstances. For example, in digital markets, some 
firms may not have immediate turnover and they may be offering some of their 
services free of charge. The profits and significant turnover may not be the immediate 
objective but the creation of network effects and the critical mass required for the new 




good and significant number of users but the turnover figures may be misleading. 
Such a challenge arose in 2014, in the US$19 billion merger between Facebook and 
WhatsApp. Despite this very large transaction value, the merger escaped notification 
to the European Commission because it did not meet the notification thresholds under 
the European Merger Regulations.  
 
19. To address this problem, competition authorities especially the Federal Cartel Office 
of Germany have taken the lead in discussions and looking for the solution. In 
Germany, under new laws, merger control will be required if the value of the 
consideration for a transaction exceeds €400 million in Germany (€200 million in 
Austria) even if the companies involved do not meet the domestic revenue 
thresholds.388 It is interesting that some commentators and experts389 in the field of 
competition law have given scathing attacks on the determination of merger 
notification thresholds based on transaction value. The argument has been that a 
transaction value is not a true reflection of the economic activity of the merging 
parties as it is possible to have a merger with a huge transaction value but relatively 
low economic activity in a particular jurisdiction. The converse is also true. It does 
appear that in the digital economy, the transaction value may give a crude indication 
of the importance of a particular transaction in a particular jurisdiction. 
 
14.2.9 Increase Allocation of Resources to the Commission to make it Effective in Dealing 
with Regional Mergers. 
 
20. It is to be recalled that a check of the Commission’s budget for merger review 
disclosed that US$10,000 was budgeted in 2016, 2017 and 2018 on an annual basis. 
This budget is far from enough to facilitate the effective review of cross-borders.390 
Further, the number of staff at the Commission is indisputably low compared to what 
 
388Mergers and the digital economy; White & Case LLP. Under “Settings”, 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=e642fc40-b55d-4dfc-88d3-23620ab583c8 (accessed on 26 May 
2019). 
389 This includes the author. As a matter of fact, even in this dissertation the author has criticized transaction 
value thresholds. However, the criticism is sound as contextualized to traditional mergers. The digital market 
has presented peculiar characteristics requiring new tools. 




pertains even at national level. A workload involving the assessment of cross-border 
mergers would not be supported by three members of staff. 
 
21. To address this problem, there should be more funding and increased staff 
complement for the Mergers Division at the Commission. In order to effectively and 
efficiently review cross-border mergers, the Commission’s resources should be 
significantly increased as what is currently obtaining may not be far from joking. 
 
14.2.10 Clothe the Regulations with Express Exclusive Jurisdiction on Mergers that 
Satisfy the Regional Dimension Requirement.  
 
22. A review of the Regulations revealed that there is no express provision that provides 
the Commission with exclusive jurisdiction to review mergers with a regional 
dimension. There is a risk that Member States can still call for merger notification 
resulting in multiplicity of review processes and increased cost for the merging 
parties. This would paralyse the envisaged ‘one-stop-shop’ principle. There should be 
an express provision in the Regulations clothing them with exclusive jurisdiction on 
mergers that have a regional dimension. Lessons can be drawn from the EUMR which 
have exclusive jurisdiction on concentrations with a community dimension. 
Specifically, Article 21(3) of the EUMR provides that “no Member State shall apply 
its national legislation on competition to any concentration that has a 
Community dimension”. 
 
14.2.11 Domestication of the Treaty and the Regulations for Effective Enforcement 
 
23. Important of all, the COMESA Secretariat and the Commission should embark on a 
vigorous campaign to lobby the Member States to domesticate the Treaty and the 
Regulations. Lack of domestication threatens the very existence and operations of the 
Commission and lessons can be drawn from the experience of the SADC tribunal 
following its decision in the Mike Campbell and Others v. Republic of Zimbabwe. 
It has been observed that domestication is indispensable for the effective 
implementation of the Regulations especially in dualist legal systems. This is because 




Treaties and Case Law appear to ignore this by stating that the domestic legal order 
should not affect the enforcement of international law, this remains theoretical. 
Practice has shown that in most cases, countries do not respect such laws unless it is 
in their interest to do so. 
 
24. There are some Member States with a monist legal approach, but it appears that even 
then, practical challenges of enforcement may arise and the principles of reciprocity 
may jeopardize the effectiveness of such a system. The challenge posed by lack of 
domestication affects both the merging parties and the National Competition 
Authorities as it results in significant legal uncertainty, a very inappropriate situation 
in law. This situation may jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of the Common 
Market and indeed the Regulations. Where there is risk of enforcing the Regulations 
because of lack of domestication, it is appropriate and legally sound to conclude that 
the Regulations have not yet resolved the challenges of cross-border merger 
regulation in the Common Market. 
 
25. In conclusion, it is observed that the Commission has to do a lot to effectively enforce 
the Regulations and realise its mandate. This can be summed up in the words of 
Professor Eleanor Fox who observed that:391 
 
“So many of the competition problems in and among the COMESA Member 
States are cross-border.  The problems are bigger than any Member State.  
COMESA has a huge opportunity to see the big picture and to take action 
against conduct and mergers that hurt the community as a whole – like EU 
does. It has the opportunity to be the voice of competition for the community 
and could stand up to or be an equal with Western authorities against huge 
mega mergers that have a principal impact in Africa, that probably should be 
enjoined, and that the West always lets through. This is a big challenge that it 
doesn’t (yet) take on”. 
 
 
391 Eleanor Fox and Mor Bakhoum, Making Markets Work for Africa: Markets, Development and Competition 




26. Nevertheless, hope should not be lost as this situation is not unique to COMESA and 
other developing regional competition authorities. Developed countries particularly 
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Gross domestic product, current prices, US$ million
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Burundi 915 1,117 1,273 1,356 1,612 1,775 2,032 2,236 2,333 2,575 2,934 3,002 3,133 4,058
Comoros 363 388 404 466 533 537 544 611 596 658 684 589 620 846
DRC 10,341 11,951 14,296 16,364 19,129 18,315 20,641 24,575 27,566 32,676 35,918 38,496 41,615 26,170
Djibouti 666 709 769 848 984 1,015 1,099 1,239 1,354 1,455 1,588 1,727 1,894 1,993
Egypt 82,855 94,127 112,902 137,055 170,797 198,316 230,024 247,726 278,769 288,007 305,567 332,075 332,349 343,473
Eritrea 1,109 1,098 1,211 1,318 1,380 1,857 2,117 2,608 3,092 3,502 4,052 4,666 5,352 5,398
Ethiopia 10,142 12,408 15,283 19,701 26,839 32,464 29,917 31,958 43,134 47,656 55,512 64,683 72,523 64,223
Kenya 18,064 21,001 25,826 31,958 35,895 37,022 40,000 41,672 50,420 55,129 61,494 63,624 68,919 71,821
Libya 32,996 47,335 54,963 67,690 83,651 56,236 73,397 38,843 89,242 62,872 33,819 29,763 33,157 118,605
Madagascar 4,364 5,039 5,516 7,343 9,413 8,550 8,730 9,893 9,920 10,602 10,674 9,744 9,740 14,583
Malawi 3,476 3,656 3,998 4,431 5,321 6,195 6,957 7,984 5,981 5,432 6,055 6,407 5,492 5,346
Mauritius 6,579 6,489 6,732 7,792 9,641 8,835 9,718 11,263 11,446 11,932 12,613 11,511 11,950 15,496
Rwanda 2,091 2,584 3,151 3,826 4,863 5,380 5,774 6,492 7,316 7,623 8,010 8,277 8,406 11,050
Seychelles 839 919 1,016 1,034 967 847 970 1,018 1,060 1,315 1,349 1,359 1,405 1,399
Sudan 21,457 26,524 35,820 45,897 54,526 53,145 65,318 66,865 62,647 65,507 71,081 81,444 94,421 89,043
Swaziland 2,859 3,245 3,351 3,526 3,356 3,648 4,498 4,878 4,755 4,420 4,301 3,929 3,770 4,130
Uganda 8,285 9,603 10,851 13,497 17,279 18,579 20,212 21,108 24,790 26,135 28,522 25,112 26,195 29,059
Zambia 6,221 8,332 12,757 14,057 17,911 15,328 20,265 23,460 25,504 28,046 27,151 21,243 21,310 34,676
Zimbabwe 8,135 7,753 7,180 6,946 5,949 8,157 9,445 10,956 12,472 13,490 14,197 14,171 14,174 17,017







GDP, as % of COMESA total by country
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Burundi 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5
Comoros 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
DRC 4.7 4.5 4.5 4.2 4.1 3.8 3.7 4.4 4.2 4.9 5.2 5.3 5.5 3.0
Djibouti 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2
Egypt 37.4 35.6 35.6 35.6 36.3 41.6 41.7 44.6 42.1 43.0 44.6 46.0 43.9 40.0
Eritrea 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6
Ethiopia 4.6 4.7 4.8 5.1 5.7 6.8 5.4 5.8 6.5 7.1 8.1 9.0 9.6 7.5
Kenya 8.1 7.9 8.1 8.3 7.6 7.8 7.3 7.5 7.6 8.2 9.0 8.8 9.1 8.4
Libya 14.9 17.9 17.3 17.6 17.8 11.8 13.3 7.0 13.5 9.4 4.9 4.1 4.4 13.8
Madagascar 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.9 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.8 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.7
Malawi 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.4 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.6
Mauritius 3.0 2.5 2.1 2.0 2.1 1.9 1.8 2.0 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.8
Rwanda 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.3
Seychelles 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Sudan 9.7 10.0 11.3 11.9 11.6 11.2 11.8 12.0 9.5 9.8 10.4 11.3 12.5 10.4
Swaziland 1.3 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5
Uganda 3.7 3.6 3.4 3.5 3.7 3.9 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.9 4.2 3.5 3.5 3.4
Zambia 2.8 3.2 4.0 3.7 3.8 3.2 3.7 4.2 3.9 4.2 4.0 2.9 2.8 4.0
Zimbabwe 3.7 2.9 2.3 1.8 1.3 1.7 1.7 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.0 1.9 2.0










2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Burundi 7.5 7.5 7.6 7.8 8.0 8.2 8.4 8.6 8.8 9.0 9.2 9.4 9.6 9.9
Comoros 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
DRC 59.0 60.8 62.6 64.5 66.4 68.4 70.5 72.6 74.7 77.0 79.3 81.7 84.1 86.7
Djibouti 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0
Egypt 69.3 70.7 72.2 73.6 75.2 76.9 78.7 80.5 82.4 84.7 86.7 89.0 90.2 91.5
Eritrea 4.4 4.5 4.7 4.9 5.0 5.2 5.4 5.5 5.7 5.9 6.1 6.3 6.5 6.5
Ethiopia 73.2 75.1 77.1 79.1 80.3 81.6 82.9 84.2 85.6 87.0 88.3 89.8 91.2 97.1
Kenya 32.9 33.8 34.7 35.7 36.7 37.7 38.5 39.5 40.7 41.8 43.0 44.2 45.5 48.5
Libya 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 6.0 6.0 5.9 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.4 7.0
Madagascar 17.8 18.3 18.8 19.4 19.9 20.5 21.1 21.7 22.3 22.9 23.6 24.2 24.9 25.3
Malawi 13.4 13.7 14.0 14.4 14.8 15.3 15.7 16.2 16.6 17.1 17.6 18.1 18.6 19.2
Mauritius 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
Rwanda 8.7 8.8 9.0 9.2 9.5 9.7 10.0 10.2 10.5 10.7 11.0 11.3 11.5 11.6
Seychelles 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Sudan 34.5 35.3 36.2 37.2 38.1 39.1 40.1 32.7 35.1 36.2 37.3 38.4 39.6 38.1
Swaziland 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
Uganda 27.8 28.7 29.7 30.7 31.8 32.9 34.0 35.1 36.3 37.6 38.7 39.9 41.1 41.9
Zambia 11.7 12.0 12.4 12.7 13.1 13.5 13.9 14.3 14.8 15.2 15.7 16.2 16.7 15.7
Zimbabwe 11.7 11.8 12.0 12.0 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.5 13.1 13.4 13.8 14.1 14.5 13.7





Population, as % of COMESA total by country
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Burundi 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
Comoros 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
DRC 15.5 15.6 15.6 15.7 15.8 15.9 16.0 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.5 16.6 16.7 16.8
Djibouti 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Egypt 18.2 18.1 18.0 17.9 17.9 17.8 17.8 18.2 18.0 18.1 18.0 18.0 17.9 17.7
Eritrea 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
Ethiopia 19.2 19.2 19.2 19.2 19.1 18.9 18.8 19.0 18.7 18.5 18.4 18.2 18.1 18.8
Kenya 8.6 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 9.0 9.0 9.4
Libya 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4
Madagascar 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.8 4.8 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9
Malawi 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7
Mauritius 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Rwanda 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2
Seychelles 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sudan 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.1 9.1 9.1 7.4 7.7 7.7 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.4
Swaziland 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Uganda 7.3 7.4 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.6 7.7 7.9 7.9 8.0 8.1 8.1 8.1 8.1
Zambia 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.0
Zimbabwe 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.7
COMESA 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0






Tariff rate, MFN, weighted mean, all products (%)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Burundi 21.1 17.5 14.6 13.4 17.9 19.5 15.5 13.7 12.3 12.4 8.9 8.95
DRC 11.3 11.6 11.1 12.0 11.0 10.2
Comoros 4.9 6.4 6.4 6.5 6.7 8.2 7.7
Djibouti 26.3 27.7 17.3 17.7 17.7 17.6
Egypt, Arab Rep. 10.6 10.0 10.0 8.9 8.9 8.9 11.7 9.6 9.7 11.1 10.6 10.5 11.44
Eritrea 5.8
Ethiopia 12.0 10.1 10.4 10.3 10.5 10.0 12.2
Kenya 10.3 7.6 7.0 8.2 8.2 10.2 8.7 8.0 13.1 10.6 9.8 7.7 12.36
Libya 0.0
Madagascar 1.7 6.5 10.3 9.8 9.6 8.7 7.7 7.6 7.3 7.3 7.0 8.43
Mauritius 12.5 5.4 1.9 2.4 2.6 1.2 1.2 1.2 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.90
Malawi 20.7 8.0 9.6 8.8 8.6 7.6 7.4 9.7 7.9 8.23
Rwanda 19.1 18.1 17.4 13.9 16.3 13.8 13.9 13.7 12.6 13.0 12.82
Sudan 13.9 11.1 18.5 16.7 15.1
Swaziland 10.6 9.8 9.5 8.3 7.1 12.2 6.7 11.1 6.3 9.0 8.7 5.2 8.49
Seychelles 31.1 30.7 28.3 4.2 5.84
Uganda 6.3 12.5 10.4 11.0 11.1 12.1 11.9 10.5 11.0 10.5 7.8 8.2 7.58
Zambia 9.8 10.5 10.2 9.1 9.3 8.7 7.8 8.5 8.4 8.6 9.00
Zimbabwe 12.7 16.7 13.4 14.6 11.9 10.62


















Total Exports as % age of COMESA GDP 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Burundi 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Comoros 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Congo DR 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.6
Djibouti 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1
Egypt 3.5 4.0 5.0 4.2 5.6 4.9 4.8 5.5 4.4 4.3 4.0 3.0 3.0
Eritrea 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0
Ethiopia 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.3
Kenya 1.3 1.4 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.8
Libya 8.3 10.3 10.6 9.1 10.9 6.2 8.0 3.0 7.9 5.7 1.3 1.2 1.1
Madagascar 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3
Malawi 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1
Mauritius 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4
Rwanda 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Seychelles 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Sudan 1.0 1.3 1.8 0.3 2.0 1.9 2.1 1.6 0.5 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.5
Swaziland 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2
Uganda 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4
Zambia 0.7 0.7 1.2 1.2 1.1 0.9 1.3 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.3 1.0 0.9
Zimbabwe 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.9 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4
COMESA 19.2 21.1 23.0 19.7 24.0 17.9 20.9 17.4 18.9 17.4 12.4 9.4 9.3




Imports as % age of COMESA GDP 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Burundi 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Comoros 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Congo DR 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 0.8 0.7
Djibouti 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.4
Egypt 5.3 7.5 7.1 7.0 11.2 9.4 9.6 10.6 9.7 9.2 10.8 9.6 9.4
Eritrea 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
Ethiopia 0.6 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.8 1.7 2.4 2.4 2.3
Kenya 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.7 2.7 2.4 2.2 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.0 1.9
Libya 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.9 3.6 3.9 3.9 1.4 3.5 4.0 2.6 1.6 1.3
Madagascar 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.4
Malawi 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3
Mauritius 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.6
Rwanda 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2
Seychelles 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
Sudan 1.7 2.6 2.8 2.2 3.1 1.8 2.2 1.7 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.4
Swaziland 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Uganda 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.7
Zambia 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 0.8 0.9 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.0
Zimbabwe 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.9 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.5 1.0 1.2 0.9 0.8 0.7
COMESA 19.9 23.6 22.7 23.0 29.0 24.9 25.7 26.0 25.6 25.9 26.6 23.2 21.8




Intra-COMESA Trade, 2016, Values in US$ millions and % Shares
Rank Exporter Value % Share Importer Value % Share
1 Egypt 1,757.40 21.9 Zambia 1,510.40 18.8
2 Kenya 1,516.40 18.9 Congo DR 1,021.90 12.7
3 Congo DR 904.6 11.3 Sudan 874.9 10.9
4 Zambia 873.8 10.9 Kenya 685.5 8.5
5 Sudan 814.9 10.1 Egypt 643.8 8
6 Uganda 801.5 10 Libya 616.1 7.7
7 Rwanda 354.5 4.4 Uganda 580.6 7.2
8 Mauritius 229.9 2.9 Zimbabwe 364 4.5
9 Swaziland 156.5 1.9 Rwanda 361.9 4.5
10 Malawi 153.6 1.9 Ethiopia 316.3 3.9
11 Ethiopia 124.6 1.6 Malawi 280.2 3.5
12 Libya 91.9 1.1 Mauritius 201 2.5
13 Zimbabwe 89 1.1 Madagascar 174.7 2.2
14 Madagascar 77.4 1 Djibouti 135.9 1.7
15 Burundi 44 0.5 Eritrea 96.9 1.2
16 Djibouti 18.1 0.2 Burundi 82 1
17 Seychelles 11.1 0.1 Seychelles 48.3 0.6
18 Comoros 7.4 0.1 Swaziland 13.6 0.2
19 Eritrea 3 0 Comoros 10.5 0.1
Total 8,029.70 100 Total 8,018.40 100
Source: COMSTAT database
 
